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A13STRACT 
Despite its significance for industrial economics, utility 
regulation and competition policy, the measurement of the 
economic profitability of a firm remains a relatively under- 
researched area. The difference between the Accounting Rate of 
Return (ARR), measured on a net replacement cost or current 
cost basis, and a firm's estimated risk adjusted cost of 
capital is favoured by many economic researchers and is widely 
employed in utility regulation, but strong claims have been 
made for Tobin's q (q - the ratio of the market value of a 
firm's securities to the cost of replicating the firm, often 
identified with the net replacement cost of its net assets). 
Both measures have shortcomings. Davis and Kay have drawn 
attention to, but have failed to fully explain, a bias in ARR 
when firms buy in goods and services. Bias in q due to the 
omission of hidden capital can be significant. 
In this paper, economic profitability is identified with a 
firm's input-output ratio expressed in present value terms, 
and with the internal rate of return on a firm's expenditure 
in the accounting year, both revenue and capital. In the case 
of ex Post profitability, the last two measures are shown to 
be equivalent. Departures from the form of these ideal 
measures explains the biases in both ARR and q. 
Employing the Capital Asset Pricing Model, two alternative, 
operational measures of a firm's economic profitability are 
derived from the ideal measures with a view to eliminating the 
biases in q and ARR. The ex post measure is called here the 
Return on Total Capital Employed (ROTCE) and the ex ante 
measure is called here modified Tobin's q (modq). 
ROTCE is appraised using data from a simple corporate model. 
modq is appraised using data extracted from the accounts of 
companies comprising the Buildings Materials and Food 
Manufacturing sectors of the FTA All Share Index. In this 
study, I/modq and 1/q are shown to be significantly correlated 
at the 95t confidence level, and some 45k of the difference 
between them can be associated with taxation effects. 
Associating market power with the product of Beta and the 
Return on Sales, 1/modq is found to be significantly related 
at the 95t confidence level with market power and wages 
deflated by market value. 
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MEASURING THE ECONOMIC 
PROFITABILITY OF A FIRM 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Area of Research 
Although much research effort has been expended on 
investigating the relationship between a firm's 'economic 
profitability', its structure and the characteristics of its 
product-markets, much less attention has been paid to what is 
meant by economic profitability, and how it can be measured. 
According to Scherer (1984), further progress in understanding 
these micro-economic issues is unlikely until there has been 
significant progress in the measurement of economic 
profitability at the firm level. This, according to Scherer, 
is a situation that frequently arises in scientific research - 
Kepler could not, for example, have postulated the Laws of 
Motion without Tycho Brahe's improved observational data. This 
paper is addressed to meeting this need. 
The need for better measures of economic profitability is not, 
however, confined to econometrics. Utility regulators and 
competition authorities also need to know how it should be 
measured if economic resources are to allocated optimally 
within an economy. 
There have been a number of significant developments since 
Scherer drew attention to the problem. There is now a greater 
understanding of the theoretical links between the Accounting 
Rate of Return (ARR) and the internal rate of return, both at 
the level of investment in the firm as a whole and in terms of 
the internal rate of return on the firm's own investments. 
Notwithstanding these advances, there is a growing practice 
amongst econometricians to abandon ARR and other ex post 
measures of a firm's economic profitability and to employ 
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instead an ex ante measure, Tobin, s q. q' is the ratio of the 
market value of a firm ascribed to it by security markets to 
its replication cost, ie the cost. -of re-creating the firm. 
Tobin (1969) conceived this ratio as a macro-economic measure 
of the divergence between the demand and supply prices of 
capital goods which would determine the rate of investment in 
an economy, powerful forces tending to restore the ratio to 
unity whenever it moved above or below that level. Lindenberg 
and Ross (1981), however, saw q as an ex-ante measure of the 
profitability of an individual firm. Strong claims about the 
advantages of q as a profitability measure have been made, but 
many of these claims have not been examined in detail and 
alternative ways of estimating q have not been explored. 
Subsequently, many economic researchers have employed q to 
analyse profitability at the firm level, but there has been 
little research of q itself and there is little common 
framework for q and ex post rate of return measures. 
1.2 A Brief Outline of the Research Undertaken 
In Chapter 2 the question of what exactly is meant by 
, economic profitability, is addressed. Using input-output 
ratios expressed in present value terms one ex ante measure 
and one ex post measure is derived. A further ex post measure, 
related to the first, is derived using the risk adjusted 
internal rate of return. The review of relevant literature in 
Chapter 3 reveals that, whilst q is a powerful measure of 
corporate profitability, it is not without shortcomings. In 
particular, it depends crucially on an assumption that capital 
markets are efficient, a matter on which there is not 
universal agreement; it is more susceptible to the-omission of 
intangible assets or 'hidden capital' from its denominator 
than is ARR; and it is distorted by taxation effects. The 
review of the literature also indicates, however, that there 
are shortcomings in ex post rate of return measures of 
economic profitability. In particular, Davis and Kay have 
identified an unexplained bias in ARR associated with the 
extent to which firms buy in goods and services. 
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In Chapter 4 the bias in ARR identified by taVis and Kay is 
examined. An alternative to ARR is derived from the 
theoretical measure of ex post profitability identified in 
Chapter 2. This measure, called here the Return on Total 
Capital Employed (ROTCE), is applied to a simple corporate 
model where it indicates that the bias in ARR and other ex 
post measures can be significant. 
In Chapter 5 an alternative to q is derived from the 
theoretical measure of ex ante profitability identified in 
Chapter 2. This measure, called here 'modified Tobin's q1, or 
Imodq 12, is intended to reduce the bias in q due to the 
omission of hidden capital and to taxation effects. Like q, it 
can be estimated from information in current cost accounts. 
modq is essentially derived by replacing the firm's capital 
employed forming the denominator of q with an estimate derived 
by combining the Dividend Growth Model (DGM) and the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of whether modq can be adapted to eliminate any 
bias due to capital market inefficiency. 
Whilst ROTCE could be appraised by examining synthetic data 
provided by a simple corporate model, modq, with its 
dependence on market values, is evaluated using real data. 
This exercise, which is far from straightforward, is dealt 
with in Chapters 6,7 and 8. If an absolutely reliable ex ante 
measure of a firm's economic profitability existed, modq could 
be appraised simply by comparing it with this measure. No such 
measure exists. q has, however, theoretical strengths and 
weaknesses that can be identified. Two tests are therefore 
devised in Chapter 6 to ascertain whether modq relates to q in 
the way predicted by the analysis: 
Test 1 
Is modq positively correlated with q? 
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Test 2 
Is the difference between modq and q related to hidden 
capital and taxation effects which q ignores? 
Both tests are constructed as tests of a null hypothesis. In 
Test 1 the null hypothesis is that modq is unrelated to the 
firm's profitability as measured by q, ie it is worthless as a 
profitability measure. In Test 2 the null hypothesis is that 
the difference between modq and q is unrelated to the biases 
in q that modq should eliminate, ie modq is nothing more than 
a noisy estimate of q and adds nothing by way of information. 
A third test of modq is also undertaken which is independent 
of the properties of q. This is 
Test 3 
Does modq give an indication of profitability that is 
consistent with a simple economic model in which supra- 
normal profits are due to market power and its 
appropriation by labour? 
This test too was constructed as a test of a null hypothesis. 
In this case the null hypothesis was that modq fails to 
indicate levels of profitability consistent with the model. 
Each of the tests was successful in that the null hypotheses 
were rejected at the 95t confidence level. It is, however, 
emphasised in the paper that such tests cannot 'prove' that 
modq is a reliable profitability measure. They represent no 
more than initial tests to establish whether modq is 
fundamentally flawed. 
The difficult problems of estimating the independent variables 
needed to perform these tests are dealt with in Chapter 7. In 
order to undertake Test 3, a novel way of estimating a firm's 
market power is devised which might have applications in other 
econometric research. 
4 
The paper concludes at Chapter 9 with suggestions for further 
research. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 
1. The widely followed convention of referring to q, rather 
than Q, even when beginning a sentence, is followed in this 
paper. 
2. To maintain consistency with q (see note 1), this paper 
follows the convention of referring to modq, never Modq. 
6 
CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMIC PROFITABILITY 
Measures of economic profitability that can, in practice, be 
directly observed or estimated can be considered to be proxies 
for ideal measures that cannot necessarily be directly observed 
or estimated. In this chapter two ideal measures are specified 
against which the practical measures described in later chapters 
can be compared and the nature of any divergence or 'accounting 
bias, inherent in the practical measures identified. 
In the analysis which follows, Hicks's concept of economic profit 
is shown to be of limited use in specifying a firm's economic 
profitability'. When, however, the firm's replication cost is 
employed, both the input-output ratio employing present values 
and the internal rate of return can be used to specify ideal 
measures and the accounting bias in practical measures. 
2.1 Hicksian Profit 
According to Hicks (1946) ,a company, s economic prof it f or a year 
is 
, the maximum value which the company can distribute during 
the year, and still expect to be as well off at the end of 
the year as it was at the beginning'. 
This definition depends on what is meant by 'well off I. Edwards, 
Kay and Mayer (1987) describe the almost universal acceptance in 
the academic literature that the extent to which firms or 
individuals are well of f is described by the present value of 
future benefits accruing to them. The distributions made by a 
company can only be provided by the internal cash f low generated 
by the business or by new capital. Recognising these two 
principles, Sandilands (1975), drawing to work by Bonbright 
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(1937) and others, defined economic profit as 
"the discounted net present value of all future net cash 
f lows at the end of the year, less the discounted net 
present value of the future net cash flows at the beginning 
of the year, plus the net cash flow arising within the year 
after making adjustments for the introduction of new 
capital during the year'. 
This definition does not mention whether the perspective is ex 
ante or ex post. The ex ante perspective is no later than the 
start of the financial year. The ex post perspective is no 
earlier than the end of the financial year, at which time the 
expectations about cash flows arising in the year have 
crystallised. Hicksian profit can accommodate either perspective 
by associating the present values with the expected present 
values at, respectively, the start and end of the current 
accounting period. 
The definition of economic profit proposed by Sandilands does not 
easily relate to a concept of economic profitability. Two 
approaches are possible. The first, sometimes followed in the 
literature of industrial economics, is simply to express the 
Hicksian economic profit as a percentage of some functionally 
appropriate measure which reflects the scale of the firm. Thus, 
for example, Sawyer (1981) asserts that a firm's sales is the 
most suitable deflator when the profitability measure is required 
for profit maximisation models, and capital employed is the most 
suitable deflator for decisions on market entry. Edwards, Kay and 
Mayer (1987) adopt a similar functional approach, describing 
economic profitability as the appropriate measure of economic 
prof it f or answering practical questions about investment and 
disinvestment, market entry and exit etc over af inite period of 
time. A functional approach can, however, provide neither insight 
into what is meant by profitability nor a framework for further 
analysis. It is based on an insufficiently rigorous definition 
of what is meant by economic profitability and is rejected in 
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this paper. The second approach which overcomes these objections 
involves incorporating Hicksian profit into an input output- 
ratio. This and other ways of constructing input-output ratios 
are described below. 
2.2 Problems with Using Hicksian Profit to Specify an Ideal 
Measure of Economic Profitabilit 
when a firm's inputs in a particular period and the 'resulting' 
outputs, ie the outputs causally linked with these inputs, are 
both expressed in terms of their present values at the start of 
the period, the ratio of the two present values is an input- 
output ratio that provides an ideal measure of the firm's 
economic profitability. When the outputs are sold in markets 
without barriers to entry and the inputs are created with factors 
of production whose replacement cost reflects their ordinary 
Ricardian rent, the input-output ratio equals 1. When there are 
barriers to entry, other conditions remaining unchanged, the 
extent to which the input-output ratio exceeds 1 reflects the 
present value attributable to the firm's market power divided by 
the present value of its inputs. Gains accruing to a firm as a 
result of its market power are termed in this paper "supra-normal 
profits". 
If Hicksian profit itself corresponded to a present value at the 
start of the year, the present value of a firm's outputs could 
be deemed to comprise the Hicksian prof it and the discounted net 
present value of the future net cash flows at the end of the 
year. The causally linked inputs would then be the discounted net 
present value of the future net cash flows at the beginning of 
the year. From an ex ante perspective, Hicksian economic 
profitability, EPHI might be defined as: 
EPH= 
H +E7.1 [pvo (X, ) 
E7.0 [pvo (X, ) 1 
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where: H is Hicksian profit; 
Xi is the net cash flow arising in the year i, after making 
adjustments for the introduction of new capital in the 
year; and 
PVO,,, (. ) is the present value operator at time t=O based 
on expectations at time t=O. 
Hicksian profit is not, however, expressed in present value terms 
at a single time. According to Sandilands's definition', 
Hicksian profit in period 1 from an ex ante perspective is: 
H= E7.1 [PVo (Xi) 1 -E-j-. o [PVO, 0 (X, ) 1 +PVO, 0 (X, ) 
This is a mixture of present values at times at the beginning and 
end of the year. If the definition is re-stated in terms of 
present values at the beginning of the year, this results in EP, 
equal to zero in all situations. If H is considered to arise at 
the end of the year, and substituting PVO, O(. ) for PV,,, (. ) using 
the relationship 
PVJIO(. ) = (I+Z)PVO, O(. ) 
results in EP, in all situations equal to 1+r, where r is the 
firm's expected cost of capital. The results from an ex post 
perspective introduce the effect of changed expectations in the 
year but are otherwise no more meaningful. It is therefore 
concluded that EP, cannot readily be adapted to become a 
meaningful measure of economic profitability. If the input-output 
ratio concept is to be retained, alternative ways of specifying 
a firm's inputs and outputs are required. 
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2.3 Using the Present Values of Cash Flows in Input-OutT)ut 
Ratios to Specify Ideal Measures of Economic Profitability 
In the analysis which follows, the present values of the cash 
flows generated by a firm are used in input-output ratios to 
specify ideal measures of economic profitability. As in the 
preceding analysis, af irm, s cash f lows can be viewed f rom either 
an ex ante or an ex post perspective. 
2.31 Economic Profitability from an Ex Ante Perspective 
Consider the ex ante perspective. Assuming that positive net 
present values accrue only to the shareholders and providers of 
loan capital Ue there are no other stakeholders) ,a firm, s 
outputs in a particular period are the expected present value of 
dividends and interest on loan capital, net of any capital 
adjustments, expected in the period and the present value the 
owners would expect to realise at the end of the period. 
Abstracting from the opportunity cost associated with the 
commitment to sunk investment hypothesised by Pindyck (1988), 
inputs would then correspond to the replication cost of the firm 
for the providers of capital at the start of the period, ie the 
notional cost of replicating their entire interest in the 
business in its existing state and potential, including the cost 
of reproducing the internal organisation and external 
relationships. Thus, abstracting from capital adjustments, the 
ex ante economic profitability in the forthcoming period 
commencing at t=O and ending at t=t, is EP,, tl, where: 
Epi, ti ý- 
PV, (Div(t1»+PV, (lnt: (t1» +PV, (, NRVOt:, ) (4) 
PVO, 0 (Co) 
where: CO is the cost to the providers of capital of replicating 
their interest in the firm at time t.; 
Div (t,. ) is the dividend paid in the period ending t,; 
Int (tj) is the interest on loan capital paid in the period 
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ending tj; 
NRVOt, is the present value the owners could realise from 
their investment at time tj; and 
PVO, O (. ) is the present value operator at time t=O 
employing expectations at t=O. 
PVO, O (NRVOtj) cannot readily be estimated, 
but can be eliminated 
by assuming that 
Limi tt: l-- PVO, 0 (IVRVOrl) =0 
so that 
E- Limi ttl-- EPj, c2 - d,., 
[PVO, O(Divi) +PVO, o 
(Inti) 
PVO, 0 (CO) 
where: Divi is the dividend in year i; and 
Inti is the interest paid in year i. 
The limit of EP,, t,, as t, goes to infinity represents the firm's 
anticipared input output ratio over all future Periods. Referring 
to this as EPj, it represents an ideal measure of economic 
profitability. Thus 
Eý. 
1 [PVO, (DI v, 
) +PV , (In t:. ) EP, =1 (7) PVO, 0 (Co) 
one aspect of EP, that is worthy of note is the meaning of 
PV,,,, (C,, ) and the implication this has for PV(),, )(Divi) and 
PVO, O (Inti) . PVO, O (CO) is the notional cost, in expected present 
cost terms, of replicating the entire business in its existing 
state and potential. The costs incurred are those born by the 
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providers of equity and loan capital. It is -worth considering 
what these costs comprise. They include not only the cost of 
acquiring and assembling the land, buildings, machinery and other 
assets of the business and the cost of reproducing the internal 
organisation and external relationships, but also the cost that 
such investment might have proved unsuccessful. Consideration of 
prior expectations indicates that 
Pvo, 0 
(Co) = Pvo, 0 (Co, 
) +P 
(F) 
COS 
1 -P (F) 
where: Col is the cost of assembling the f irm; 
Coll is the sunk cost when assembling the firm; and 
P(F) is the probability of failure when assembling the 
f irm. 
The discount rates applied to arrive at PVO, O(Divi) and PVO, O (Intl. ) 
are then the rates which reflect the risks arising after t=0. 
2.32 Economic Profitability from an Ex Post Perspective 
From the ex post perspective, a firm's outputs in a particular 
year can be identified as the sales receipts in cash terms in 
that year and the terminal value of the firm at the end of the 
year. The appropriate terminal value is the opportunity cost of 
the f irml s investment at the end of the year 2. In a going 
concern this opportunity cost can be represented by the cost to 
the firm of replicating itself at the end of the year, ie the 
notional cost of recreating the entire business in its existing 
state, including the internal organisation and external 
relationships. Abstracting again from the opportunity cost 
associated with sunk investment, the corresponding input is the 
cost to the owners of replicating the firm at the start of the 
year and the expenditure incurred in the year. Thus, assuming 
that a firm's operational cash flows in the year, X, comprise 
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X= S-E-BI (8) 
where: S is sales receipts in the year; 
E is the fixed expenditure in cash terms in the year, ie 
that part of firm's operational disbursements that does 
not vary with demand; and 
BI is the variable (or bought in) expenditure in cash 
terms in the year, defined as that expenditure which 
varies directly with demand' 
EP2, the input-output ratio employing present values which 
expresses the ex post economic profitability in a particular 
year, is 
EP2 = 
PVO,, (S) +PVO, I(Kl) 
PVO,, (KO) +PVO,, (E) +PVO,, (BI) 
(9) 
where: KO is the expenditure that would be incurred by the firm 
to replicate itself at the start of the year; and 
is the replication cost at the end of the year. 
Assuming capital markets are efficient, KO has the same meaning 
as C. in the preceding section, except that it ref ers to the 
costs that the firm would incur rather than the costs the 
providers of equity and loan capital would incur to replicate the 
firm. As argued in later chapters, the only differences between 
K. and CO are, in effect, those due to taxation. 
PVo,,. (. ) represents the present value operator at time 0 based on 
expectations at time 1, but a small modification is needed before 
this can be applied in an ex post perspective. An ex post risk 
adjusted cost of capital is a tautology, as from the ex post 
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perspective, the risks will have crystallised. 'Thus, whilst other 
information at time t=1 may be used, the discount factors 
employed to arrive at present -. values should be the rates 
anticipated for the year at the start of the year. This ensures 
that, in a competitive market without barriers to entry at the 
start of the year, EP2 =1 and supra-normal profitability is 
identified with EP2_1' 
2.4 The Internal Rate of Return 
An alternative approach to defining economic profitability in 
terms of an input-output ratio is provided by the difference 
between the internal rate of return on an investment in a year 
and its expected opportunity cost of capital, r, in that year. 
Solomon (1963) defined the internal rate of return as 
"the rate at which the incremental cash benefits... (from an 
investment] ... have a discounted present value which is 
exactly equal to the discounted present value of all 
incremental outlays'. 
Internal rate of return has, according to Merret and Sykes 
(1973), an impressive economic pedigree with Fisher and Keynes 
amongst its exponents. It is, however, subject to two inherent 
weaknesses: 
i. the problem of multiple solutions -if negative benefits 
arise, the definition above may not result in a unique rate 
of return ; and 
ii. the problem of ranking mutually exclusive investments - 
the order indicated is not necessarily the same as that 
indicated by the NPV. 
As explained below, neither of these weaknesses represent a 
problem when the risk adjusted internal rate of return is 
employed to define the economic profitability of a firm. 
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Assuming a single cash flow X arising in a' year, continuous 
interest rates and an ex ante perspective, the internal rate of 
return is, according to Solomon's definition, the solution IRR 
to the equation: 
PVo 
Io 
(Inv) = fo 
1X. e --rRR- I dt 
where: Inv is the cash outlay, including the original investment 
at time t=0 and any outlays in the year; and 
X is the cash benefit, or non-investment cash flow. 
Where there are several cash f lows in the year, Xj, each with the 
same perceived level of risk, the internal rate of return is 
simply 
f Xi. e --rRR*l dt 0 PVO, 0 (Inv) =E1 1 
Brealey and Myers (1984, page 78) point out that, where the non- 
investment cash flows Xi do not share a common perceived level of 
risk, the above definition of internal rate of return results in 
a complex average of different rates associated with each cash 
f low. In consequence, the internal rate of return does not 
correspond to the cost of capital associated with the investment 
in its entirety. To achieve this it is necessary to specify a 
risk adjusted internal rate of return. 
From the ex ante perspective, each investment cash f low has 
associated with it a present value, PVO, O (XI. ) corresponding to 
16 
PVO, 0 (Xi) : -- 
fo 1 X., e-II-t clt: 
where ri is the expected cost of capital or discount rate 
specific to Xj; 
Thus each investment cash flow has associated with it an amount 
receivable one year hence, RAE (Xi) , which has the same level of 
risk as the investment as a whole, equal to 
RAE (X1) =e -" PVO, 0 (X, 
) (13) 
where r is the expected cost of capital or discount rate 
of the entire investment. 
The risk adjusted internal rate of return, RAIRR, is the internal 
rate of return on this amount', ie it is the solution to the 
equation: 
PVO, 0 (Inv) =E (14) ,, PME 
(X, ) e -RA-rRR 
Therefore the risk adjusted internal rate of return is the 
solution RAIRR to 
PVO, 0 (Inv) =e I-IIII(E PVO, 0 (Xi) (15) .k di 
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The profitability of the investment is indicated by its excess 
return above its opportunity cost of capital, RAIRR-r. 
Adopting an ex post perspective, the risk adjusted internal rate 
of return on an investment is the solution RAIRR to the equation 
PVo, i (Inv) = e-r-PAIP-"(E, PVO, 1 (Xi) 
) 
As with the ex post input-output ratio, the present value 
operator, PVO,, (. ) must be modified to employ the anticipated 
discount rates at the start of the year rather than the ex-post 
rates, assuming these could be defined. The risk adjusted 
internal rate of return can then be compared with the anticipated 
cost of capital at the start of the year. 
The ex post risk adjusted internal rate of return may be applied 
to measuring the economic profitability of a firm in two ways: 
a. by analysing af irm, s cash f lows into discrete packets 
corresponding to particular investments and the returns 
thereon; and 
b. by considering a firm's operating cash flows in a single 
year to represent a single investment and the returns thereon 
in that year. 
The identification of project-level internal rate of return with 
a firm's economic profitability is an approach associated with 
Salamon (1973) and is discussed in the next chapter. The second 
approach is applied below to arrive at EP3 Ithe third ideal 
measure of a firm's economic profitability. 
In the context of a firm's operating cash flows in a year, the 
Investment, Inv, is represented by K., the replication cost (to 
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the firm) of the business at the start of the a`ccounting year, 
and the operating expenditure, E+BI disbursed in the year 5. Non- 
investment cash flow Xi comprises the sales receipts in the year, 
S, and the terminal value represented by the firm's replication 
cost at the end of the year, K1. The discount rates, ri, 
correspond to the discount rate, r., associated with sales 
receipts6 and the discount rate, rk, associated with the terminal 
value. Thus the risk adjusted internal rate of return on the 
firm's annual operating cash flows is the solution, RAIRR, to the 
equation: 
PVO, I(Ko)+PVO, I(E)+PVO. I(BI) - ex-JýA-r"(PVO,,, (S)+PVO,,, (KI. )) 
where: r. is the discount rate specific to sales receipts; and 
rk is the discount rate specific to the terminal value. 
The firm's risk adjusted internal rate of return as defined above 
may be compared with the firm's risk adjusted cost of capital 
anticipated at the start of the year, r. This can be estimated 
in a number of ways, eg using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), the Dividend Growth Model (DGM), or by comparison with 
the known cost of capital of another firm. When the firm's sales 
are made in markets without barriers to entry and its investment 
is made with factors of production whose replacement cost 
reflects their ordinary Ricardian rent, RAIRR = r. Assuming the 
latter condition holds, RAIRR-r reflects the excess return 
attributable to market power. This is referred to in this paper 
as the rate of I'supra-normal profitability". RAIRR-r is the 
third ideal measure of economic profitability and is identified 
as EP3. Thus, rearranging equation 17, EP3 is defined as: 
EP, - RAIRR-r - log 
PVO, 1 (S) +PVO, 1 (KI) (18) 
( 
PVC (4) +PVO, 1 (E) +PVO, 1. (F1-) 
) 
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where log is the natural logarithm. 
Comparing equations 9 and 18 
EP3 = 10 9 (EP2) 
Thus the difference between the firm's risk adjusted internal 
rate of return and its cost of capital, EP3. is equal to the log 
of its input output ratio, EP2. This provides a measure of 
corroboration' for the preceding analysis. 
As mentioned above, the internal rate of return suf f ers f rom two 
inherent weaknesses: multiple solutions and f ailure to rank 
mutually exclusive investments according to NPV. Neither of these 
weaknesses is a problem f or EP3 as multiple solutions do not 
arise with typical corporate cash f lows" and the practical 
applications to which measures of economic profitability are put 
(competition policy, utility regulation and economic research) 
do not generally concern choosing between mutually exclusive 
investment opportunities. 
2.5 Defininq Accountinq Bias 
EP1, EP, and EP3 represent ideal forms of economic profitability. 
As such, they provide bench marks for defining what is meant by 
the 'accounting bias, in more practical measures. 
A practical measure of economic profitability, MOEP, would be 
unbiased if 
MOEP = EP, +e- (20) 
where: EPj is EPj, EP2 or EP3 as appropriate; and 
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e- is an error term with zero mean. 
The bias in a hypothetical measure of economic profitability is 
therefore identified with the systematic difference between the 
measure and the appropriate theoretical measure. It can be 
expressed in percentage terms as 
MOEP -EPi 
EPi 
(21) 
Accounting bias can also be demonstrated when there exists a 
variable w such that 
d (EPj) 0 dw 
d 
-j7- (MOEP) 0 
W 
(22) 
It may not be necessary to observe EPj before assuming that 
d/dw(EPj) = 0. For example, if w were the proportion of the 
firm's directors who had red hair, it would be reasonable to 
assume that d/dw(EP) = 0. In consequence, a finding that 
d/dw(MOEP) #0 could be sufficient to indicate accounting bias. 
Finally, ' whilst EPj may not be observable, proxies may exist 
which would enable the accounting bias in practical measures to 
be assessed. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 
1. Strictly, the Sandilands's definition does. not require cash 
flow in the year and any new capital introduced in the year to 
be stated in present value terms, but this is taken to be a 
simplification which is ignored below. 
2. It is quite logical to associate the terminal value of an 
asset with its opportunity cost as this is, by definition, the 
revenue it would generate in the best alternative use. 
3. The division of expenditure into fixed and variable elements 
and the assumption that all expenditure can be classified in this 
way is to facilitate analysis in later chapters and does not 
effect the principles expounded in this chapter. 
4. As the risk adjusted internal rate of return is an annual 
return, not a variable that varies throughout the year, it is not 
the solution R to the equation 
if 
1 RAE (X, ) e -R. t dt PVO, o (Inv) =E0 I 
5. See footnote 2 above. 
6. Assuming, of course that individual sales receipts, Si, are 
all of the same degree of risk. 
7. Further corroboration is provided by an alternative derivation 
of EP3 which links the measure with the weighted average risk 
adjusted internal rate of return on separate investments. In the 
simplest case, the firm can be considered to comprise two 
activities: 
i. a manufacturing activity with a risk adjusted internal rate 
of return R1, being the solution to the equation 
PVO,, (KO) +PVO,, (E) = [PVO,, (Sl) +PVO,, (Kl)le r-R, 
ii. a trading activity with an internal rate of return R2, 
being the solution to the equation 
PVO, 1 
(131) = PVO, 1 (S2) .e 
r-R. 
Assuming customers are indifferent to whether the product they 
buy is manufactured internally or bought in, the exponential of 
F'P3 is equal to the simple weighted average of e R1 and eP2, 
weighted in proportion to the present value of each investment. 
8. Provided both sales receipts and the terminal value are 
positive. A necessary condition for multiple solutions is, as 
Merret and Sykes (1973) point out, that the sum of the cash flows 
from any point in time must be negative. 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Literature relevant to the use of Tobin's q as a measure of 
the economic profitability of a firm is widely scattered. This 
chapter commences with a review of the small body of 
literature dealing q as a profitability measure, and the 
somewhat larger body where q is employed as a profitability 
measure rather than forming the subject of the research 
itself. Next, the literature on the following five topics is 
reviewed: 
3.4. The Fundamental Model of share value; 
3.5 A firm's capital and the valuation of tangible 
assets; 
3.6. Intangible assets and Hidden Capital; 
3.7 The influence of taxation on q; and 
3.8 The relationship between Beta and market power. 
These topics are critical to the use of q as a measure of a 
firm's economic profitability, but there is often little or no 
reference to q itself in this literature. 
The literature on ex post measures of a firm's economic 
profitability is more concentrated. This chapter concludes 
with a review of the literature on these measures. 
With the exception of a particularly important paper published 
in 1990 by Kay and Davis and described in 3.92 and 3.94, the 
literature reviewed includes publications up to the end of 
1989. Important literature published after this date is 
briefly surveyed at the end of the chapter. 
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3.1 Tobin's cr as a Measure of a Firm's Economic 
Profitabilitv 
Tobin (1969) conceived the q ratio as a macro-economic measure 
of the divergence between the demand and supply prices of 
capital goods. In this formulation, the numerator comprises 
the market price of capital goods in an economy as valued by 
financial markets and the denominator comprises their "current 
reproduction costs", corresponding to the replication cost 
defined in the previous chapter. Tobin hypothesised that this 
ratio would act as a determinant of the rate of investment in 
an economy, with powerful forces tending to restore the ratio 
to unity whenever it moved above or below that level. The Bank 
of England (1976) pointed out, however, that this process 
might take a considerable time: it depended mainly on capital 
stock being increased or reduced by changes in the rate of 
investment. There were difficulties and costs attached to 
rapid adjustment; and such factors as technical progress, 
changes in taste and government policy would result in the 
equilibrium being adjusted before it was reached, leading to a 
more or less permanent divergence from unity. Others who have 
questioned whether q provides a basis for a satisfactory, 
economy-wide investment model include Chirinko (1985). 
Hayashi (1982) pointed out that whilst q, the ratio of 
existing financial capital to existing capital stock, could be 
observed, the factor which induced capital investment was the 
unobservable marginal qI, the ratio of incremental change in 
financial capital to incremental change in capital stock. 
Hayashi also demonstrated, however, that when the profit and 
installation functions were linear homogeneous in respect to 
capital and investment, marginal q and q were equal. 
Despite its conception by Tobin as a determinant of future 
investment, this aspect has largely been ignored by 
researchers of the firm-level q ratio. Lindenberg and Ross 
(1981), Hayashi and many subsequent researchers have 
effectively defined q for an individual firm as 
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q= 
Ve + Vb 
PVO, 0"(CO) 
(23) 
where: Ve is the market value of the firm's equity securities; 
Vb is the market value of the firm's loan capital; and 
CO is the cost of replicating the f irm'; and 
PVO, O(. ) is the expected present value operator at time 
t=0, based on expectations at that time. 
All variables are measured at the same point in time (t=O). 
For convenience, the present value operator is omitted in the 
analysis which follows, CO being taken to be a single payment 
at this time. 
Having assumed that capital markets reflect rational and 
informed expectations about future cash flows accruing to the 
providers of capital, Lindenberg and Ross, Hayashi etc argued 
that, for a competitive firm in long run equilibrium, q should 
be close to unity and that values in excess of unity could 
only be sustained if the firm possessed market power as a 
result of barriers to market entry2. Thus, whilst no ideal 
measure of economic profitability was postulated, q was seen 
as filling this function as a result of the property: 
v +vb PV 
q0,0( 
SNP) + Co (24) CO CO 
where SNP is supra-normal Profits accruing to the 
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shareholders', ie profits in excess of the risk adjusted cost 
of capital. Thus q was seen to. be a practical measure of 
economic profitability in that 
l+ 
Pvo, 0 (sivp) 
, (25) CO 
ie it was equal to 1+ the expected present value of supra- 
normal profits deflated by the replication cost of the firm. A 
fuller exposition of this analysis is given in Chapter 5. 
Lindenberg and Ross identified the replication cost of the 
firm with the net replacement cost of its net assets. No 
attempt was made to compare q with an idealised concept of 
economic profitability such as those developed in Chapter 2. 
This is also addressed in Chapter 5. 
Attempts were, however, made to relate q to a fundamental 
variable in the economics of a firm: the elasticity of demand 
it experiences. Salinger (1984) adopted a similar, analytical 
approach to Lindenberg and Ross in considering a firm, s q in 
long-run equilibrium. His analysis was as follows: 
Assume that, in long run equilibrium with constant returns 
to scale and with no taxes or inflation, the value of the 
firm in security markets reflects rational expectations, so 
that: 
ve+ vb = Co +f _Q (P- -mc) e --r (s- t) ds (26) t 
where: P- is the price of the f irm, s output; 
. Z. , 
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MC is the marginal cost; 
is output; and 
r is the firm's risk adjusted cost of capital. 
Thus: 
q=- 
ve+vb 
= l+ 
- (P~ -mc) Q. e --"(s- t: ) ds (27) 
CO 
ft: 
CO 
Defining the elasticity of demand, ed, as 
ed 
do P (28) 
ap- dP- 
p- 
Profit maximisation implies that': 
1 P--MC 
ed p- 
Substituting for (P--MC) 
(29) 
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q+fS1 e--r(s-t) ds (30) 
t C6 ed 
where S= P-. Q, the firm's turnover. 
In the steady state with the firm's sales growing at a 
constant rate, g, which is less than r, and ed unchanging: 
q=1+ -j2ý -L 
f me (9-, ") (II-t) ds 
Co ed t 
Evaluating the integral 
q+s1 -- 
1 (32) -Eo" -ed ( -- - 9) 
Thus, if SIC, and g could be observed or estimated, Salinger 
demonstrated that q would provide a means of estimating the 
elasticity of demand, ed* 
Sawyer (1985 p 165) followed a similar approach to Salinger. 
He also assumed steady growth and, abstracting from borrowing, 
derived a relationship for q in terms of the Accounting Rate 
of Return, ARR, using discrete time. Sawyer's analysis is as 
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follows: - 
Assuming the stock market value of the firm, Ve, is 
determined by the expected future dividends, ie the 
Dividend Growth Model (DGM): 
Ve ppt (33) 
(1+r) t 
where: p is the constant payout ratio; 
r is the cost of capital; and 
Pt is the profit in year t. 
By definition 
ARR = 
pt (34) 
Kt-, 
where: ARR is the Accounting Rate of Return; and 
Y,, 
-, 
is the net replacement cost of the firm's 
capital stock, at the start of the year t. 
If ARR is constant 
(1 -p) ARR (35) 
and 
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Kt=E" t=l (1+9) t Ko (36) 
Thus 
p ARR k0 (1+g) t (37) (1+g) - E-C., -(, +, ) t: 
Summing the geometric progression: 
Ve p ARR (38) 70 (. r-g) 
Assuming KO and CO are equivalent and substituting for p 
ARR- (39) 
Z-g 
Sawyer finished the analysis at this point', but a further 
step can be taken. Substituting for the unobservable g in the 
above and rearranging: 
p 
.r (lp) ARR 
The above equation has attracted little attention but is 
significant for q's use as a Profitability measure. Whilst 
(40) 
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recognising that it was derived from the DGM and therefore 
ignores Modigliani and Miller'-s argument (1958) that, if 
capital markets are efficient and. taxes are ignored, payout 
ratios are irrelevant to valuation, it indicates that q 
depends on the payout ratio, ie dq/dp s 0. If the payout ratio 
is considered to be a purely financial variable that affects 
shareholders but not the economic profitability of the firm, 
and assuming there is no compensating error in the other 
terms, it indicates that, according to the criterion proposed 
in the previous chapter, q is subject to accounting bias. 
Researchers have pointed out a number of advantages in using q 
to measure economic profitability. Salinger argued that, in a 
competitive market in which monopoly profits cannot be earned, 
a firm faces a horizontal demand curve, ie the elasticity of 
demand is infinite. In this situation, the equilibrium value 
of q is unity. Where the firm has some market power and is in 
a position to earn monopoly profits, it confronts a demand 
curve with a negative gradient ie the elasticity of demand is 
finite. Salinger observed that, assuming the term (r-g) in 
equation 32 is small, and the market value of the firm's share 
capital reflects all anticipated monopoly profits, q is 
sensitive to these anticipated monopoly profits; but this 
sensitivity depends on all inputs being provided 
competitively: if, for example, labour were able to price 
itself so as to share in any monopoly profits, the sensitivity 
of q to these profits would be diminished. Salinger argued 
that this sensitivity to monopoly profits made qa better 
measure of profitability in econometric studies of 
structure-performance paradigm than accounting rates of 
return. other advantages over accounting rates of return 
identified by Salinger were as follows: 
(a) q was independent of the choice of an asset pricing 
model, while profit rates could only be compared with an 
estimate of the risk-adjusted required rate of return; 
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(b) the market value of a firm captured more information 
than accounting data; and . 
(c) q could be measured more precisely than the rate of 
profit as: 
(i) profit is the difference between two larger items, 
revenues and costs, and was therefore highly sensitive 
to measurement errors in either; 
(ii) the rate of profit could be distorted by 
the effects of inflation; and 
(iii) depreciation charged in arriving at the 
accounting profit could differ from economic 
depreciation. 
Hirschey (1985), apparently working independently of Salinger, 
saw similar advantages in using q to examine the relationship 
between profitability and market structure. He referred to 
the 'compelling virtue' of an approach based on the market 
value of the firm which minimised the effect of 'accounting 
bias'. He did not explain what he meant by 'accounting bias', 
but the context of his discussion suggests that he was 
primarily referring to the fact that market values reflect the 
value of. intangible assets including the economic value of 
prior years' expenditure on R&D and advertising. It appears, 
however, that he may also have included in his concept of 
accounting bias the possibility that management can influence 
a firm's reported profits through exercising discretion over 
when profits are realised and manipulating reported profits by 
'creative' or misleading accounting. 
Shepherd (1986), in an exchange with Smirlock, Gilligan and 
Marshall (1986) following their (1984) study of market 
structure and Tobin's q, argued that there is no advantage in 
using q in econometric studies of the 
conduct-structure-performance paradigm as q was 'conceptually 
debatable' and difficult to measure due to the volatility of 
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market values and the difficulty in defining and estimating 
the replacement cost of net assets. McFarland (1987(l)) 
recognised that difficulty in estimating the replacement cost 
of net assets and the omission of intangible assets were 
features which Tobin's q shared with the accounting rate of 
return, although not necessarily to the same extent. 
McFarland (1987(2)), nevertheless, considered q 'far superior 
to the accounting rate of return as a measure of economic 
profitability', whilst recognising that: 
(a) q could only be applied to the activities of the firm 
as a whole; and 
(b) q could not detect otherwise supra-normal profits if 
these were captured by employees or managers or dissipated 
by inefficiency. 
The failure of q to reflect profits dissipated through 
inefficiency (referred to as Ix-inefficiency in the 
literature) is a feature shared with other measures of 
profitability. As, however, q captures the present value of 
all future profits accruing to the shareholders, x- 
inefficiency is a problem when using q for profit measurement 
only if it is persistent - or, more precisely, if financial 
markets believe it will be persistent. Ashton (1987) argued 
that there were a number of influences on firms which tended 
to eliminate x-inefficiency in the longer term, including the 
threat of take-over, the need to minimise costs in order to 
compete in export markets, the finite life of many 
product-markets and, in the case of contestable product 
markets, the threat of market entry. If Ashton is correct, q 
should be less susceptible to x-inefficiency than other 
profitability measures as it reflects the present value of all 
future profits. 
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3.2 Econometric Studies EmiDlovinq 
' 
With the initial perception of. q as a determinant of economy 
wide investment, it is unsurprising that empirical studies 
were initially directed to this end using aggregated data. As 
Blundell, Devereux, Bond and Schiantarelli observed (1987), 
the model did not prove noticeably successful in explaining 
economy wide investment. Galeotti (1988) observed that the 
disappointing performance of the q model in this area was 
associated with evidence of omitted variables, mis- 
specification and poor goodness of fit. 
Lindenberg and Ross (1981) pioneered the use of q as a 
corporate level measure of profitability in empirical studies. 
q was estimated for some 250 US corporations, average values 
for each firm over the years 1960-1977 being calculated. The 
market value of the firm was taken to be the sum of the market 
value of equity, preference shares and debt: equity was valued 
as the product of the quoted share price and the number of 
shares in issue; preference shares were valued by comparing 
their yield with the Standard and Poor's Stock Yield; and debt 
was valued in terms of the coupon rate, the current yield to 
maturity associated with that firm's bond rating and simple 
assumptions about how debt matured. The unavailability of 
replacement cost data for all but the year 1977 required 
Lindenberg and Ross to estimate earlier replacement costs of 
fixed assets by a method involving indexation and backward 
extrapolation from the 1977 figure. The fact that advertising 
expenditure, R&D and specific training costs were expensed 
in accounts but could represent substantial intangible assets 
was noted, but no allowance was made for these factors other 
than to note that they would bias q upwards. The mean share 
price over many years appears to have been taken in order to 
average out disequilibrium effects. Finding an average value 
of q for the sample of about 1.5, Lindenberg and Ross 
commented that "capitalised rents (ie monopoly profits] earned 
by firms in the sample had been sufficient to keep the firm's 
market value approximately 50k above the replacement cost of 
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its assets". Such a conclusion appears not to be very soundly 
based, given the likelihood that there were intangible assets 
which had been ignored. Lindenberg and Ross concluded their 
study by regressing q on an estimate of Lerner's Index6 and 
the estimated weighted four-firm concentration ratio for each 
firm in the sample. They found that the Lerner Index, 
represented by the ratio of sales less operating expenses to 
sales, was a statistically significant independent variable 
but there was no significant relationship between q and 
concentration. The explanatory power of Lerner's Index was, 
however, slight - R2 was only 0.08 - although the researchers 
claimed this was not unreasonable for cross-sectional 
regressions. 
Lindenberg and Ross's general approach to calculating q has 
been adopted, with minor variations, by subsequent 
researchers. Typically, q has been estimated in a similar 
manner and employed as the dependent variable in ordinary 
least squares regression studies in which the independent 
variables reflect the structure of the firm and its markets. 
Thus, Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall (1984,1986) estimated 
the net replacement cost of fixed assets by forward 
extrapolation from an estimate of the commencing replacement 
cost found by indexing the book value, rather than by the 
backward extrapolation used by Lindenberg and Ross. An average 
q was calculated for each firm in a sample of 132 US 
manufacturing firms for the period 1960-69. High q, assumed to 
reflect monopoly profits was found to be associated with high 
market share but not with market concentration. This finding, 
they argued, weakened the validity of the so-called 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, although this 
conclusion was hotly denied by Shepherd (1986). Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery (1988) used Lindenberg and Ross's data to conclude 
that narrowly diversified firms do better than widely 
diversified firms. 
Salinger (1984) also adopted similar procedures to Lindenberg 
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and Ross, except that q for a specific year (1979) for 252 US 
corporations was calculated, rather then the average q for a 
number of years. Reasoning that with such a narrow temporal 
cross-section, disequilibrium might be a significant factor, 
an independent variable representing growth in demand was 
included in the regression. The intangible assets representing 
earlier years' investment in advertising and R&D were 
represented by three years, expenditure on advertising 
adjusted for inflation, depreciated exponentially at a rate of 
0.3, and three years expenditure on R&D, depreciated 
exponentially at a rate of 0.1. Each item was divided by the 
estimated replacement cost of tangible capital forming the 
denominator of q and was included among the independent 
variables. The coefficients of these terms were found to be 
positive and significant. Independent variables representing 
market concentration were, again, found not to be significant. 
R2 was 0.43. In a further study of 175 firms the influence of 
labour unionisation was studied. This study involved 
non-linear least squares (OLS) regression and, while the 
results were somewhat ambiguous, they suggested that unionised 
workers captured on average 77k of the monopoly profits that 
might otherwise have accrued to the shareholders. 
Like Salinger, Hirschey (ibid) made some allowance for 
intangible assets formed by past expenditure on advertising 
and R&D by inclusion of the ratios of advertising spend to 
sales and R&D spend to sales as independent variables in an 
OLS study of 370 US corporations. Also like Salinger, there 
was no attempt to estimate a firm's average q over a long 
period: market values at a single date (31 December 1977) were 
estimated to arrive at the numerator of q; the accounting data 
used to estimate the denominator of q presumably referred to 
the nearest accounting year end to this date, but no 
confirmation of this is given in the paper. R2 of 
ýbout 0.3 
was achieved and, whilst the independent effects of both 
market share and related firm size were statistically 
insignificant, the effect of concentration was found to be 
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negative and "modestly significant" in explaining q. 
Contrasting with these findings, q was found to be more 
closely related, in terms of both-significant individual 
coefficients and overall explanatory power, to growth in 
earnings and to R&D and advertising intensity, leading 
Hirschey to comment that previous uncertainty over the 
economic importance of various market structure variables 
might have been caused, at least in part, by failure 
adequately to consider the influence of R&D and advertising. 
Other empirical studies of q for US firms have been undertaken 
- for example, Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall (1984), 
Lustgarten and Thomadakis (1987), and McFarland (1987(2)). 
The last named researcher is notable for seeking to overcome 
the disequilibrium effect by comparing the firm's q ratio, not 
with the theoretical unity value but with the average q of all 
non-financial firms. 
McFarland (1987(l)) adopted a totally-different approach to 
empirical research of q by studying the relative error in q 
and the accounting rate of return (ARR) arising from ignoring 
hidden capital and employing depreciation schedules for 
tangible capital assets which do not reflect economic 
depreciation. Employing Monte Carlo methods on synthetic data 
from a universe of 20,000 firms, McFarland found that both q 
and ARR were fairly highly correlated with the internal rate 
of return on new investment, and both measures indicated in 
most cases the presence or absence of supra-normal profits. 
Both measures were, however, found to be subject to large 
errors in individual cases and these errors could be seriously 
misleading. Tobin's q generally had smaller errors than ARR 
and a higher correlation with the internal rate of return on 
new investment, which led McFarland to conclude that it was 
more suitable than ARR for econometric studies, but performed 
neither consistently better nor consistently worse than the 
accounting rate of return for detecting supra-normal profits 
earned by a particular firm. 
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Many interesting avenues for empirical research of q remain 
unexplored. Most empirical research using firm level data has 
been based on US firms (an exception is Blundell, Devereux, 
Bond and Schiantarelli (ibid)) and the data has generally been 
obtained from computer files such as Compustat in a rather 
mechanistic manner. The estimation of replacement costs of 
fixed assets using forward or backward iteration is, at best, 
a means of arriving at a rough estimate and, for UK companies, 
ignores a largely unutilised source of data: the published 
information on the current cost of assets contained in the 
Current Cost Accounts published in the first half of the 
1980s. In the work cited above, no account was taken of the 
influence of taxation and gearing on the equilibrium value of 
q; and financial markets were assumed, often implicitly, to be 
efficient in the sense that they reflected rational 
expectations (this is also true of McFarland's study on 
synthetic data). Growth in earnings or capital was found to 
be an important determinant of q by Hirschey, yet the 
inclusion of this variable suggests that the true causal 
variable was not identified. 
3.3 Other Applications of a as a Profitability Measure 
Apart from McFarland, economists have generally confined their 
interest in and use of q at the corporate level to measuring 
profitability in econometric studies. In such studies, which 
are often concerned with the relationship between sustainaýle 
and undiversifiable supra-normal profits and market structure, 
a portfolio approach is generally employed, so that transitory 
and firm-specific excess profits, which are of little interest 
in this context, are eliminated. Ohlson (1989) recognised, 
however, that such profits are reflected in the q of an 
individual firm. It might therefore be thought that q would be 
of interest to a wider group including financial analysts and 
the wider financial community. These groups have, however, 
shown little interest in q. Unlike that other ratio combining 
financial market and accounting data, the Price Earnings 
ratio, q receives relatively little attention in the financial 
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press and is not, as a rule, discussed in general texts 
describing useful ratios in financial analysis'. This may 
reflect a view that, whilst q may-be of potential interest to 
competition authorities engaged in detecting supra-normal 
profits, it does not appear very suitable for detecting 
, under-valued' shares in financial markets subject to 
asymmetrical information. By including the market value of the 
firm in the denominator, q may be seen as already compounding 
all the available information about the firm's prospects. This 
view, however, overlooks the fact that the analyst's skills 
are still needed to evaluate the denominator of q, and, by 
including the market value of the firm in the numerator, the 
extent to which market views are compounded may be no more 
than occurs when, say, the Accounting Rate of Return of a firm 
is compared with a market derived estimate of its cost of 
capital. As, however, the concern of this paper is with 
measuring economic profitability with a view to meeting the 
requirements of econometricians, utility regulators and 
competition authorities, any failings of q perceived by 
financial analysts are of limited concern. 
3.4 The Fundamental Model of Share Value 
The question whether financial analysts can identify 'under- 
valued, shares using any conceivable profitability measure may 
be beyond the scope of this paper, but the question of 
whether, to what extent, and in what sense, capital markets 
are efficient must still be addressed. Both Lindenberg and 
Ross's conclusion that q reflects anticipated supra-normal 
profits and Salinger's conclusion that q reflects the 
elasticity of demand rely on the assumption that capital 
markets reflect rational and informed expectations about 
future cash flows accruing to the providers of capital. In 
effect, it is assumed that stock prices reflect the present or 
discounted value of future dividends. Furthermore, as the 
market value of a company is found by multiplying the current 
share price by the number of shares in issue, there is also a 
requirement that these expectations, and the discount factors 
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employed are homogeneous. Such assumptions are referred to in 
the literature as the Fundamental Model of share value. If the 
Fundamental Model is to be employed in the subsequent analysis 
this paper, it is necessary to consider whether it remains 
plausible. 
The concept of stock market "efficiency" is also employed in a 
related but different context to that of the Fundamental 
Model. According to the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
(ECMH), stock prices reflect all the information that is 
available about the future cash flows from firms to 
shareholders. Three levels of efficiency are recognised in the 
literature: 
a. Weak Efficiency, when share prices fully reflect the 
information implied by all prior price movements; 
b. Semi-Strong Efficiency, when share prices respond 
instantaneously and without bias to newly published 
information; and 
c. Strong Efficiency, when share prices fully reflect all 
relevant information including data not yet publicly 
available. 
Le Roy and Porter (1981) demonstrated that ECMH implies and is 
implied by the Fundamental Model. Thus rejection of ECMH would 
result in rejection of the Fundamental Model. Jensen (1986) 
asserted that there is no better documented proposition than 
Weak and Semi-Strong Efficiency in any of the social sciences. 
Summers (1986), on the other hand, argued that many of the 
statistical tests used to support capital market efficiency, 
especially those indicating that share prices follow a random 
walk (Weak Efficiency), have very low power. Scepticism about 
ECMH has been growing as a result of apparent stock market 
anomalies which would appear to provide opportunities to earn 
"excess" profits. Fama and French (1988), for example, 
referred to the mounting evidence that stock returns are 
predictable. Others, however, find this evidence 
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unpersuasive. Thus, for example, Pearce (1987) concluded after 
an extensive review of the literature that this type of 
evidence was insufficient to reject the ECMH. The issue 
remains, however, one of the most fiercely debated in 
economics. 
Other evidence concerning capital market efficiency is more 
directly relevant to the Fundamental Model. Tobin himself 
(1984) observed that, whilst it was [then] the long standing 
judgment of almost all academics in economics and finance that 
securities markets were efficient in terms of Weak and Semi- 
Strong Efficiency, the Fundamental Model was more doubtful. 
Tobin quoted two pieces of evidence for this view: Shiller's 
(1981) study of share price volatility; and the behaviour of 
share prices when there are takeovers, which he described in 
the following terms: 
"Takeover mania, motivated by egregious under valuations, 
is testimony to the failure of the market in this 
fundamental valuation criterion of efficiency". 
In the study referred to by Tobin, Shiller, using an approach 
similar to that of LeRoy and Porter (ibid), examined the 
volatility of the Standard & Poors Composite Index over the 
years 1871-1979 and concluded that it exhibited volatility of 
between five to 13 times that which would have been expected 
with perfect foresight of dividends. Such 'excess volatility, 
can be explained by volatility in real rates of interest, but 
the range of some ten percentage points required appeared to 
be unreasonably high. The validity of these tests for 'excess 
volatility' turns on the adequacy of the statistical tests 
employed. Scott (1985), for example, modified the statistical 
approach and found "overwhelming evidence" against the 
Fundamental model; but whether the existence of excess 
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volatility' has been demonstrated sufficiently to undermine 
the Fundamental Model remains a matter of dispute, as West's 
(1988) review of the literature confirms. 
Tobin's view that merger and acquisition activity in-security 
markets was inconsistent with the Fundamental Model appears to 
be a popularly held view in the financial press, where merger 
activity is attributed to the detection of 'under-valued, 
companies. Thus, prior to a bid, a firm is seen as being 
valued too cheaply, at least by those trading in small 
quantities of shares relative to its value under rational 
expectations. Under an alternative view, which also implies 
market inefficiency, much merger activity is seen as the 
result of over-ambitious management of bidding companies who 
are prepared to pay unjustified premiums to acquire target 
companies Pmerger mania, ). 
According to the Fundamental Model, markets do not 'under 
value, firms prior to a bid. Any premium to the market price 
is attributed to a payment to secure for the bidder a share of 
advantages accruing to the enlarged group such as increased 
market power, savings in overheads resulting from joint 
operation and other synergy. Thus, whilst some departure from 
homogeneous expectations is implied, merger-induced premiums 
in the share prices of companies are held to be consistent 
with the Fundamental Model. Another explanation for merger- 
induced premiums, which is also consistent with the 
Fundamental Model, is provided by Shleifer and Summers (1987) 
who argued that takeover gains come largely from breaching 
implicit contracts with stakeholders of the firm such as 
employees and suppliers. 
it is difficult to establish by empirical studies whether 
merger activity does indeed represent a departure from the 
Fundamental Model. Franks and Harris's (1986) study of over 
1800 UK mergers in the period 1955-1985 found that the target 
company's share price rose by an average of 23t on an equal 
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weighting basis in the month of the bids. This premium was 30t 
for a six month period around the bid to allow for leakage of 
information and delayed reaction to the news. Consistent with 
other studies, significant gains for the acquiring 
shareholders were not, however, detected. If the premium in 
the target company's shares was due to anticipated gains 
through improved efficiency or increased market power (which 
creates shareholder gains but no social wealth), it is 
difficult to see why these gains were not more equally shared 
between vendor and acquire. Perhaps the only safe conclusion 
to draw from all aspects of the debate on merger activity as 
it affects q as a profitability measure is that, when a 
company is known to be the target of a bid, q will not 
reliably indicate future profitability of the existing 
undertakings. 
Doubts about the efficiency of capital markets in a 
fundamental sense are not confined to the issues of 'excess 
volatility, and 'merger mania,. Summers (1986) argued that the 
Fundamental Model and a 'fads' hypothesis under which prices 
react immediately but too violently to new information would 
be indistinguishable in most tests. A study by Nickell and 
Wadhwani (1986) suggested that the 'fads' hypothesis takes the 
form of market myopia in which short term events are 
over-valued relative to more distant prospects ('short 
termism'), but Porterba and Summers (1986) found that shocks 
to stock prices did not persist for long periods - many had 
half. lives of less than six months and some had lives as short 
as one month. This suggests that the effect of this type of 
market inefficiency on Tobin's q might be overcome by 
employing the average security price over a number of months. 
Pindyck (1984) pointed out that how investors perceived risk 
was an important issue that required more attention: if, for 
example, investors believed that there was a low but 
non-negligible probability of economic catastrophe (as many UK 
investors must have thought in 1974) this might have a 
43 
significant and rational downward influence on share prices 
but, in the absence of the feared collapse, would not show up 
in tests of market efficiently based on subsequent earning and 
dividends. Also relevant to this problem is an earlier 
investigation by Brainard, Shoven and Weiss (1980) into the 
decline in US corporate stock values in the 1970s. This study 
was based on a sample of 187 firms for which they computed the 
ratio of aggregate market value to aggregate intrinsic value 
under a variety of assumptions about rational expectations. 
Attempts were made to explain this so-called Z value in terms 
of various independent variables, but with only limited 
success. Brainard, Shoven and Weiss, like Pindyck, concluded 
that general pessimism about the future was the hardest factor 
to capture when examining the rationality of market values. 
They did claim, however, that changes in the 1970s in some of 
the explanatory variables they examined suggested that there 
had been a general loss in confidence in the US capital 
markets in this period, a finding which would help to explain 
the fall in share prices at that time without conflicting with 
Semi-Strong Efficiency. A finding by Brainard, Shoven and 
Weiss of particular interest for the study of q was that the 
most important variable for explaining the Z value was the 
gross rate of return of the particular firm. The coefficient 
for this variable was generally positive and significant, 
which they interpreted as an indication that firms possess 
substantial and long lived intangible assets such as 
, trademarks, monopoly power or key personnel,. Weiss also 
agreed that this 'hidden capital' did not appear to depreciate 
as quickly as tangible assets, although the evidence for such 
a conclusion appears, in both instances, to be thin. 
Many non-academics in economics and finance, particularly 
market practitioners, are less than convinced about all forms 
of market efficiency. Fundamental analysis in the securities 
industry involves detecting under-valued, securities, 
reflecting-the assumption in Graham and Dodd's standard work 
for investment analysts (revised 1988) that share prices 
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oscillate around their rational equilibriums. - 
A common technique used by investment analysis is to look for 
departures of the level of wide-ranging indices, such as the 
FTA All Share Index, from the levels suggested by the 
Fundamental Model. This Imisvaluation', if it exists, would 
represent a systematic, over or under-valuation of the 
individual security which would not be eliminated in 
cross-sectional samples. It is therefore referred to in this 
paper as 'Systematic Inefficiency'. The Equity Risk Premium 
Chart from County Nat West Wood Mac is an example of a belief 
in Systematic Inefficiency. Ross's presentation to the 1988 
National Association of Pension Funds Conference confirms that 
the concept is also inherent in the way actuaries value 
investments. In his presentation, the FTA All Share Index was 
compared by Ross with the value estimated using actuarial 
principles and assumptions, a key one of which was, in effect, 
the Fundamental Model. Ross found over and under-valuations of 
up to 40% persisting for a year or more. Another example of 
the actuarial approach is found in the estimation of over and 
under-valuation of the FTA 500/487 Industrials Index by Plymen 
(1987). Plymen compared what he referred to as the 'real 
yield' on the index with the return on long dated government 
securities from which the return due to future inflation had 
been eliminated. The 'real yield' employed by Plymen was 
simply the yield calculated in terms of the dividends paid in 
the following year so as to make some allowance for the lag 
due to deferred declaration and payment of dividends. This 
particular piece of work is flawed: the correction for future 
inflation is tautologous: in effect the 'real, interest rate 
is simply the return on index linked government securities 
which, for periods prior to their introduction, was assumed to 
be 3.5k or, when the return on long dated government gilts was 
above 12t, 4t to reflect in an admittedly arbitrary fashion 
the premium afforded to indexation at times of high inflation. 
Furthermore, Plymen made allowance neither for the risk 
premium on equities needed to compensate for their greater 
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volatility relative to that of government securities nor for 
the anticipated long-term growth in the real level of 
dividends. An important implicit assumption made by Plymen and 
used in other examples of this type of work is Irving Fisher's 
proposition that nominal interest rates reflect the expected, 
real interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. 
Bleaney (1987) commented that this proposition has a long 
history of failure in tests against empirical data, although 
Bleaney's own tests using data from eleven OECD countries from 
1961 to 1981, went some way to correcting this. 
Black (1986) took a position midway between academics 
committed to capital market efficiency and practitioners whose 
livelihood depends on exploiting perceived inefficiencies. 
Black generously defined an efficient capital market as one in 
which price was within a factor of two of the fundamental 
value for at least 90t of the time. In Black's view, 'almost 
all markets, are efficient in this sense, but, in a way 
reminiscent of Heizenberg's Uncertainty Principle, he 
postulated that noise, in information on future returns to 
shareholders ensured that deviations in market prices from 
fundamental values could not be measured with precision. 
Non-heterogeneous expectations amongst share holders would not 
be consistent with 
, 
the Fundamental Model. As Steele (1986) 
pointed out, if expectations about a firm's future cash flows 
are non-heterogeneous, the demand curve, AB, for a firm, s 
shares, illustrated below, would be downward sloping: 
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Demand for Shares when Expectations are Non-heterogeneous 
. 
Price 
Pl 
P2 
Q, Q2 Quantity 
Thus, if the quoted price is determined by the price P, at 
which a small number of shares* Q, can be sold, and larger 
volumes, say Q21 can only be sold to potential buyers for a 
lower price P2, reflecting their less sanguine expectations 
about the firm's future cash flows, the product of the quoted 
share price and the number of shares in issue would over-state 
the market value of the firm, with the result that q would be 
over-stated. 
A popular view often reflected in the financial press is that 
price and quantity are inversely related, ie the demand curve 
is indeed initially downward sloping. This view appears to be 
based on the casual, empirical evidence that it is difficult 
to realise large blocks of shares at the quoted price. In this 
respect, it is notable that the London Stock Exchange SEAQ 
trading system assumes that prices and volumes are related. 
Similar assumptions underlie the TSA Capital Adequacy Rules. 
Research by Scholes (1972) of secondary share issues ' on the 
NYSE suggests, however, that this view is mistaken. Scholes 
found no significant relationship between the size of the 
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issue and the deviation of the share price, ' and concluded that 
elasticities of demand were negative and large, ie the demand 
curve corresponded to CD in the diagram, not AB. Scholes, 
study was carefully constructed to avoid any possibility that 
the share disposals examined were associated with inside 
knowledge and new information reaching the market. This 
condition may not apply to more typical large transactions. 
Thus Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1987) found some 
evidence that large transactions initiated by buyers on the 
NYSE had a permanent, upward effect on prices which was 
related to the transaction size, but no evidence of a 
corresponding, permanent downward effect from seller-initiated 
transactions was found, and the authors concluded that the 
effect could have been due either to imperfectly elastic 
supply curves , 
or the impact of buyers, information. They also 
pointed to earlier, empirical studies which generally 
indicated a permanent price effect, but which disagreed over 
whether these effects were related to the size of the 
transaction. Thus the apparent relationship between quantity 
and price does not necessarily signify that the Fundamental 
Model has broken down: it could be the result of the demand 
schedule slipping from CD to EF due to new information 
reaching the market. This information could simply be the 
market's belief that the shareholder selling the large volume 
of shares has some inside knowledge that the shares should be 
sold at price P,. Non- heterogeneous expectations and the 
Fundamental Model are therefore difficult to distinguish. 
It is not easy to reach a final conc lusion on whether the 
Fundamental Model of share value should be rejected. Tobin's 
argument that the excess volatility observed in share prices 
and the behaviour of the corporate mergers are inconsistent 
with the Model has been disputed by others. The circumstantial 
evidence of non-heterogeneous expectations is open to 
alternative explanation and has not been confirmed by some 
empirical research. Alternatives to the Fundamental Model, 
such as summers's fads hypothesis, have not won universal 
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acceptance. Thus the Fundamental Model cannot-be said to have 
been discredited. Whilst it may not provide a perfect model of 
share pricing, its employment in later sections of this paper 
would, therefore, appear to be justified. The possibility that 
share prices incorporate a degree of systematic over or under- 
valuation is not, however, dismissed. Such a possibility is 
considered in the subsequent analysis. 
3.5 A Firm's Capital and the Valuation of Tangible Assets 
According to Tobin's original formulation, the denominator of 
q is the current 'reproduction cost' of the firm's capital. 
Tobin did not define the term, but he appears to mean the cost 
of replicating the firm, including its intangible assets such 
as trained staff, brands and knowhow. The term used in Chapter 
2 for the same concept is the firm's 'replication cost'. When 
adapted by Lindenberg and Ross and others as a practical 
firm-level measure of profitability, the denominator of q has 
been represented by the book value (ie the value extracted 
from accounts) of tangible assets less liabilities valued on a 
replacement cost basis. Hirschey (1985) is typical in his use 
of q in that the denominator is taken to be the net 
replacement cost of 'tangible assets' disclosed in the 10K 
reports filed by US corporations with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, and there is no indication that care was 
been taken to match, in a logical way, the denominator with 
the chosen numerator. Assuming. borrowing is included in the q 
numerator, and ignoring the intangibles not disclosed in 
accounts, the q denominator should comprise, in accounting 
terminology: 
fixed assets; 
current assets; 
less liabilities and provisions other than borrowing 
and dividends due. 
Reflecting their background as economists rather than 
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financial analysts, most researchers using q in econometric 
studies have shown little interest in the precise form used 
and whether data derived from accounting systems and intended 
for very different purposes are suitable. They have generally 
relied on summarised data such as that provided by Compustat 
and 1OK reports with little qualification or justification. In 
particular, whether, even in the absence of intangible assets, 
net replacement cost is a suitable proxy for 'reproduction 
cost, has generally not been addressed in this context. In a 
different area of research, that of accounting theory, there 
is, however, a considerable body of literature on the question 
of-asset valuation which is highly relevant to the 
consideration of what is the appropriate denominator of q. 
The Sandiland Report (1975) observed that the concept of 
deprival value had been originally proposed by Bonbright 
(1933) and was accepted by a large number of researchers of 
accounting as representing the value of an asset to its owner. 
In proposing the use of deprival value for accounting 
purposes, Bonbright commented that: - 
'The value of a property to its owner is identical in 
amount to the value of the entire loss, direct or 
indirect, that the owner might expect to suffer if-he 
were to be deprived of the property,. 
Edwards, Kay and Mayer (1987) stated that the basic technique 
of establishing the minimum loss a firm would suffer if it 
were deprived of an asset, pre-dated Bonbright and originated 
from the USA in the 1920s. 
The basis of valuation now referred to as the current cost 
basis is related to deprival value and can be expressed as 
follows: 
CC = Min (RC, EV) 
so 
and 
EV = Max (PV, NRV) 
where : CC is the current cost or value to the owner; 
RC is the net replacement cost; 
EV is the economic value, defined as above; 
PV is present value of future cash flows 
discounted at the risk adjusted cost of capital; 
and 
NRV is the net realisable value. 
Whittington (1983) considered this basis of valuation to be to 
some extent a practical technique without much theoretical 
justification; but according to Kay and Mayer (1985) and 
Edwards, Kay and Mayer (1986), economically significant 
results are obtained when the basis is employed to value 
initial and terminal values in discounted cash flow 
calculations. This conclusion was corroborated by Devereux's 
(1986) simulation exercise, notwithstanding the use of 
straight line depreciation to arrive at the net replacement 
cost of assets. 
Edwards, Kay and Mayer described four 'practical objections, 
to the current cost basis. They appear to mean by this that 
there are difficulties in employing the current cost basis, 
but a corollary of their concerns is that published current 
cost valuations may be unreliable. The four practical 
objections identified were: 
(a) Subjectivity - this is a feature of all aspects of 
the current cost asset valuation process, but is 
particularly significant in the estimation of present 
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values. 
(b) Arbitrary Capitalisation - expenditure is 
capitalised or written off according to accounting 
convention which embodies no universal recognition that 
accounts should reflect the economic substance over form. 
(c) Inconsistent Valuation of Intangible Assets - again 
intangible assets may be included, or more usually, 
excluded from company balance sheets according to 
accounting convention. 
(d) Aggregation - Edwards et al pointed out that under 
the current cost convention, rules were needed to allow 
for any interdependence of assets under which the 
replacement cost of groups of assets would not equal the 
sum of individual costs, or the economic value of groups 
of assets would not equal the sum of individual economic 
values. They proposed that, in order to adhere to the 
principle of valuing according to the minimum loss 
suffered on deprival of an asset, replacement cost, RC, 
in the definition of current cost should be defined in ex 
post analysis as: 
RC = mi min (RCj, EVj) ,R 
q ri-1 CTI (41) 
where: RCj is the replacement cost of the ith asset (or 
liability); 
EVj is the economic value of the ith asset (or 
liability): 
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RCT is cost of replacing all the firm's N -assets 
and liabilities. .- 
The ASCIs Guidance Notes on SSAP 16 (1980) recommended 
practical methods intended to assist those preparing current 
cost accounts, but did not address the problem of aggregation. 
Differences also exist between current reproduction cost 
conceived by Tobin and the corresponding net replacement cost 
employed in current cost accounting, sometimes called the 'net 
current replacement cost'. As the ASC Guidance Notes make 
clear, net current replacement cost comprises two elements: 
gross current replacement cost, representing the cost of 
acquiring a new, modern equivalent asset with the same service 
potential, and accumulated depreciation, representing 
consumption of this service potential. The method of 
calculating depreciation is, therefore, an important 
determinant in the valuation of fixed assets. 
According to the ASC Guidance Notes, the cost of a modern 
equivalent asset was generally to be estimated using specific 
indices. Secondhand market prices were only to be used to 
determine gross replacement costs, and only then when existing 
assets were bought in that market. As subsequently recognised 
by the ASC Handbook on Accounting for the Effects of Changing 
Prices (1986), this approach reflected the concept of Physical 
Capital Maintenance. An alternative approach, advocated by Kay 
and Mayer (1985), recognised in the ASC Handbook, and 
recommended by Byatt (1986), is the concept of Financial 
Capital Maintenance. Under this concept, which derives from 
the concept of a contestable market, assets should be valued 
at the price at which they could be bought for in a rational 
second-hand market. Given the original analysis in terms of 
the divergence of the markets for financial and physical 
assets, this is closer to Tobin's original concept of current 
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reproduction cost than it is to Physical Capital Maintenance 
advocated under SSAP 16. This difference will tend to generate 
different depreciation profiles, and hence different net 
replacement costs under the two concepts, but in practice the 
accounting depreciation profile employed in published Current 
Cost accounts is invariably arrived at under the straight line 
method. Negative depreciation, required for example under 
Physical Capital Maintenance when the service potential is 
enhanced, is not allowed on account of the definition of 
depreciation in SSAP 12, originally as the allocation of 
capital to revenue so as to. charqe a fair proportion to each 
accounting period, and, in the current version, the measure, of 
the wearing out, consumption or other reduction in the useful 
economic life of a fixed asset. The employment of conventional 
depreciation profiles, particularly straight line 
depreciation, in published Current Cost accounts suggests that 
net current replacement costs disclosed in such accounts may 
be systematically over or under-stated relative to the 
theoretical current reproduction cost. Carsberg and Lumby 
(1986) proposed a method of estimating economic depreciation 
in the water industry by employing so called 'tilted 
annuities'. OFTEL in effect employed this approach (1986) to 
estimate the current reproduction cost of British Telecom's 
tangible net assets. This approach is, however, based on an 
assumption that the net revenue generated by fixed assets over 
their entire lives is constant after allowing for specific 
inflation. Such an assumption may be reasonable for a state 
regulated monopoly where the regulatory authority is concerned 
to ensure that different generations of consumers do not 
cross-subsidise each other; but it would be less suitable for 
a price-taker where net revenues cannot be controlled by the 
firm through the pricing mechanism. Furthermore, Awerbuch 
(1988) has pointed out that annuity depreciation is sensitive 
to departures from constant net revenue generation assumed by 
OFTEL and is unlikely to produce accounting measures any 
better than those obtained with straight line depreciation; 
and, as already noted, Devereux found in a simulation exercise 
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that, in aggregate, straight line depreciation performed well. 
In the absence of knowledge about the profile of the cash flow 
anticipated from the continued employment of existing assets, 
the net current replacement cost of a firm's fixed assets 
disclosed in the firm's current cost accounts may therefore 
represent a reasonable proxy for their current reproduction 
cost required as the denominator of q. Similarly, straight 
line depreciation can be expected to perform adequately in 
iterative techniques used by Lindenberg and Ross and others 
for estimating net current replacement costs from indexed 
historical costs. 
Econometricians have generally employed exponential 
depreciation in their empirical work. This is computationally 
simple as, when the real rate of growth in capital expenditure 
is constant, a book value for the capital stock of assets on a 
net replacement cost basis may be estimated as follows:, 
BVO - 
10 
g+d 
where: BVO is the net current replacement cost book value; 
10 is the current level of capital expenditure; 
(42) 
g is the 'real, rate of growth in capital expenditure 
in previous years; and 
d is the rate of exponential depreciation9. 
55 
The real rate of growth in capital expenditure, g, is 
estimated from past levels of. capital expenditure indexed by 
an appropriate index of replacement costs. 
Financial economists (eg Brealey and Myers, page 248) are 
content to define 'economic depreciation' as the decline in 
the present value of an asset, but do not explain what 
discount rate should be used to arrive at this present value 
and give little indication of the relationship between the 
replacement cost of a new and a used asset. These shortcomings 
and the significance of exponential and other conventional 
depreciation methods are examined in Appendix 1. 
3.6 Intangible Assets and Hidden Capital 
if q is to indicate profitability as in equation 25, capital 
cannot be confined to net tangible assets. If a firm without 
supra-normal profits is to retain aq value of 1, account must 
be taken of intangible assets. Such intangible assets are 
referred to as 'hidden capital,. 
There is some guidance on the disclosure in accounts-of 
current values of intangible assets, including brands and 
goodwill, but the practices recommended are not conducive to 
systematic disclosure of information that might be used in 
quantitative analysis. 
SSAP 16 required intangible assets other than goodwill to be 
valued in Current Cost accounts in the same way as tangible 
assets, but the Guidance Notes on SSAP 16 state that: 
,... it is not intended that current capital costs should 
be established where it has not been the practice under 
the historical cost convention to capitalise such costs., 
In the absence of a requirement to disclose current values of 
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such intangible assets as patents and copyrights in a 
comprehensive way, any amounts-disclosed in Current Cost 
accounts will generally be of limited interest. 
The acquisition cost of acquired brands which are separately 
identifiable may be disclosed in balance sheets, but 
revaluation was discouraged in Technical Release TR7 38 
issued by the Accounting Standards Committee in 1989 on the 
grounds that there was no generally accepted method of 
calculation. 
Purchased goodwill arises when a business combination is 
accounted for as an acquisition. SSAP 22, issued in December 
1984, defined purchased goodwill as the difference between the 
fair value of the consideration given and the aggregate of the 
fair values of the 'separable net assets' acquired. It is 
required to be written off immediately or, alternatively, 
capitalised and amortised on a systematic basis over its 
, useful economic life,. SSAP 16 did not, however, require 
capitalised goodwill to be re-stated in current cost terms. 
The historical cost of purchased goodwill is of limited 
interest even at the time of the acquisition. Edwards, Kay and 
Mayer pointed out that the economic value of an acquisition 
can exceed its cost as the consideration paid would reflect 
the existing reputation of the acquiring company and 
efficiency gains following acquisition in addition to the 
reputation of the acquired company. Other factors not 
mentioned by Edwards, Kay and Mayer include the non-additivity 
of elements of economic value and the contribution to the 
historical cost of purchased goodwill represented by payment 
to acquire and extend market power. Economic interpretation of 
the historical cost of purchased goodwill in the years 
following the acquisition is further impeded by the absence of 
a rational basis for determining how the historical cost 
should be depreciated. Simon and Unwin (1981) criticised the 
analysis in a Discussion Paper by a working party of the 
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Accounting Standards Committee (1980) which concluded that the 
useful economic life of purchased goodwill was approximately 
2% times the exit PE ratio of the. -acquired firm. It may, 
however, have been less in recognition of Simon and Unwin's 
criticism" than in response to pressure from preparers of 
accounts to minimise the charge to the profit and loss account 
that the subsequent Exposure Draft, ED30, made no mention of 
the approach recommended in the Discussion Paper - Appendix 1 
to SSAP 22 simply states that it is not possible to specify 
general rules regarding the useful economic life of purchased 
goodwill. Views of preparers of accounts are perhaps better 
represented by Stacey (1987) who argued that purchased 
goodwill was sufficiently long lived to require capitalisation 
but no depreciation. Although rejected in subsequent guidance 
from the ASC, support for such a policy is provided by Utton's 
(1986) study of the profitability of markets and firms 
referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. This study 
found that monopoly profits could persist for decades. Thus, 
to the extent that purchased goodwill reflects the capital 
value of future monopoly profits, a policy of capitalisation 
without depreciation makes sense. 
As SSAP22 acknowledged, there is no difference in character 
between purchased goodwill and non-purchased goodwill. The 
exclusion of the latter from published accounts means that, 
even if the problems of valuation and depreciation referred to 
above were resolved, the amounts disclosed are only of 
interest in the context of merger activity. Thus the amounts 
disclosed as goodwill by companies will seldom through any 
light on the firm's current reproduction cost forming the 
denominator of Tobin's q. 
There is wide agreement that, as a result of the accruals 
concept, 'assets, under both the historical and 
current/replacement cost conventions comprise expenditure that 
is capitalised in order that depreciation can be matched 
against the resulting 'future economic benefits, - this 
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expression is used in FASBIs Statement of Financial Concepts 
(1980), IASCIs Exposure Draft. on a Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (1988), 
and in Exposure Draft 42 (1988). The items actually treated as 
, assets, in published accounts represent, however, a more 
narrowly chosen selection of capitalised expenditures whose 
range is largely determined by ad hoc accounting conventions. 
The term 'hidden capital, is used in this paper to represent 
those expenditures which result in future economic benefit', 
but which are expensed in the accounts. 
Expenditure on advertising has long been identified as a 
possible source of hidden capital. Weiss (1969) commented that 
, the treatment of long-lived advertising as current expenses 
leads firms that invest heavily in such intangibles to 
over-state their rates of return since their equity is 
under-stated ... Investments in research and on-the-job 
training are also "expensed" although they yield benefits 
mainly in the future'. Telser (1961) argued that advertising 
expenditure can be viewed as a capital good which depreciates 
over time and needs maintenance and repair. Ayanian (1983) 
observed that the on-going debate over the competitive effects 
of advertising which has been, in large measure, a debate 
about the economic durability of advertising expenditure, 
commenting that: 
'Knowledge of this durability is crucial to interpretation of 
the well-known positive cross-sectional relation between 
accounting rates of return and advertising intensity, as 
measured by advertising to sales ratios. Although other 
explanations are possible, the main contending hypotheses to 
explain this relation are barriers to entry and accounting 
bias. ' 
one of the 'other explanations' referred to by Ayanian is that 
firms that advertise really are more profitable than those 
that do not. Moriarty and Salamon (1988) argued that, even if 
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the effect of advertising lasts for months rather than years 
as Comanor and Wilson (1974) and Clarke (1976) concluded, a 
positive association between advertising intensity and 
profitability would still arise if profit maximising firms 
spent more on advertising to defend products earning supra- 
normal profits behind existing barriers to entry. This 
explanation is referred to below as the 'Sub-optimal 
Expenditure Hypothesis'. 
The idea that expenditure on R&D can generate hidden capital 
has been accepted more readily. Before SSAP 13, issued in 
1977, prohibited the capitalisation of research expenditure 
and set tough conditions for the capitalisation of development 
expenditure, some firms did indeed capitalise R&D expenditure. 
The reason given in SSAP 13 for effectively prohibiting 
capitalisation was that no one period could be expected to 
benefit from the expenditure. This argument is disingenuous - 
no fixed asset can be said, ex ante, to benefit any particular 
future period. It is true that most R&D expenditure is, by its 
nature, unsuccessful, but, as Stauffer (1975) pointed out, 
unsuccessful R&D is an unwelcome but integral part of the 
process of obtaining success and all outlays in a given period 
should be charged against the future income streams generated 
by the fraction of the expenditure which is successful. 
Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) commented that, while a policy of 
capitalising advertising and R&D was controversial, acceptance 
of the view that they represented-intangible assets was 
increasing. A more likely explanation for the policy 
promulgated in SSAP 13 is, therefore, that it was felt that, 
following the collapse of Rolls Royce, companies could not be 
trusted to write capitalised R&D down to the lower of cost and 
realisable value and a policy of almost total prudence was 
called for in this area. 
Attempts by econometricians to value hidden capital arising 
from expenditure on advertising and R&D have generally 
involved capitalising the relevant expenditure, often after 
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some form of indexation has been applied, to arrive at gross 
current replacement cost, and then deducting the estimated 
accumulated depreciation. In order to estimate the accumulated 
depreciation, it is necessary to employ a depreciation method. 
The depreciation method often employed by econometricians is 
the computationally simple one of exponential depreciation, 
but, as explained in Appendix 1, this method depends on a 
number of assumptions about the nature of the lag between 
expenditure and benefit which may not be appropriate. 
Evidence about the lag between expenditure on advertising and 
R&D and the subsequent benefits is limited. In the case of 
R&D, Schott's (1976) study based on answers to a questionnaire 
sent to 300 major UK manufacturing companies is informative. 
The survey concerned the characteristics of applied research 
in 1971 or 1972.178 replies were received: of these, 17 
failed to quantify their answers and 63 said they did no 
applied research. Results from the remainder indicated that, 
on average, 36%ý of the research effort was devoted to projects 
completed in the year, 9t to projects abandoned in the year 
and 55t was devoted to projects which continued in subsequent 
years. 60t of research projects worked on in the year were 
completed within two years. These estimates suggest that 
applied research undertaken by UK manufacturers is of 
relatively short duration. The delay between completion of a 
research project and incorporation in a product or process was 
also found to be relatively short: 64t of projects were 
expected to be incorporated within one year and 80t within 
two. on the other hand, the lifespans of processes and 
products incorporating the research were thought to be long. 
The survey showed the following anticipated lifespans: - 
1-5 years 
6-10 years 
11-15 years 
More than 16 years 
Process Product 
?k P6 
25 44 
40 22 
19 25 
16 9 
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It is clear from the above that the benefits to UK 
manufacturers from applied research could, after a fallow 
period of two or three years, accrue over a decade or so. 
This suggests that, when the research spend over a number of 
years is known, a more complex depreciation profile than the 
exponential might usefully be employed. This idea is developed 
further in Appendix 1. 
Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry also indicates that 
the lag between R&D expenditure and the benefit arising is not 
straightforward. Jordan's 1986 survey of the industry stated 
that it took between 12 and 14 years to develop a new drug and 
bring it to the market. The survey quoted the Association of 
the British Pharmaceutical Industry as considering that there 
then remained only about four years in which the invention 
might be exploited As in most countries patents are filed at a 
very early stage of R&D and last for twenty years, the ABPI 
estimate may indicate that the protection afforded by 
patenting breaks down before the patent expires. Barclays de 
Zoete Wedd (1988) estimated a shorter development time - some 
6-9% years, broken down as follows: - 
Research planning, chemistry 
and patent search 
Pre-clinical testing on animals 
Testing on healthy humans 
Small group trials 
100+ patient studies concurrent 
with factory scale-up 
Duration Success 
rate' 
1-2 years 1: 10,000 
2-3 years 1: 1,000 
0.5-1 year 1: 100 
1-1.5 years 1: 50 
1.5-2 years 1: 20 
1. Success rate 
is the likelihood of a compound tested 
reaching the market. 
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These estimates suggest that the lag between R&D expenditure 
and the benefit arising differs fundamentally in the 
pharmaceutical industry from that in manufacturing industry: 
in the former, the fallow period is long and the period over 
which benefits are generated is short; in the latter Schott's 
data suggest that the opposite is more typical. 
There is very little evidence about the typical lag between 
expenditure on advertising and the subsequent benefits. 
Comanor and Wilson (1974) and others have attempted to 
estimate the rate of decay of advertised-induced sales from 
the correlation between current sales and advertising spend. 
Ayanian (1983) criticised this approach on the grounds that 
the estimated sales decay rates were marginal sales decay 
rates and did not reflect long-run effects. As Ayanian 
demonstrated, a significant portion of advertising expenditure 
depreciating rapidly is not inconsistent with a low overall 
average advertising depreciation rate. Kotler (1976, p 367) 
described techniques used by advertising practitioners, such 
as recall and recognition testing, which could be adapted to 
estimating typical advertising decay rates but commented that 
the amount of fundamental research on advertising 
effectiveness was lappallingly small'. 
Hirschey and Weygandt (1985) said that there was no consensus 
over the depreciation rates or estimated useful lives of the 
hidden capital represented by expenditure on advertising and 
R&D; their own estimates, based on an empirical study of 390 
large US firms with q as the dependent variable, indicated 
that R&D amortisation rates generally fell in the 10 to 20k 
range and advertising amortisation rates were in the 10 to 20k 
range for non-durable goods and 30 to 60k range for durable 
goods. Hirschey's earlier (1982) study of the same data used 
the ratio of firm market value to the book value of assets as 
the dependent variable and was a cruder effort. It 
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nevertheless produced not dissimilar results. -In Hirschey's 
later (1985) study of the same data, market concentration, 
market share and relative firm size added little explanatory 
power to the model when q was used as the dependent variable. 
Ayanian (1983) employed data from Comanor and Wilson's 1974 
study of 39 US industries to re-estimate the original 
regression equation in which the dependent variable was the 
industry average accounting rate of return. The independent 
variables were amended to include the ratio of advertising 
spend to tangible capital employed and the explanatory power 
of the regression equation was found to be maximised when, in 
effect, a depreciation rate of 20 to 30! k was applied to 
capitalised advertising expenditure. 
One difficulty with the above studies that is not always 
recognised by the researchers is that, while the findings are 
generally inconsistent with the Sub-optimal Expenditure 
Hypothesis, the explanation that the expenditure creates a 
barrier to entry enabling supra-normal profits to be earned 
cannot be so readily dismissed. This explanation is a, 
plausible one and has, for example, led the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (then the Monopolies Commission) to 
recommend limits to advertising intensity in the detergents 
market (1966). 
It is difficult to distinguish between the hidden capital 
effect and the barrier to market entry effect. There is, 
however, some evidence to suggest that the hidden capital 
effect is the correct explanation. Ayanian (1983) found that 
when an accounting policy of depreciating hidden capital at 
the rates he had estimated was adopted, industries with a high 
advertising intensity were, on average, no more profitable 
than those with a lower advertising intensity. Demsetz (1979) 
examined the inter-temporal correlation of profit rates of 
groups of industries with different advertising intensities 
and rates of growth in advertising and, finding no difference 
between producer and consumer goods industries, concluded that 
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advertising does not create a barrier to entry. 
The possibility that expenditure on staff could generate 
hidden capital was recognised by Telser (1961) but has 
generally been the subject of separate research. Much of this 
research has been directed at ways in which firms should 
account in their management accounts for this so-called 'human 
capital,. Some of the research is, however, helpful'in 
indicating how an external financial analyst might value human 
capital. Thus, the Report of the American Accounting 
Association Committee on Human Resource Accounting (1973) 
identified the costs associated with human capital as those of 
recruiting, selecting, hiring, training, placing and 
developing staff. Less attention has, however, been paid in 
economic literature to other elements of human capital 
represented by expensed items which generate deferred benefits 
to the employing firm such as: 
(a)-deferred remuneration, eg loyalty payments and employee 
and executive share option schemes, which are accounted for 
under generally accepted accounting practices in a prudent 
manner; 
(b) pension fund contributions - even following the 
introduction of SSAP 24 in May 1988, pension contributions 
are accounted for in a conservative manner with no 
immediate account taken of pension fund surpluses and the 
benefit accruing to the employing firm as a result of 
depressed transfer values which provide, in effect, a 
deferred loyalty payment to long stayers; and 
(c) the opportunity cost of restrictions on the free 
movement of staff within an industry, eg covert no-poaching 
agreements between firms. 
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Likert and Pyle (1971) defined human capital as the cost of 
replacing the entire human organisation of a firm. This 
definition takes account of the firm's investment in 
infrastructure as well as those elements deriving from 
deferred remuneration identified above. Managers, when asked 
by Likert and Pyle to estimate such human capital, came up 
with figures within a range of two to ten times the annual 
payroll. The wide range undoubtedly reflects uncertainty over 
the concept as well as estimating error and firm diversity. 
Sydenham (1979) described mathematical models using the Markov 
process to model the expenditure/benefit profile of investment 
in human resources and suggested that human capital could be 
negative for some firms. The distinction between negative 
human capital and an ability of a well organised workforce to 
appropriate supra-normal profits is, however, a fine one: as 
already noted, Salinger found unionisation negatively 
associated with Tobin's q for a sample of US firms -a finding 
he interpreted as employee appropriation, but negative human 
capital would also provide an explanation. 
The valuation of human capital is also of interest to 
financial analysts, especially where firms have skilled 
employees and few tangible assets, ie so-called people 
intensive businesses. This interest was intensified by the 
wave of take-overs of financial services and advertising 
companies in the second half of the 1980s. Sydenham (1979) had 
argued that there was no conceptual basis for capitalising 
salaries of higher paid employees with a bigger multiplier 
than was applied to less well paid employees. While this 
argument appears counter-intuitive, some financial analysts 
appear to agree: Financial Weekly (17 September 1987, p. 4) 
referred to a so-called PD or People Dependent ratio for 
assessing financial services companies; this ratio employed 
staff numbers, rather than staff costs, as the denominator, 
the numerator being the market value of the firm less the net 
book value of its assets. 
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Shleifer and Summers (1987) argued that a firm is a nexus of 
informal, long-term contracts between shareholders and 
stakeholders (employees, suppliers etc). Such contracts could 
also represent an investment with a non-zero replacement cost 
and would therefore represent another form of hidden capital, 
ie Is takeholders' capital,. Neither economists nor financial 
analysts appear to have addressed how the replacement cost of 
stakeholders' capital might be estimated. 
It has been assumed above that the appropriate basis for 
valuing the various forms of hidden capital identified is 
replacement cost. It is possible, however, that, like any 
other asset, the replacement cost of hidden capital might 
exceed its economic value, in which case the lower value would 
represent its current cost or deprival value. Edwards, Kay and 
Mayer commented that a firm's hidden capital (which they 
associated with its reputation) would typically have an 
economic value less than its replacement cost, but their 
reasons for this view are not completely clear. There would 
certainly be huge diseconomies of scale in replicating 
investment in R&D, brands and people if this were attempted 
within too short a time, but the concept of replication should 
allow for orderly and optimal expenditure discounted to a 
single present value to arrive at replacement cost. 
Furthermore, empirical research by Grabowski and Mueller 
(1978) indicates that the economic value of R&D generated 
hidden capital exceeds its replacement'cost: above average 
returns on investment in hidden capital generated by research 
and development expenditure were found, indicating that the 
economic value of the investment in R&D exceeded its 
replication cost. This finding needs, however, to be treated 
with caution: as Freeman (1974) commented, the uncertainty 
surrounding innovation means that, among alternative 
investment possibilities, R&D projects were unusually 
dependent on what Keynes described in a celebrated passage 
(1936) as "animal spirits". Freeman also noted that empirical 
evidence indicated that, in practice, more advanced portfolio 
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methods were seldom used for R&D selection. This might help 
explain the above average returns on R&D found by Grabowski 
and Mueller: if decisions on investment in R&D ignored 
portfolio effects, it might result in sub-optimal investment 
levels, ie R&D projects would be declined even though their 
anticipated returns were sufficient to recover their risk 
adjusted cost of capital. This could have the effect of 
inflating the rate of return on the investment that was made. 
An assumption implicit in valuing hidden capital in terms of 
capitalised and depreciated expenditure is that the benefits 
of the expenditure are not shared with other firms. This would 
not be the case if firms engaged in, possibly covert, 
co-operative agreements on R&D. Jacquemin (1987) argued that 
such agreements would be fragile and unstable and are 
therefore not very common. R&D 'spillover' need not, however, 
depend on collaboration between firms. Empirical research by 
Jaffe (1984) on US corporations indicates that all R&D 
expenditure influences the performance of firms with related 
products and technology: where R&D in a firm's vicinity in 
what Jaffe describes as "product-technology space,, increased, 
the firm tended to do more R&D itself, to produce more patents 
per dollar from this work and to increase its overall 
productivity more quickly, suggesting that R&D generated 
hidden capital depends on the expenditure of firms engaged in 
the same or related markets or employing similar technology. 
The possibility of spillover of other categories of hidden 
capital has received less attention, even though it appears 
likely: advertising spillover would arise when advertising has 
a generic component or where it assists in blocking market 
entry by potential competitors; human capital spillover would 
arise when firms draw from the same labour market - for 
example, when staff join another employer in the same 
industry, some of the benefits of training might accrue to the 
new employer. Finally, the interaction between advertising, 
R&D and investment in staff is possible. Hula (1988) argued 
that advertising could affect a firm's incentive, ability and 
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willingness to engage in R&D and might encourage R&D through 
making diversification more attractive. Similar interactions 
involving staff investment are conceivable but appear not to 
have been addressed. 
3.7 The Influence of Taxation on cr 
Under a so-called 'classical, corporation tax system in which 
interest on borrowing is deductible in arriving at a company's 
taxable profits, dividends are not tax deductible, and 
interest and dividends are taxed at the same rate in the hands 
of the recipients, the owners of a firm can increase their 
post-tax income by converting part of their interest in a 
company from equity into loan capital. As, according to the 
Fundamental Model, the value of a company reflects rational 
expectations about future cash flows accruing to the providers 
of capital, and these cash flows are, by definition, post tax, 
it suggests that the value of a company with loan capital 
should be greater than the value of the same company without 
loan capital. This increase in value is referred to in the 
literature as the 'tax shield, on borrowing. 
The tax shield is described by Brealey and Myers' as a 
"valuable asset" of a company. The concept that such an 
increase in capital value can be viewed as an intangible 
asset, rather than, say, a reduction in the company's cost of 
capital, may appear to conflict with accountants' concepts of 
what comprises an asset. There is no formally accepted 
definition in the UK of what comprises an asset, but the ASC 
proposed in ED 42 (1988, para 14) that assets are 
"probable future economic benefits controlled by and 
accruing to a particular enterprise as a result of past 
transactions or events'. 
The tax shield is consistent with this definition, in that: 
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a. there is a probable future economic benefit in the form 
of the increased cash flow payable to the shareholders of 
the company; 
b. the benefit is not under the control of anyone other 
than the company and its shareholders and accrues to the 
company and its shareholders; and 
c. it arises as a result of past transactions and events, 
namely the incidence of the borrowing and the imposition of 
tax by the government. 
The significance of the tax shield for q is that the inclusion 
of such an intangible asset in the denominator normalises q in 
a world of taxes and borrowing, so that q=1 continues to 
correspond to 'normal' profitability. This is referred to in 
the literature as the 'tax wedge effect'. According to 
Porterba and Summers (1983) and King (1986(2)), there are, 
however, two views of the valuation of corporate equity. Under 
the so-called traditional view,, the market value of a firm 
would, in a steady state, exactly equal the replacement cost 
of its assets, ie the equilibrium value of q would be unity. 
In effect, there would be no tax wedge, ie the value of the tax 
shield asset would be nil. Under the alternative 'trapped 
equity model', the tax relief on borrowing is capitalised into 
share price, so that, if the tax shield asset is ignored, the 
equilibrium value of q is less than unity. In a simplified 
version of the trapped equity model, King. (1986(i)) 
demonstrated that the equilibrium value of q under the UK 
imputation tax system would be: 
I-T 
(43) 
1-t 
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In a fuller analysis (1986(l)), King made 
result depends on the assumption that the 
indifferent as to its choice of its debt 
the Modigliani-Miller theorem (see below) 
dividend policy. Two other models were al 
King: 
it clear that this 
company is 
- equity ratio as per 
and as to its 
so considered by 
(a) a model in which agency costs of borrowing and/or 
bankruptcy costs become positive after some critical 
debt-equity ratio - under this regime the equilibrium 
value of q lies between (1-T)/(l-t) and 1; and 
(b) a model in which agency costs of borrowing are a 
function of the debt-equity ratio, resulting in an 
equilibrium debt-equity ratio - under this regime, the 
equilibrium value of q is unity. 
Ashton (1989) addressed the question of whether personal 
taxation could be ignored and pointed to a lack of detailed 
and accessible discussion of the UK imputation tax system. He 
concluded that it was possible to use formulae and models that 
made no explicit reference to personal tax rates, but fairly 
strong assumptions about the nature of equilibrium returns 
were necessary - in particular the irrelevancy of dividend 
policy. 
It is shown in Appendix 2 that, with the UK imputation tax 
system, the equilibrium value of q under the trapped equity 
model is: 
i-( ,)=( I-, ) (44) 
1-tp 1-tp 
where p is the payout ratio. This, of course, implies that the 
value of a company is reduced by the payment of dividends (an 
apparent paradox given that firms do Pay dividends referred to 
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as the 'Dividend Puzzle'). 
A consideration of the trapped equity model begins with 
Modigliani and Miller's seminal analyses (1958 and 1963). 
According to this analysis, 
TSB =VbT' 
where: TSB is the present value of the tax shield; 
Vb is the market value of borrowing; and 
TI is the anticipated corporation tax rate under a 
'classical' corporation tax system. 
(45) 
Lewellen and Emery (1986) and others have adapted equation 45 
to the UK imputation tax system by substituting 
Tl- T- t i --t 
where: T is the Corporation Tax rate; and 
t is the income tax rate. 
(46) 
This, however, ignores the fact that only that portion of 
taxable profits that is paid out as dividend results in a tax 
credit. If UK corporation tax is considered to result in a 
mainstream corporation tax charge and Personal taxes are 
ignored (ie the cost of capital is considered for convenience 
to be the rate at which pre-personal tax cash flows are 
discounted"): 
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T' = 
T- tp 
1-tp 
(47) 
where p is the payout ratio, ie the ratio of gross dividends 
to prof its after mainstream corporation taxI2. Thus, on an 
imputation tax basis which applies in the Uk, the tax shield 
predicted by Modigliani and Miller is: 
TSB = Vb 
T- 
1-tp (48) 
The payout ratio and the tax rates employed above are the 
anticipated rates which could be assumed to be constant in all 
future periods. Another key assumption employed above is that 
investors consider it to be the intention of management to 
maintain the present level of debt, Vb, indefinitely and are 
fully confident that this can be achieved. Lewellen and Emery 
preferred the assumption made by Miles and Ezzell (1980 and 
1983) that borrowing is assumed to be periodically re-balanced 
in response to evolving information on cash flows. In effect, 
the capital gearing ratio is maintained at the initial level 
and the annual tax saving is seen as dependent on there being 
sufficient profit to support this level. Accordingly, after 
the first accounting period, tax savings are discounted at the 
firm's (unleveraged) cost of equity capital. Under this 
approach: 
TSB=V 
r', (1 +ru) 
Ti (49) ,b (r, -g) (1+ro) 
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where: ro is the interest rate on default-free debt; 
ru. is the firm's (unleveraged) cost of equity capital; 
and 
g is the anticipated steady rate of growth in earnings, 
dividends and debt. 
Masulis (1983) commented that, despite a wide acceptance in 
principle of the tax shield effect, there was little empirical 
evidence of any relationship between capital structure and 
firm value other than Modigliani and Miller's rather narrowly 
based work on public utilities. To fill this gap, Masulis 
conducted a study of 14 recapitalisations and 119 exchange 
offers 13 in the US between 1963 and 1978. Ignoring 
anticipated growth in borrowing, his findings were consistent 
with a tax shield effect with a valuation enhancement per 
dollar of borrowing in the range 0.23 to 0.45. 
Under the Adjusted Present Value (APV) approach favoured by 
Brealey and Myers (1984), tax savings from debt are discounted 
at the default-free interest rate, ie they are assumed to be 
pre-scheduled and certain. Lewellen and Emery (ibid) 
demonstrated that the APV approach is equivalent to valuing 
the tax shield as follows: - 
TSB=Vb 
(0) 
T' (50) 
ro 9 
Whilst the trapped equity model is both plausible and . 
supported Masulis's findings, none of the methods above to 
value the tax shield is completely satisfactory. In arriving 
at equation 48 it is unrealistic to assume that tax savings 
are pre-scheduled and certain. This formulation does, however, 
avoid-the awkward assumption in equation 49 that the riskiness 
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of the tax saving changes abruptly at the end'of the current 
accounting period. Furthermore, equation 49 employs ru - the 
firm's cost of (unleveraged) equity capital - which introduces 
a degree of circularity into the equation, as the cost of 
unleveraged equity is unobservable and must be estimated after 
making assumptions about the tax saving from debt. 
Furthermore, equation 50 assumes that r. is greater than g. 
This is not a necessary condition for the firm as a whole. At 
a more fundamental level, none of-the models explains why 
companies in practice limit borrowing. Thus no account is 
taken of the risk of corporate bankruptcy, no allowance is 
made for personal tax liability, and the possibility of future 
tax exhaustion whereby profits may be insufficient to use the 
tax relief on interest is ignored. 
One way to accommodate such concerns would be with a 
stochastic model such as that developed by Mayer (1984). With 
this model Mayer demonstrated that, even without bankruptcy 
effects, an optimal level of gearing exists which depends only 
on exogenously determined tax rates and the firm's investment 
policy. According to Mayer's model, tax exhaustion results in 
a progressive effective corporation tax rate which limits 
firms, borrowing; but, as formulated, the model does not 
provide a practical means of valuing the tax shield of a firm 
from published data. 
Lewellen and Emery (ibid) suggested a very practical means of 
valuing the tax shield. Recognising that the effect might not 
be related to the full extent of the tax deduction, might be a 
combination of tax and other influences, or might not even be 
tax-related at all, they proposed that the tax shield could be 
evaluated using an empirically estimated universal 'debt 
advantage multiplier' on firm's borrowing. This approach was, 
in effect, adopted by Masulis in his empirical study. There 
appears, however, to be little theoretical justification for 
assuming a universal constant, given the variations in tax 
positions of individual firms. 
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The tax effects described above do not take account of any 
initial and capital allowances granted for tax purposes which 
are an integral part of the UK tax system. As Hayashi (1982) 
demonstrated, it is relatively easy to adapt such models if 
simplifying assumptions about the rate of allowances are made, 
but diversity in allowances for different types of asset make 
such assumption unrealistic. A better approach which would 
allow for this diversity would be to employ the so-called 
liability for deferred taxation. In published accounts, the 
deferred taxation liability r* elates to the liability to pay 
corporation tax, including the ACT element, and is accounted 
for as a timing difference subject to adjustment for the 
extent to which it is probable that a liability will 
crystallise. This basis does not reflect present values and 
results in figures which have little relevance in the 
evaluation of the present value of the tax shield. Edwards, 
Kay and Mayer have, however, observed that under the current 
cost conventions the deferred tax liability at any time is 
that balance which, when deducted from the overall book value 
of capital employed determined under pre-tax 
value-to-the-owner conventions, gives the value-to-the-owner 
on a post-tax basis. when assets are valued at net replacement 
cost, the deferred tax liability would be the present value of 
initial and capital allowances that could be claimed at 
current tax rates when investing in these assets; for assets 
valued at net realisable value, the deferred tax liability 
would correspond to the tax liability which would arise on 
disposal; and, for assets valued at present value, the 
deferred tax liability would be the present value of expected 
future taxes on the cash flow generated by the operation of 
these assets. Edwards, Kay and Mayer did not explain precisely 
how capital allowances on existing assets could be estimated, 
but this would be relatively straightforward if the 
assumptions, employed in their empirical study Of post-tax 
corporate profitability, that all assets are valued at 
replacement cost and there is no tax exhaustion, were 
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repeated. Edwards, Kay and Mayer disregarded deferred tax on 
intangible assets including hidden capital, but as expenditure 
on hidden capital is generally allowed for tax purposes in the 
year in which it is incurred, this would appear to be correct. 
In Appendix 2 it is demonstrated that the tax wedge effect is 
eliminated if deferred tax calculated in the manner proposed 
by Edwards, Kay and Mayer is treated as a liability and 
included in the denominator of q. 
Estimation of the deferred tax liability using the principles 
expounded by Edwards, Kay and Mayer provides the best way 
identified in the literature of evaluating a company's tax 
shield. This is the method adopted in later chapters. 
3.8 The Relationship Between Beta and-Market Power 
Salinger's analysis described in section 3.1 above 
demonstrating that values of q in excess of one arise when 
there is market power in the form of a non-zero reciprocal of 
the elasticity of demand is one of a number of such analyses, 
eg Booth (1981), Conine (1983), Spiller (1984) and Chen, Cheng 
and Hite (1986). Despite the complexity of some of these 
analyses, this relationship can be inferred simply by noting 
that, in a competitive product market and an efficient capital 
market, the absence of barriers to entry would ensure that the 
expected present value of supra-normal profits from the 
exploitation of market power is zero. Whilst, however, the 
influence of elasticity of demand on q is uncontroversial, it 
is (as discussed in Chapter 6) difficult to estimate at the 
firm level. The degree of systematic risk experienced by a 
firm can, however, be inferred from its Beta Coefficient, 
being the covariance of the return on its securities and the 
market return, divided by the variance of the market return. 
Any relationship that would enable the average elasticity of 
demand experienced by a firm to be estimated from its Beta 
would therefore be invaluable in assessing the reliability of 
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a profitability measure. Literature dealing with this 
possibility is now reviewed. . 
It is common practice to include the Beta Coefficient among 
the independent variables when studying the correlation 
between profitability and market structure, eg Sullivan 
(1978), Hirschey (1985), Bernier (1987), but often the 
correlation has been found not to be significant 3.4 . As the 
theoretical justification is often not explained, such 
persistence may reflect the ready availability of Betas rather 
than the existence of a coherent model linking Beta and 
profitability. Although it is intuitively appealing that the 
absence of competition would enable a monopolist to enjoy a 
low level of systematic risk, Booth (1981) commented there is 
no a priori reason why this should be so; but, Spiller (1984), 
Booth (ibid), Conine (ibid), and others have nevertheless, 
demonstrated that, while market power cannot be unambiguously 
inferred from Beta, the cost of equity capital, and hence 
Beta, decreases as market power increases. Chen, Cheng and 
Hite, extending a model developed by Subrahmanyam and 
Thomadakis (1980), also concluded that market power and Beta 
were inversely related but claimed that market power could be 
inferred from Beta. Abstracting all other factors except 
market power that could result in q greater than I and using a 
one period model of the firm in which the value of the firm is 
maximised by restricting output, ie 
d (ve+vb) 
"ý 0 dQ 
where: V. +Vb is the market value of the firm, s securities, 
equal to the'net present value of future earnings; and 
Q is the quantity demanded 
78 
Chen et al concluded that: 
cov( s, r 
v Ko (52) (i+ b) 
Var (z. ) Beta 
where: SIKO is the ratio of sales to capital employed; 
rm, is the market return; 
Vb is the market value of the firm's debt; 
Ve is the market value of the firm's equity capital; 
Beta is the firm's equity Beta Coefficient; 
Cov () signifies covariance; and 
Var () signifies variance. 
Unlike the result reached earlier by Spiller (1984)15, the 
elasticity of demand itself is eliminated from the right hand 
side of equation. All the terms on the right hand side are 
therefore observable, and this expression can therefore be 
used as an independent variable representing market power. 
Such use is, however, rejected as Cheng et al's derivation has 
three significant flaws: 
i. SIKO is retained within the covariance term. This 
results in inadequate separation of the influence of 
operational leverage and market power. Chen, Cheng and 
Hite argue that the cov(S/K, rm) is similar in concept 
to the Accounting Beta conceived by Beaver, Kettler and 
Scholes (1970). It would certainly be just as hard to 
estimate, as accounting data in the UK are published 
only annually or, at most, biannually. A more 
fundamental objection, however, as argued in Chapters 5 
and 8, price effects should be eliminated from 
covariance term, reducing it to Cov(bQ/Q, r. ) . 
ii. SIKO is employed as a proxy for the sales generated 
by El of new investment. It is a poor measure of this 
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given the existence of economies of scale,, and, as 
Spiller (ibid) observed, could be expected to vary 
independently with efficiency. 
iii. it is assumed that dr/dQ =0, where r is the cost 
of capital and Q is demand. In Chapter 5 this is shown 
not to be the case. 
Some less serious matters are raised by equation 52. The term 
(1+Vb/V, ) represents the adjustment factor necessary to convert 
the firm's observed equity Beta Coefficient into the ungeared 
Beta associated with the systematic risk of the firm, s 
activities. If allowance is made for the tax effect of 
borrowing and the treatment of mainstream corporation tax 
employed elsewhere in this paper is adhered to, this term 
becomes: 
V 1-T 1+ b (53) 71 1 T-- -tP 
where: T is the Corporation Tax rate; and 
is the payout ratio; and 
t is the Income Tax rate. 
Buckley (1981) and Schnabel (1983) have pointed out that this 
simple adjustment for tax does not take account of the 
riskiness of corporate borrowing. If allowance is made for the 
fact that firms cannot borrow at the risk free rate, the 
relationship is: 
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Beta asset = 
Be ta +a 
+ 
Vb 1-T (54) 
tp 
where: a is Buckley's Correction Factor, such that 
V 1-T (. rb-'rO) (55) 
i---tp 
where rb 
is the cost of corporate borrowing. 
Nevertheless, the simple adjustment for tax is still widely 
used and may represent a reasonable approximation to the 
formulation proposed by Buckley and Schnabel. One further 
modification is, however, justified: calculating Vb net of 
any cash on deposit. Where cash exceeds borrowing, it could 
also be argued that Vb should be negative so as to allow for 
the effect of high liquidity depressing systematic risk. 
It should be noted that, notwithstanding the theoretical 
objections to Chen, Cheng and Hite's model described above, 
they nevertheless reported significant results from a 
principal component analysis using equation 52. 
3.9 Ex Post Measures of Economic Profitability 
The literature on ex post measures of the economic 
profitability of a firm is generally both separate from that 
dealing with q and less scattered. There is, however, a 
measure of overlap. Some of the issues already covered are 
equally relevant to ex post measures, and some of the issues 
identified in the literature on ex post measures is relevant 
81 
AM 
to 
Lindenberg and Ross's original claim for q as a measure of 
economic profitability was based on the argument that, in a 
competitive market without barriers to entry, a firm cannot 
sustain q in excess of 1. In consequence the extent to which q 
exceeds 1 is an indication of the expected present value of 
supra-normal profits deflated by the net replacement cost of 
the firm's capital stock. Claims that various rates of return 
can be used to measure a firm's economic profitability have 
generally been based on a similar argument: in a competitive 
market without barriers to entry, a firm cannot sustain a rate 
of return in excess of the risk adjusted cost of capital, 
anticipated at the start of the accounting year, as such 
'excess returns' would prompt market entry, thereby driving 
them back to a rate equal to the risk adjusted cost of 
capital 16 . Thus supra-normal profitability 
has been associated 
with the extent to which these rates of return exceed the 
estimated risk adjusted cost of capital17. 
The need to estimate a firm's risk adjusted cost of capital at 
the start of the accounting year in order to measure economics 
profitability highlights one of q's inherent advantages - it 
requires no such estimate and is therefore independent of the 
particular method chosen to accomplish this. 
Against this advantage may be set q's unsuitability for 
measuring the economic profitability of a line of business 
within a firm" - This is generally more practicable using 
rates of return, as these may be calculated from line of 
business accounting information published in accounts or 
obtainable from the firm's management accounting information 
system". Some consideration of the suitability of such 
information is, however, called for. 
Where there is less than complete separation of different 
lines of business, the methodology employed to arrive at line 
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of business information is the more or less arbitrary 
allocation of revenues, costs and book values to specific 
output. It is widely recognised that preparers of accounts 
have wide discretion over the choice of the method of 
allocation. Furthermore, such full absorption costing, 
techniques are closely associated with the 'cost plus' basis 
for setting prices which has been criticised for conflicting 
with incremental principles which underlie much micro-economic 
theory. Thus Baxter and Oxenfeldt (1961) suggested that the 
main attraction of cost plus pricing was that it offered a 
means by which plausible prices could be found with ease and 
speed. its imposing computations looked factual and precise, 
and enables prices to be justified on moral grounds. This may 
explain why Coulthurst (1986) found that allocative techniques 
had even found their way into capital project appraisal, an 
area where incremental principles appeared to be 
indisputable 20 . If the behavioral explanation for the 
widespread use of full absorption costing is correct, it 
suggests that the full cost methodology is specious and 
consequently cannot be relied on in estimating rates of return 
for a line of business. Full absorption costing and 
conventional accounting techniques of allocation may, however, 
be more soundly based than Baxter and Oxenfeldt suggest. 
Skinner (1987) argued that, while it had been long accepted 
that there was no economic justification for allocating shared 
costs to goods produced jointly, the cause-effect basis of 
allocating costs to separately produced goods would ensure 
that these cost allocations were not without significance. In 
Skinner's view, fully allocated cost was likely to be a good 
estimate of long run incremental cost. An objection to this 
view is that it assumes that the firm has certain knowledge of 
the demand schedule for its products in the forthcoming 
period. Whilst in these circumstances it could be argued that 
the budget represents an optimal plan for a particular, chosen 
level of demand, with overhead and other allocations 
reflecting economically efficient allocations and full cost 
corresponding to opportunity cost, in practice firms do not 
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know with certainty their demand schedules. Thus, when there 
are short term changes in demand, output rather than price is 
changed and overheads continue to. be allocated to output 
according to the budgeted or standard rate". The incremental 
principle, under which profit maximisation requires price to 
equal marginal cost, has, however, not gone unchallenged. 
Baumol and Bradford (1970) drew attention to much prior 
economic literature which pointed out that systematic 
departure from pricing at marginal cost was required 
throughout an economy to balance the effect of government 
revenue 22 . 
It is also generally impossible to estimate directly the risk 
adjusted cost of capital of a line of busines S23 . This would 
not, however, preclude using a rate of return to estimate the 
economic profitability of a line of business provided an 
indirect estimate of the cost of capital was available 24 . 
The evidence above provides a less than comprehensive 
vindication of full absorption costing and conventional cost 
allocations employed in arriving at line of business 
information. Nevertheless, using these techniques, it is 
possible to estimate the rates of return earned in particular 
lines of business, something q cannot generally be used for. 
Rates of return can only be measured by an analyst or other 
external observer lex post', that is after the end of the 
accounting year when a firm publishes its accounts and 
possibly makes available other information about its cash flow 
etc. These rates of return may be compared with the risk 
adjusted cost of capital anticipated at the start of the 
accounting year Ue the ex ante cost of capital), estimated 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the Dividend 
Growth model (DGM) or in some other way. Whilst the various 
rates of return described below may also possess significance 
from an ex ante perspective (eg as management tools for 
investment appraisal), this aspect is not relevant to a study 
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of q and is not addressed below. 
It could be argued that q is fundamentally different from a 
rate of return measure which is compared with the firm's risk 
adjusted cost of capital. q relates to investment 
opportunities, whereas, as Luckett (1984) has observed, rates 
of return, especially those based on accruals based accounting 
information, are concerned with periodic assessment of 
on-going corporate activity. 
If q and rates of return, whether based on cash flows or 
accruals, were seen to have nothing in common, the literature 
on rates of return would have little to contribute to this 
paper. It is certainly true that q and rates of return have 
different perspectives and cover different periods. q measures 
the anticipated economic profitability of a firm in all future 
periods; whilst the difference between the rate of return in 
an accounting year and the ex ante risk adjusted cost of 
capital at the start of that year measures the firm's economic 
profitability in a particular, past period. Both may, however, 
signal the exploitation of market power; and many of the 
problems that arise are common to both approaches. These 
problems include potential bias due to the omission of hidden 
capital, distortion due to taxation effects, and the extent to 
which capital markets are efficient25 . Furthermore, as argued 
in later chapters, there are structural similarities between 
measures, such as q, which are based on an input-output ratio 
and measures based on an internal rate of return. Finally, in 
many econometric studies the perspective for economic 
profitability is often irrelevant as the hypothesises being 
considered are concerned with steady states. In consequence, 
the literature on various rates of return is considered 
relevant. 
Claims are made in the literature for four types of rate of 
return: 
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a. the Internal Rate of Return (CIRR); 
b. the Accounting Rate of. Return (ARR); 
c. the Recovery Rate (RR); and 
d the Added Value Ratio (AVR). 
The Return on Sales is also used in practical financial 
analysis and sometimes in empirical economic research, but the 
absence of any theoretical link with the internal rate of 
return and the susceptibility of this measure to the level of 
vertical integration means that it is not considered further 
in this paper. 
The literature dealing with the four measures of economic 
profitability referred to above does not generally address 
their relationship to idealised measures such as those 
identified in Chapter 2. 
3.91 The Corporate Internal Rate of Return Relative 
One concept of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) as it relates 
to the profitability of firms is to identify it with the 
average of the internal rates of return of the firm, s 
individual projects measured over their entire lives. This 
approach, adopted by Salamon (1973), avoids the need to 
determine how the initial and terminal values of a firm are 
arrived at. Salamon's model of the firm comprises a 
perpetually growing collection of identical projects. He 
demonstrated that, when the rate of growth of investment is 
less than the IRR of the individual projects, the IRR earned 
on investing in the firm is the same as the IRR on the 
individual investmentS26. 
Salamon's finding, rather than any similarity with an ideal 
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measure of a firm's economic profitability, 'represents the 
typical rationale for using the difference between the IRR on 
an investment in the entire firm, valuing initial and terminal 
capitals on some 'economic, basis, and the firm's risk 
adjusted cost of capital as a profitability measure. This 
internal rate of return is referred to in the literature as 
the Corporate Internal Rate of Return (CIRR). In the multi- 
period version, the firm's CIRR is the solution to the 
equation: 
V =YM -n 0 
(S -E -BIt) (1 + CIRR) -t+V (56) ttn 
(1 + CIRR) 
where: Vo is the initial 'value' of the firm at t=0; 
Vn is the'terminal "value' of the firm at t=n; 
St is the cash received from sales in the year t; 
Et is the cash expenditure of the firm that does not 
vary with output Ue, its 'fixed, expenditure); and 
BIt is the cash expenditure of the firm that does vary 
with output Ue the 'variable' expenditure). 
As previously, the division of all expenditure into two 
categories, E and BI, is to facilitate later analysis and has 
no immediate significance. Abstracting from taxation, St-Et-Bt 
corresponds to both the firm's net cash flow and the net cash 
flow accruing to shareholders and providers of loan capital. 
In a single accounting year CIRR is the solution to 
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VO --- 
S-E-BI + 
V, (57) 
(1 + CIRR) (1 + CIRR) 
where S, E and BI are the cash flows in that year. Thus 
S-E-B V 
+ (58) 
CIRR 
VO 
The difference between the CIRR and the firm's risk adjusted 
cost of capital, r, is considered to be a measure of the 
firm's economic profitability and can be expressed as the 
Corporate Internal Rate of Return Relative, CREL, defined as 
CREL = 
('+ (59) 
I+r 
Thus 
sE BI Vi 
CREL 
-+r -+r 1 -+r 1 +. r (60) 
VO 
Substituting continuously compounded interest rates, CREL is 
CREL = 
S. e--r -E. e-, ' -BI. e--r + V,. e-, r (6 OA) 
VO 
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Unlike q, CREL requires an estimate of the firm's risk 
adjusted cost of capital. This is most conveniently estimated 
before personal taxes. In consequence, the net cash flow S-E- 
BI and the capital values, where appropriate, are generally 
calculated either after mainstream corporation tax and before 
personal taxes or before all taxes. The cost of capital at a 
pre-personal tax level may be estimated using the Dividend 
Growth Model or by comparison with the cost of capital of 
other firms, but the most widely used method is the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Despite the fact that, according 
to Levy and Sarnat (1986, page 345), the empirical results do 
not support CAPM in its purest form, it nevertheless provides 
a practical means of estimating a firm's risk adjusted cost of 
capital. According to the de-geared form of the CAPM: 
zu=ro +Beta (asset) [z, -rol 
where: r, is the cost of capital of the (ungeared) f irm; 
ro is the risk free interest rate; 
rm is the return on the universal or all-asset 
portfolio, generally taken to be proxied by the return 
on some diversified index such as the FTA All Share 
Index; and 
Beta(asset) is the Beta Coefficient associated with the 
firm's ungeared activities, which, ignoring the 
refinements described in 3.8 above, may be approximated 
by 
Beta(asset)=Beta 
b -T] (62) 
Ve 
[ V 
I- tp 
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where: Vb is the market'value of the firm's loan 
capital (net of cash on deposit); 
Ve is the market value of the firm's equity 
capital; 
T is the corporation tax rate; 
t is the income tax rate; and 
p is the payout ratio - included in this 
analysis, even though this is not the generally 
accepted practice. 
A number of valuation bases f or VO and V, have been proposed. 
Steele (1986) used stock market values, but, as Franks and 
Harris (1986) observed, stock market values reflect both the 
current level and anticipated changes in a firm's 
profitability, making it difficult to untangle the two. it 
would be more accurate to say that stock market values reflect 
the cost of capital and anticipated changes in profitability. 
This may be illustrated by considering a firm operating in a 
world in which stock market prices reflect the Fundamental 
Model and, for simplicity, there is no taxation nor premium 
for risk. If the cost of capital is 10t per annum and the firm 
has a single investment which yields 20t per annum in 
perpetuity (ie it has an internal rate of return of 20t) which 
is paid out in dividends, the stock market value of the firm 
is E200. Employing this value in equation 57, in year i: 
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200=- 20 + 200 (63) I+CIRR 1+CIRR 
Solving, CIRR = 100i. 
Thus, if the stock market value is used, the cost of capital 
(10k), not the internal rate of return on the single project 
(20k) is revealed. Franks and Harris's concern is further 
illustrated if, at the start of the second year, the firm 
disposes of its existing project for its stock market value 
and invests the proceeds in a new project yielding E25 per 
annum in perpetuity. CIRR in the second year is: 
200= 25 + 
250 (64) 
1+CIRR 1+CIRR 
Solving, CIRR = 37.51. 
This return is neither the cost of capital (1010 nor the 
internal rate of return on the new project (25! k). Its true 
significance is revealed by considering CREL. Abstracting from 
borrowing and tax, this as: 
CREL= 
S-E-BI+V,, 
V, o (i +. r) 
(65) 
where VO is the stock market value of equity at the beginning 
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of the year; and 
V.,. is the stock market value at the end of the year. 
Assuming the stock market is efficient and subject to new 
information which arrives at the end of each accounting period 
S-E-BI + 
V. 1 (66) 
(1+r) (1+a) (1+. r) (1+ý-) 
where: r is the risk adjusted cost of capital; and 
a is the abnormal gain (ie at the start of the year 
E(a) = 0) 
Therefore 
CREL= 1 
1+a 
(67) 
Thus, when the CIRR employs stock market values, CREL simply 
measures the abnormal or unexpected share price market gain. 
Thus if CREL is to impart useful information, an alternative 
basis of valuing Vo and V, is called for. 
Rappaport (1986) proposed valuing a firm's initial and 
terminal capital in terms of the present value of the 
sustainable cash flow. There are two objections to this 
approach: 
a. the sustainable cash flow is very subjective; and 
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b. V. 0 and V., would include the capital Val'ue of any 
economic rents, so the resulting CREL would not indicate 
supra-normal profits generated by market power. 
Realisable value might provide a basis for valuing V. 0 and V. 1. 
Whittington (1983) argued that this basis lacks relevance for 
a continuing business; but what is, in effect, exit price 
accounting has its advocates (eg Arnold and Wearing, 1988). 
The suitability of the current cost basis for CIRR and related 
measures has received considerable attention. Kay and Mayer 
(1985), refuting Whittington's claim (1983) that current cost 
has no theoretical basis, demonstrated that CIRR with current 
cost values imparts the correct signals for market entry and 
exit. Their analysis assumed that current cost values included 
intangible assets and that economic depreciation had been 
charged in arriving at book values. Devereux (1986) 
demonstrated by simulation that, when the current cost 
valuation basis is employed, CIRR is a good indicator of the 
internal rate of return on a firm's projects. Net replacement 
cost provides a closer approximation to the concept of a 
firm's replication cost described in the previous chapter. In 
practice, however, hidden capital is often ignored and the net 
replacement cost of a firm's capital is taken to by synonymous 
with the net replacement cost of its tangible net assets. 
Thus, if hidden capital and other intangibles are included in 
the valuation, the current cost basis will approximate in many 
cases to the replication cost described in the previous 
chapter. 
CREL is similar in form to the ideal profitability measure EP2: 
EP, = 
PVO, I (S) +PVO, I (K, ) 
PVO. I (KO) +PVO,, (E) +PVO,, (FI-) 
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where: KO is the firm's replication cost at the start of the 
year; and 
K3. is the firm's replication cost at the end of the 
year. 
Assuming the cash flows arise at the end of the accounting 
year, and that KO and K, can be represented as single payments, 
EP2 takes the f orm 
EP2 - 
S. s -x& +K,. e -rk (9A) 
Kc +E. e -r" +BI. e -zbl 
where r., rk, r. and rbi are the discount rates appropriate f or 
and specif ic to S, Kj, E, and BI. 
CREL, on the other hand, may be expressed as 
CREL = 
S. e --r -E. e --r -BI. e --r + Vj. e -z (GOA) 
VO 
Comparing the two measures, it is apparent that, provided v. 
and V, are the same as K. and K1, CREL dif f ers f rom EP2 not only 
regarding the assumption that cash flows arise at the end of 
the year, but also in the following respects: 
a. S, E, BI and K, are discounted by the f irm, s risk 
adjusted cost of capital r, whereas in EP2 the discount 
factor is specific to each cash flow; and 
b. In CREL the terms containing E and BI appear as 
deductions in the numerator rather than additions in the 
denominator. 
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The significance and implications of (a) and (b) and of the 
assumption that cash flows arise at the end of the accounting 
year are referred to again in the-next section dealing with 
literature on the Accounting Rate of Return and are analysed 
in greater detail in the next chapter. 
In practice, VO and V, are of ten taken to be the net 
replacement cost of the firm, s net assets, BVO and BV, 
respectively, rather than the replication costs KO and K1. As 
CREL can be computed in pre-tax terms provided the pre-tax 
cost of capital can be estimated, taxation effects can be 
abstracted and the dif f erence between BV, and KO and between 
BV, and K, can, by def inition, be identif ied with the f irm, s 
hidden capital. Literature describing hidden capital was 
summarised in 3.6. The potential for hidden capital to distort 
CREL and measures equivalent to CREL (eg ARR - see next 
section) is extensively described in the literature, although 
the term 'hidden capital' is not always employed. Hirschey 
(198s), for example, simply refers to accounting bias'. Egan, 
Higinbotham and Weston (1982), following Weiss, concluded that 
such accounting bias was eliminated when expenditure on hidden 
capital was constant. Their analysis employed the accounting 
rate of return, rather than CIRR, but appears to be mistaken 
as analyses by Telser (1969), Weiss (1969) and Demsetzlz 
comparative study (1979) demonstrate. These analyses may be 
re-stated in terms of CIRR and CREL, as follows: 
The 'true' CIRR, is defined by the equation: 
BVO+HCO - 
S-E-BI 
+ 
BV, 
+ 
HC, (68) 
1+CIRR 1+CIRR 1+CIRR 
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where: HCo is the hidden capital at t=0; 
HC1, is the hidden capital at t=1; 
BVo is the net replacement cost of net assets, ie the 
tangible capital, at t=0; 
BV, is the net replacement cost of net assets, ie 
tangible capital, at t=1; and 
S-E-BI is the firm's sales revenue, S, less cash 
expenditure, E+BI, in the year. 
The apparent CIRR, Ra, is defined by the equation: 
BVO = 
S-E-B + 
BV, (69) 
1+Ra 1 +Ra 
The accounting bias, BIASCRELI in the CREL may be defined as 
BIASCUL apparent CREL - 'true' CREL 
'true' CREL 
ie 
1 +R, 1+ CIRR 
1 -Tr 1 Tr (70) BIAScREL 
tiý 
( 
1+ 
1 +. r 
which reduces to 
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BIASCR,, -. 
Ra - CIRR (71) 
1+ CIRR 
For any depreciation profile (straight line, constant 
exponential etc) that does not change over time: 
HC, = (1 +ghc) HCO 
where ghc 
'S the growth in expenditure on hidden capital, 
assuming this is constant. 
combining equations: - 
(72) 
BIASCREL = 
HCO CIRR-ghc 
(73) 
B Vo 1+ CIRR 
This indicates that the accounting bias in CREL eliminated 
when: 
CIRR = ghc; or 
HCo = 0. 
As CIRR is not a risk adjusted internal rate of return, it has 
been assumed, in effect, that investment in hidden capital has 
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the same internal rate of return as investirýent in tangible 
assets. The first condition cannot therefore be satisfied as 
Salamon (ibid) demonstrated that growth must be less than the 
internal rate of return if the latter is defined. The second 
condition is satisfied when there is 10Wk first year 
depreciation, or when there is no expenditure on hidden 
capital. Thus only in these exceptional conditions is 
accounting bias not generated by hidden capital. 
Hirschey (ibid) asserted that q is less subject to accounting 
bias than is the accounting rate of return (ARR). It is not 
completely clear that Hirschey confines the term 'accounting 
bias' to distortion caused by omission of hidden capital, but, 
assuming ARR and the CIRR are equivalent, this view can be 
tested, as follows: 
The accounting bias, BIASq, in Tobin's q arising from ignoring 
hidden capital may be defined as 
BIASq apparent q- 'true' q 
'true' q 
But apparent q= Ve+Vb 
BVo 
and, abstracting from taxation, 
, true, q Ve+Vb 
BVo+HCo 
where Ve+Vb is the market value of the firm's securities. 
Thus: 
Ve + Vb 
ve 
V +vb 
BIAS, z 
B Vo BVO+HCo (74) 
Ve + Vb 
B Vo + HCO 
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Simpliiying 
BIAS,, = 
HCO 
Tco 
Comparing equations: 
(75) 
HCO 
_LCO 
CIRR-gh, 
> BIASq > BIASCREL (76) 
B Vo BVO 1+CIRR 
This simplifies to: 
gh, > -1 - Aq > Ar (77) 
but, ý assuming hidden capital is positive, from equation 72: 
ghc ý -1 (78) 
Therefore: 
BIASq > BIASCpEL (79) 
Thus, contrary to Hirschey's assertion, the accounting bias in 
q resulting from omitting or overlooking hidden capital is 
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greater than that in the CIRR Relative. Given'the equivalence 
of CIRR and the Accounting Rate of Return (ARR), discussed 
below, a similar finding applies to the ARR relative. 
Other forms of accounting bias than that arising from the 
omission of hidden capital can be conceived. Consideration of 
these is, however, deferred to the next section dealing with 
the ARR. 
3.92 Accountincr Rate of ReturReturn Relative 
The Accounting Rate of Return (ARR) consists of the annual 
profit divided by capital employed (corresponding to net 
tangible assets and, possibly, those intangible assets 
recognised in the accounts). It is widely used in day to day 
financial analysis. Reflecting the multitude of concepts of 
investment base and income generated from this investment, 
there exists a variety of views on how the return should be 
calculated, but there is a general recognition that the 
numerator and the denominator should be causally related 
(Bernstein, page 149). 
In measuring the economic profitability of a firm, it is 
generally of no interest how the firm's activities are 
financed, ie whether by equity or loan capital. In 
consequence, ARR, like CIRR, is often calculated with 
long-term loans treated not as a deduction from net assets but 
as part of the capital employed. Profits are accordingly 
struck before interest on this loan capital. This corresponds 
to including Vb in the numerator of q. 
ARR is widely used for management control purposes and in 
comparative studies, but consideration here is confined to its 
use as a measure of a firm's economic profitability. The 
rationale for this is that it is similar, and may even be 
equivalent to, the CIRR. 
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Salamon (1982) observed that research in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s seeking to specify-a relationship which would 
enable internal rates of return to be estimated from ARR had 
largely been abandoned when the goal proved elusive. Fisher 
and McGowan's claim (1983) that ARR was unrelated to economic 
profitability stimulated further work. While Martin (1988) 
argued that the relationship between ARR and internal rates of 
return was simply 'a red herring', others took up the 
challenge directly, useful insights being gained by Franks and 
Hodges (1983) and Kay and Mayer (1985). Salamon had, however, 
overlooked that a fundamental relationship between the CIRR 
and the ARR had already been demonstrated by Peasnell (1982). 
Abstracting from tax, Peasnell defined profit in a "clean 
surplus" manner so that, assuming that expenditure can be 
classified into fixed and variable elements: 
Pt =S -E -BI +BV, -BV, -, 
(80) 
where: P, is the prof it for the year; 
S is the firm's sales revenue in the year; 
E is the firm's fixed expenditure in cash terms 
in the year; 
BI is the variable expenditure in cash terms in 
the year; and 
BVt-j and BVt are the book values of net assets at 
the start and at the end of the accounting year, 
being net of depreciation and the firm's 
liabilities, other than its loan capital. 
Assuming the variable expenditure, BI, is the same on a cash 
or an accrual S27 basis, an alternative definition of the clean 
surplus profit is 
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Pt: =S -Exd -BI +Revn (81) 
where: Revn is the surplus in the year on revaluing fixed 
assets; and 
Exp is the fixed expenditure on a matching or accruals 
basis. This is, by definition 
Exp =E -CAPEX +Depn (82) 
and results in the accounting identity 
BVo +CAPEX -Depn +Revn = BVi (83) 
This definition of profit requires all extraordinary items, 
holding gains and other transfers to and from reserves to pass 
through the prof it and loss account. ARRt, the Accounting Rate 
of Return in the year ending t is then defined as: 
ARR 
Pt 
t BVt-l 
(84) 
Peasnell related ARR to CIRR by substituting BVj-3. above for Vi 
in equation 56. After algebraic manipulation this yields: - 
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- I:. 
t En ARR BV. _l(l+CIRR)-t: CIRR t1 +E (85) 
BV. 
-1 
(l+CIRR) 
t. i 
where E is an error term such that: 
E= 
(Cn-BVn) (l+CIRR) -'- (CO-BVO) 
n BV. 
-1 
(l+CIRR) 
t. i t: 
(86) 
Peasnell's equation indicates that the CIRR is equivalent to a 
weighted average of the annual ARRs, where the weights are the 
corresponding net book values discounted by the CIRR, plus an 
error term, E, which depends on the divergence of accounting 
book values from the economic values used to calculate the 
CIRR. This error term vanishes when the opening and closing 
net book values are equal to the 'economic' values employed in 
the CIRR expression. When this condition is satisfied, the 
one-period version of equation 81 is simply 
CIRR = ARRr (87) 
Thus, when profit is calculated in a clean surplus manner, and 
book values of net assets correspond to the 'economic I values 
of the initial and terminal capitals in CIRR, ARR and CIRR 
are, in effect, equivalent. Subject to a need to establish a 
suitable basis for valuing book values, a measure of economic 
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profitability, the ARR Relative, AREL, can be'defined 28 as 
AREL = 
I+ARRt 
1+z 
(88) 
Given the equivalence of the one-period versions of CIRR and 
ARR when the basis of asset valuation is the same, it follows 
that the Corporate Internal Rate of Return Relative, CREL, and 
the Accounting Rate of Return Relative, AREL, are the same, ie 
AREL = CREL (89) 
It follows that the differences between AREL and EP2 are the 
same as those between CREL and EP2 identified in 3.91, ie, in 
addition to the assumption for AREL that cash flows arise at 
the end of the year, and the possibility that BVO and BV, are 
not necessarily the same as the replication costs K. and K,, 
AREL differs from EP2 and is therefore a biased measure of a 
firm's economic profitabity in the following respects: 
a. S, E, BI and BV, are discounted by the firm' s risk 
adjusted cost of capital r, whereas in EP2 the discount 
factor is specific to each cash flow; and 
b. in AREL the terms containing E and BI appear as 
deductions in the numerator rather than additions in the 
denominator. 
The significance and implications of (a) and (b) and of the 
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assumption that cash flows arise at the end of the accounting 
year are analysed in greater detail in the next chapter. The 
literature on the significance of the difference between 
BVO/BV, and KO/Kj was described in the 3.91. 
In view of the equivalence of ARR and CIRR, Brealey and Myers 
claimed that, abstracting from the valuation basis, the only 
bias in clean surplus ARR is that resulting from failure to 
use economic depreciation 29 (1984, page 254). This is 
inconsistent with the finding above that differences between 
AREL and EP2 are not confined to differences in asset 
valuation. Furthermore, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
echo a widely held view when they commented in their report on 
the supply of Cinema Advertising Services (1990, page 48) that 
ARR is "not the most appropriate basis to assess 
profitability" when the capital base of a firm is small in 
relation to its sales. As the capital base is reduced when a 
firm substitutes bought in goods and services for internally 
produced ones and when it rents property and other assets 
rather than owning them, even when the goods, services and 
property are obtained in competitive markets, this observation 
appears to conflict with Brealey and Myers's assertion. 
Davis and Kay (1990) appear to share the MMCIs misgivings. 
Without producing any empirical evidence to support their 
argument beyond a survey of a small selection of UK companies 
with different levels of buying in, they claimed that ARR is 
inflated or biased upwards when a firm substitutes bought in 
goods and services for internally produced ones. Davis and Kay 
considered the bias in ARR to be significant enough to 
undermine AREL as a measure of economic profitability. 
As the bias identified by Davis and Kay appears superficially 
to be associated with Value Added, a profitability measure 
employing this variable might provide an obvious solution. 
Morley (1978) found that no such measures providing comparison 
of profitability across firms with different levels of buying 
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in are known. Davis and Kay proposed a new measure, the Added 
Value Ratio, as an alternative-to ARR. This is described in 
the 3.94 below. The reason for the bias in ARR identified by 
Davis and Kay is analysed in the next chapter. 
In much of the literature on ARR and CIRR, tax is abstracted. 
In practice, ARR is estimated using the pre-tax profit and 
values. Franks and Hodges (1983) adapted equations 85 and 86 
to accommodate this, arriving at 
CIRR = (1-T) Eztl. l 
ARR*tBV, 
-, 
(1+CIRR) -t 
+E +E* (90) 
t. 1 
BVt-l (I+CIRR) -t 
where: ARR*t is the pre-tax ARR; 
T is the Corporation Tax rate; and 
is a second error term such that 
T En E* 
[Dt (tax) -Dt (acc) ] (1+CIRR) -t 
BVt-l (1+CIRR) -t 
where: Dt(tax) is the depreciation allowed for tax 
purposes; and 
Dt(acc) is the depreciation charged in the accounts. 
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If returns are calculated, as elsewhere in this paper, on a 
pre-personal tax basis, equations 85 and 86 become: 
1. 
En ARR* BVt-, (1 +CIRR) 
1. t CIRR 1T t-1 +E +E* (92) 
(1-tp) 
BVt-, (1 + CIRRT- t 
t. i 
and 
E* T- ) t., 
[Dt (tax) -Dt (acc) I (I +CIRR) -t (93) 
1 tp B Vt -t 
t., -1 
(1 + CIRR) 
where: t is the Income Tax rate; and 
p is the payout ratio. 
The corresponding pre-tax ARR Relative is calculated using the 
estimated cost of capital on a pre-income tax basis. 
An alternative way of using ARR to estimate economic 
profitability, much used in practice, is to calculate ARR 
using pre-tax 'operating profits', which exclude unrealised 
holding gains on assets, and compare this with some measure of 
average profitability, computed on the same basis. This 
technique is much favoured by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission, who typically use the average pre-tax ARR for 
commercial and industrial companies as a whole or for 
particular industries" as a comparator. There is, however, no 
clear economic rationale for the technique and no objective 
way of assessing whether the difference betwee4 the ARR and 
the comparator is significantly large to indicate 'excessive, 
returns. 
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Given the close relationship between CIRR and'the internal 
rate of return earned by a firm on its individual investments, 
the above relationships, particularly Peasnell's relationship 
between CIRR and ARR, yield valuable insight into the 
relationship between ARR and the internal rate of return -a 
relationship which had eluded the earlier work referred to by 
Salamon; but, as Steele (1986) observed, there is a paradox 
implicit in Peasnell's equation. ARR conveys no information 
about CIRR when nothing is known about the 'economic' 
valuation of capital by means of which CIRR is defined; yet 
this is precisely when ARR is needed to measure economic 
performance. To put it another way: if sufficient data is 
available to estimate Peasnell's error term, there is 
sufficient information to estimate CIRR directly without 
bothering with ARR. 
Despite the equivalence Of CIRR and ARR when the same basis of 
valuing initial and terminal values are used and the latter 
employs a 'clean surplus, profit, Devereux (1986) maintained 
that the two measures are fundamentally different in concept. 
This conclusion is disputed. Whilst the internal rate of 
return, on which CIRR is based, is essentially a measure that 
applies to the entire life of an investment, CIRR, like the 
theoretical measure EP3, has been adapted to indicate af irm, s 
return in a specific period, and when that period is a year 
and the basis of valuing the initial and terminal values are 
the same, ARR and CIRR are identical. This result does, 
however, depend on the condition that profit is calculated on 
a clean surplus basis. In a study using simulated data, 
Devereux (ibid) found that ARR was a poor measure of CIRR when 
the clean surplus profit concept was not adhered to. It should 
be noted that, in practice, reported profits do not generally 
comply with the clean surplus principle: under both the 
historical cost and current cost conventions, there may be 
prior year adjustments and transfers directly to reserves for 
items such as purchased goodwill and foreign exchange 
translation differences; and some profits and losses are 
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considered 'extraordinary' and taken 'below the line,, ie 
after profit is struck. Under the current cost accounting 
convention specified in SSAP 16, holding gains and losses are 
not passed through the profit and loss account, although 
sufficient information is generally disclosed to permit clean 
surplus profits to be calculated. I 
Criticism is sometimes made of financial analysts that they 
are over-preoccupied with reported levels of profit. Beaver 
and Demski (1979), for example, argued that the process of 
reporting profits had little to do with informing financial 
markets about the economic profit earned in the last period. 
They suggested that reporting profits was simply a noisy but 
cost effective communication process. Converting reported 
profits to a clean surplus basis would seem unlikely, of 
itself, to undermine such a conclusion which has obvious 
implications for ARR. Furthermore, it is self-evident that in 
some situations, for example when a company is starting up, 
reported profits, and hence ARR, are of little significance. A 
similar criticism could, however, be made of the theoretical 
measures described in the previous chapter 31 . 
Despite the theoretical significance of clean surplus profit, 
it is apparent that at many financial analysts attach 
importance to other definitions of profit, especially where 
these are thought to give a better indication of future 
sustainable profits, eg the reported operating profits before 
exceptional and extraordinary items - see, for example, the 
guidance in the standard text for financial analysts, Graham 
and Dodd (page 156,1988). This suggests that ARR based on 
operating profit might have some value in measuring economic 
profitability, notwithstanding the literature described above. 
Black (1980), in a radical reappraisal of what reported 
profits really represent, noted the relative stability of 
price earnings ratios compared with ratios of book value of 
net assets to market value and concluded, perhaps somewhat 
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mischievously, that accountants had achieved a remarkably good 
measure of value with their concept of profit. This idea is 
drawn on in the next chapter. 
3.93 Recoverv-Rate 
Ijiri (1980) pointed out that profit, and thus ARR, was a 
residual after all cash and non-cash items had been put 
together. The non-cash items were relatively "soft" and 
ambiguous, while the cash items were "hard" and objective. 
Ijiri proposed that the primary measure of profitability 
should be the recovery rate' (RR), defined in terms of a 
"hard" item, the annual cash recoveries of a firm, divided by 
another "hard" item, the gross, undepreciated book value of 
the assets employed in the business. Thus RR was defined as 
RR S-E-BI (94) 
GBV 
where: S is the sales receipts in cash terms; 
E is the fixed expenditure in cash terms; 
BI is the variable expenditure in cash terms; and 
GBV is the gross book value of the assets employed in 
the business, ie their book value before depreciation. 
The recovery rate is indeed "hard" to the extent that no 
estimation of depreciation or net replacement cost is 
required. The computation of the book value of gross assets 
would, however, not completely avoid "soft" or subjective 
items: for example, any work in progress would still need to 
be valued in terms of conventional accounting concepts. 
Observing that, for many firms, the recovery rate was 
110 
.4 
"reasonably uniform over the years", Ijiri concluded, without 
formal proof, that the average. value of RR over a number of 
years would correspond to: 
RR= R (95) 
1- (1+R) -n 
where: R is the internal rate of return on the firm's 
individual project S32 ; and 
n is the average life of the firm's projects. 
ijiri recognised that the average life of the firm's projects 
could not be measured objectively but he provided no guidance 
as to how it might be measured subjectively. If project lives 
and fixed asset lives are assumed to be the same, it might be 
possible to estimate average project life from the lives of 
fixed assets disclosed in the accounts or from'the disclosed 
total gross assets divided by the disclosed annual 
depreciation charge. The recovery rate is, however, intended 
to be an unambiguous or 'hard' measure: employing such 
subjective criteria would appear to defeat this objective. 
Reflecting perhaps the low rate of inflation in the US economy 
at the time, Ijiri disregarded the effect of general and 
specific inflation and the difference between gross book 
values and gross replacement costs. 
The Recovery Rate is neither an input-output ratio using 
present values nor an internal rate of return. It does not, 
therefore correspond to any of the ideal measures of economic 
profitability proposed in the previous chapter. Its validity 
depends exclusively on the link proposed with the internal 
rate of return on a firm's individual projects. Salamon (1982) 
examined this link by modelling the firm as an entity steadily 
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investing in a series of projects with the same life and 
internal rate of return. Expressed in nominal terms" this 
model yields the following relationship: 
RR =( 
gi 
. 
)( (, +g, )n-(I+b)n ( (1+R)n(R-b) (96) 
(1 +gi ) n-I (gi-b) (1 +R) n- (1 +b) n) 
where: gi is the annual rate of growth in gross investment; 
and 
b is a 'cash flow profile parameter' being the annual 
growth in cash flow for an individual project. 
Salamon commented that when both b=0, ie investment 
generates a constant income in notional terms, and gi=R, ie the 
annual growth rate of gross investment is equal to the common 
IRR, equation 96 collapses to equation 95. Salamon interpreted 
the second condition, gi=R, as requiring a firm to invest all 
its cash flow and pay no dividend. He concluded that this was 
not only an inappropriate assumption but also one that would 
make equation 95 redundant as, if cash flow was entirely 
reinvested, the firm's ARR would approach the IRR of firm 
projects. Salamon appears to have overlooked the fact that the 
condition b=0, which is implicit in Ijirils analysis, is 
sufficient, by itself, to collapse his equation. The condition 
b=0 is not an unreasonable assumption. Furthermore, Salamon, 
himself, concluded that RR was not particularly sensitive to 
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b. This conclusion was supported by Gordon and Harmer's (1988) 
extension of equation 96 to allow for concave cash flow 
patterns. 
Some of the other assumptions behind equations 91 and 92 are 
cause for more serious concern. First, the analysis assumes 
that inflation has been constant over the period of the useful 
life of the projects. In the period 1972 to 1985, a period of 
13 years which could be taken as representative of a typical 
project life, the annual rate of change in the Retail Price 
Index ranged from 3.6k to 26.1t. While CIRR and ARR suffer 
from similar weaknesses, this is probably even more damaging 
to the RR which depends on the observation of a long run 
stable rate to give it credibility. Second, to be a useful 
measure, the recovery rate must be observable. Ijiri suggested 
that the total of cash recoveries, S-E-BI, is not generally 
observable in company accounts, but could be estimated 
approximately as the total of: 
funds from operations before interest paid; 
proceeds from disposal of long term assets; and 
the annual decrease in total current assets. 
Stark (1987) questioned whether Ijiri's proposals represented 
a satisfactory proxy for the true RR. Lee and Stark (1987) 
concluded that they were fundamentally unsound because the 
cash recovery would be unsuitable for discounting. Worked 
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examples demonstrated that Ijirils proposed basis could result 
in a significant distortion in the time pattern of cash flow 
recognition, so that rankings according to the IRR of the 
firm's projects and according to its RR could diverge. They 
suggested that it would be better to estimate the recovery 
rate as the ratio of operating cash flow Ue. profit before 
depreciation less increases in working capital) to gross fixed 
assets. This would assume that the initial project investment 
did not include an initial investment in current assets 
unmatched by liabilities, which might not be a realistic 
assumption in some industries. The conceptual problems over 
discounting would, however, be largely eliminated and the data 
required would be more readily observable from published 
accounts. 
The advantage claimed for RR is that it is less prone than 
other measures to management manipulation. As noted above, the 
impact of inflation has not been addressed; and neither Ijiri 
nor other researchers have claimed that RR is effective in 
eliminating accounting bias arising from hidden capital. There 
has also been no consideration of how an RR relative might be 
calculated. 
3.94 Added Value Ratio 
As noted in 3.92, Davis and Kay considered there to be an 
upward bias in ARR, and in AREL, when a firm substitutes 
bought in goods and services for internally produced goods and 
services. They did not attribute this effect solely to a 
tendency for hidden capital to increase as buying in 
increases. Thus, notwithstanding its wide use in financial 
analysis and economic research, ARR was held to be an 
unsatisfactory profitability measure. Davis and Kay therefore 
proposed, as an alternative to ARR, the Added Value Ratio 
(AVR). A number of computational shortcuts of no theoretical 
significance were incorporated in the specification, together 
with a recommendation that the interest free rate rather than 
114 
A 
34 the risk adjusted rate should be used . Abstracting these 
features, and assuming again that expenditure can be analysed 
into fixed and variable elements, -AVR as proposed by Davis and 
Kay, takes the form: 
A VR - 
Pt-. r. BVO 
. r. B Vo + Exp 
(97) 
where: Pt is clean surplus prof it in the year, corresponding to 
Pt: =S -Exp -BI +Revn =S -E -BI +BVI -BVO ; (98) 
is the sales in the year; 
Revn is the surplus on revaluing fixed assets in the 
year; 
Exp is the fixed revenue expenditure on an accruals 
basis in the year, corresponding to: 
Exp =E -CAPEX +Depn ; (99) 
E is the fixed cash expenditure in the year; 
CAPEX is expenditure on fixed assets in the year; 
Depn is the depreciation of fixed assets in the year; 
r is risk adjusted cost of capital on a pre-tax basis 
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anticipated at the start of the year; 
BVO is the book value of net tangible assets on net 
current cost basis at the start of the year; and 
BV, is the book value of net assets on a net current 
cost basis at the end of the year. 
Substituting continuously compounded interest rates, and 
substituting for Pt and Exp 
AVR = 
S-E-BI+BV, -BVO-(e-'-I). BVO 
(e-r-1) BVO +E -CAPEX +Depn 
Thus 
I+AVR =S 
-BI +BV, -BVO -CAPEX +Depn 
(e-r-1) BVO +E -CAPEX +Depn 
Assuming the difference between capital expenditure and 
depreciation is small, ie 
S -BI +BV, -BVO >> CAPEX -Depn 
(100) 
(101) 
(102) 
and assuming the difference between the corporate internal 
rate of return and the cost of capital is small, so that 
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(e-'-l) BVO +E zS -BI +BV, -BV, (103) 
then, from the first two terms of the binomial expansion 
I+AVR =S 
+BV, -BVO -BI (104) 
(e -r-1) BVo +E 
multiplying top and bottom by e-r and re-arranging 
l+AVR xs 
+BV, -[ (BVO +BI) e -zl 
- 
(105) 
BVO +E. e-r +BI. e--r -[ (BV. +BI) e-xl 
Davis and Kay viewed AVR as a ratio of outputs less inputs 
divided by inputs. Thus 1+AVR can be compared with one of the 
ideal measures of economic profitability proposed in Chapter 
2. The most appropriate ideal is EP2, which, assuming cash 
flows arise at the end of the financial year, corresponds to 
EP2 ý 
S. e -rs +Kj. e -rk (9A) 
Ko +E. e -. re +Bl. e -. rbi 
where: r. , rk, r. and rbi are the discount rates approporite to 
S, E, BI and K,; and 
KO and K, are the replication costs of the f irm at the 
beginning and end of the year. 
Comparing the two measures, it is apparent that, in addition 
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to the assumption that cash flows arise at the end of the 
year, and the possibility that. BVO and BV, are not necessarily 
the same as KO and K1, AVR differs from EP2 and is therefore a 
biased measure of a firm's economic profitabity in the 
following respects: 
a. S, E, BI and BV1 are discounted by the firm, s risk 
adjusted cost of capital r, whereas in EP2 the discount 
factor is specific to each cash flow; and 
b. AVR contains an extra term in square brackets in both 
the numerator and denominator - (BV, +BI) e-1. 
The extra term represents a bias in AVR. It may, however, be 
eliminated by re-defining AVR, using continuously compounded 
interest rates, as AVR,, where 
A VR, = 
Pt - (e -r-1) BVO (106) 
BVoe-r +Exp +BI -Revn 
Thus 
1 +A VR, = 
S+BVO 
(107) 
BVo e --r +Exp +BI -Revn 
Substituting the accounting identity 
BVO +CAPEX +Revn -Depn = BVi (98) 
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results in 
1 +A VR, = 
S +BV, -CAPEX -Revn +Depn 
BVoe--r +Exp +BI -Revn 
(108) 
assuming the difference between capital expenditure 
and depreciation, net of any revaluation surplus, is small, ie 
S +BVi >> CAPEX +Revn -Depn (109) 
and assuming the difference between clean surplus profit, S- 
Exp-BI+Revn, and the capital charge represented by BV, e-r-BV, is 
small, ie 
S +BV, = BVoe--r +Exp +BI -Revn 
then, from the first two terms of the binomial expansion, 
1 +A VR, =S 
+BV, 
BVO e--+E +BI 
Multiplying top and bottom by e-I 
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1 +A VRI =S 
e--r +BVi e--r 
BVo +E e-z +BI e-, - 
(112) 
Thus, abstracting from the assumption that cash flows arise at 
the beginning and end of the year and the differences between 
BVO/BV, and KO/Kj, AVR, approximates to F'P2, except that a single 
discount rate r is used for the various cash flows. 
3.10 Estimating the Cost of Capital 
The theoretical measures of a firm's economic profitability 
EP1, EP2 and EP3 identified in the previous chapter all employ 
the ptesent values of various corporate cash flows. As 
explained in Chapters 4 and 5, evaluation is only possible by 
reference to market values or by estimating the appropriate 
discount factor or cost of capital for the particular cash 
flow; and these discount factors can be estimated from the 
firm's overall risk adjusted cost of capital. The various 
rates of return described in this chapter are, on the other 
hand, compared directly with the firm's risk adjusted cost of 
capital. In every case, it is the anticipated cost of capital 
at the start of the accounting period that is the appropriate 
rate. 
A review of the extensive literature on the estimation of a 
firm's risk adjusted cost of capital is beyond the scope of 
this paper. It is simply noted here that there are two 
principal methods: 
a. the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); and 
b. the Dividend Growth Model (DGM). 
CAPM, in particular, has gained wide acceptance in both 
economics and business, the 1990 Nobel Prize Citation stating 
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that it remains "the premier model for the relation between 
risk and expected return". CAPM is described and employed in 
later chapters. 
3.11 Survev of Subsecruent Literature 
Research published after 1989 has increased doubts over 
whether capital markets are efficient in a fundamental sense, 
and Shiller (1989 but available in the UK in 1990) has 
provided a convincing explanation in the form of a model in 
which investors comprise two groups, only one of which is 
, smart'. The Capital Asset Pricing Model, employed throughout 
this paper, has, notwithstanding the endorsement referred to 
above, come under attack in a paper by Fama and French (1992). 
In the area of the theoretical aspects of profitability 
measurement, an interesting development has been Stark's 
proposal (1991) for a new definition of deprival value based 
on optimal investment rules under uncertainty and the presence 
of genuine timing options. The analysis has not yet, however, 
been extended to ex post accounting rates of return. Davis, 
Flanders and Star published a further paper on AVR (1991), but 
this added little in the way of theory. Other research 
touching on profitability measurement published after 1989 has 
had few implications for this study. Except for such obvious 
experimentations as the substitution of cash flow for 
earnings, most empirical research requiring a measure of 
profitability has relied on reported profits or unadjusted 
values of q, causing Lev (1990) to comment on the surprising 
imbalance between the level of effort and sophistication that 
goes into statistical methodology and that goes into arriving 
at the profits measure used. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 
1. Lindenberg and Ross described CO as the cost of replacing 
the firm's capital stock'. This is equivalent to the 
replication cost of the firm provided 'capital stock, includes 
all intangible assets and is net of any liabilities (other 
than Vb) at the year end. 
2. The possession of factors of production whose replacement 
cost does not reflect ordinary Ricardian rents was abstracted. 
Lindenberg and Ross also recognised that actual market entry 
was not essential to undermine market power. The mere absence 
of barriers to entry and the consequent threat of entry by 
another firm would generally be sufficient to eliminate the 
incumbent's supra-normal profits. 
3. Strictly 'shareholders and providers of loan capital,. The 
latter are, however, seldom in a position to share in supra- 
normal profits. 
4. ie, in a competitive market, price equals marginal cost. 
Langlois (1989) has proposed that firms will seek to maximise 
profit per unit of time, with the result that price in a 
competitive market would equal average variable cost, not 
marginal cost. 
S. Sawyer def ined the accounting rate of return as Pt/Kt and 
then summed the series from t=0 rather than t=1. He therefore 
actually arrived at 
q- 
(R-q) (I+z) 
(Z-g) 
6. Lerner's Index is 
ed 
where ed is the elasticity of demand. When estimating Lerner's 
Index it is a common practice to assume that marginal cost and 
unit variable cost are equal, so that 
1- S-BI 
ed s 
where S is the firm's sales; and 
BI is the firm's variable expenditure. 
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As described in Chapter 6, this practice is very questionable. 
7. An exception may be found at page 578 of Corporate Finance 
by Brealey and Myers. 
B. A secondary share issue is a sale of a large block of 
shares by a party other than the firm itself. Problems over 
simultaneous information release and other price sensitive 
information are thus minimised. In the sample studied by 
Scholes, issues ranged in size from Vk to 35%ý of the issued 
share capital and up to $100,000. 
9. This equation assumes continuous capital expenditure and 
that g and d continuous rates. 
10. Unwin and Simon were critical of this finding on the 
grounds that it assumed arbitrary parameters and depended on 
discounting present earnings in perpetuity at a rate equal to 
the inverse of the PE ratio, ignoring the fact that PE ratios 
reflected growth prospects as well as cost of capital. 
11. In this paper, a post-corporation tax pre-income tax 
perspective is adopted throughout the analysis. This is a 
convenient approach, often used in the literature, as it 
accommodates the fact that post-income tax returns are not 
generally observable. It does not reflect a belief here that 
the Fundamental Model applies to pre-income tax returns. 
12. This is not the inverse of the conventional Dividend Cover 
ratio, usually defined as profit after Corporation Tax, 
including ACT, to net dividends. 
13. In an exchange offer, one or more classes of security is 
given the right to exchange part or all of the holding for a 
different class of security. Terms typically involve a package 
of new securities of greater value than the pre-offer original 
holding and little or no cash adjustment. 
14. Bernier, for example rejected, at the lt confidence level 
in two of the four years studied, the hypothesis that Tobin's 
q and a firm's Beta Coefficient are inversely related. 
15. Spiller's relationship was 
s 
K 
Beta -ed('+*rO) 
where ed 
is the elasticity of demand. 
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16. Most literature ignores the option associated with sunk 
investment and the prior risk that the investment would prove 
abortive. These are referred to in Chapter 2. 
17. An exception is the argument adopted in some of the 
industrial economics literature that economic profitability 
can be measured by the firm's Hicksian profit deflated by some 
functionally appropriate measure reflecting the scale of the 
firm. This argument was discussed in the previous chapter and 
rejected there as being based on an insufficiently rigorous 
definition of economic profitability. 
18. In order to use q to measure the economic profitability of 
a line of business, it would be necessary to estimate the 
market value of the line of business. This would only be 
practicable when the line of business, or the balance of the 
firm's activities, represent a large proportion of the entire 
firm. 
19. Although it might be necessary for, say, competition 
authorities and utility regulators to obtain the information 
on a confidential basis. Notwithstanding the disclosure 
requirements of the Companies Act 1985 and SSAP 25, issued in 
June 1990, the disclosure by companies of line of business 
information remains unsatisfactory due to the discretion 
afforded to directors in deciding what is a line of business. 
In this respect, it is notable that the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission's recommendation (1980) that lines of business 
should be defined in terms of the Standard Industrial 
Classification was ignored by the government. Furthermore, 
there is nothing comparable in the UK to the PIMS data set or 
the Federal Trade Commission's Financial Reporting Program in 
the USA, although information in Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission's reports do provide a useful but limited set of 
data on the financial performance of firms in specific 
product-markets - see Utton (1986). 
20. Coulthurst found that some firms made an adjustment to 
incremental cash flows in order to allow for non-income 
generating assets and expenses, especially those concerned 
with infrastructure. 
21. To accommodate this criticism, Dorward (1986) suggested 
that budgeted overheads should be allocated in direct 
proportion to the rate of capital utilisation. 
22. Baumol and Bradford went on to demonstrate that, in 
industries where, perhaps due to economies of scale, marginal 
costs were below average costs, the elimination of losses 
resulting from pricing at marginal cost would be achieved most 
efficiently by marking up prices in inverse proportion to 
their demand elasticities (so-called 'Ramsey pricing'). 
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23. An exception might be when the line of business 
represented a large proportion of the business of the entire 
firm. 
24. For example by using the cost of capital of a similar 
business which could be estimated directly from capital market 
information. 
25. This may be less obvious for rates of return. In order, 
however, to estimate the risk adjusted cost of capital, 
assumptions are made about the efficiency of capital markets. 
26. When, however, the growth in investment was equal to or 
greater than the common project IRR, IRR was not defined. As 
the present value of a perpetual cash stream growing at a rate 
in excess of the discount factor is, itself, not defined, this 
finding was a useful reminder of the principles of discounting 
but was not unexpected. 
27. This assumption simplifies the subsequent analysis and 
would represent a reasonable approximation for most firms. It 
is not, however, essential for subsequent findings. 
28. In practice, Edwards, Kay and Mayer and others identify 
economic profitability with ARR-r rather than (1+ARR)/(l+r). 
This is, however, a simple transformation of AREL. 
29. Economic depreciation was defined by Brealey and Myers as 
the reduction in present value of an asset. 
30. Utton (1986) formalised this approach in his study of MMC 
reports, noting that the MMC appeared to become concerned 
about excessive profits when ARR exceeded 'average ARRI by a 
factor of 2. 
31. The theoretical measures would, however, provide useful 
information even in start up situations if account were taken 
of the option value of potential investments. Consideration of 
such a possibility is, however, beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
32. Ijiri argued that, as cash flows normally occurred 
throughout the year, R could be replaced by the natural 
logarithm of 1+R. 
33. Salamon's analysis and the resulting equation is in real 
terms with a constant inflation factor, but this does not 
effect his findings or conclusions. 
34. This has been justified by Davis using some novel ideas 
about the nature of risk, but the use the risk free rate may, 
to some extent, have simply been an experimental ploy to 
overcome awkward results when AVR is calculated using the risk 
adjusted cost of capital estimated from the CAPM. 
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I 
A 
CHAPTER 4 
EX ANTE MEASUREMENT OF THE ECONOMIC PROFITABILITY OF A FIRM: 
RETURN ON TOTAL CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, AREL, or, in practice, ARR- 
r, the difference between the Accounting Rate of Return, ARR, 
and the firm's risk adjusted cost of capital, r, is a widely 
used measure for the ex post economic profitability of a firm. 
Davis and Kay have, however, drawn attention to the inflation 
of ARR when bought in goods and services. are substituted for 
those manufactured internally. In effect, Davis and Kay claim 
that ARR is biased by the operational gearing of the firm. 
Furthermore, there is a widespread belief, given expression by 
the monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC), that ARR is an 
unsuitable measure of profitability when the capital base is 
small in relation to sales. The literature contains no 
satisfactory explanation for such a bias. Without such an 
explanation, there can be no confidence that q would not also 
share the bias. , 
In this chapter, the bias identified by Davis and Kay is 
explained by the differences between ARR and a semi- 
operational form of the ideal measure, EP3. identified in 
Chapter 2. This semi-operational measure is called here the 
Return on Total Capital Employed (ROTCE). The difference 
between ARR and ROTCE is shown to conform to the pattern 
identified by Davis and Kay and by the MMC. 
The chapter concludes with an analysis which derives a fully 
126 
operational form of ROTCE. Using data from a simple corporate 
model, this operational form is compared with ARR and measures 
proposed by Davis and Kay. The results demonstrate that the 
bias in ARR and the other measures can be significant. 
4.1 The Bias in ARR identified by Davis and Ka 
As the review of literature in the previous chapter confirms, 
it is widely recognised that ARR is biased if the denominator 
excludes hidden capital, and the numerator is net of 
expenditure on hidden capital rather than depreciation of 
hidden capital. Other biases identified in the literature are 
those that arise from the use of historical costs rather than 
current or net replacement costs and from the use of 
depreciation profiles that do not correspond to economic 
depreciation. Brealey and Myers (1984) assert, however, that 
there are no other biases in ARR. It is therefore somewhat 
surprising that Davis and Kay (1990) should claim, albeit with 
little hard empirical evidence, that ARR is inflated when a 
firm buys in goods and services. Identifying the bias as the 
difference between ARR and the 'true' rate of return, R*, that 
would be independent of the proportion bought in, it can be 
illustrated as follows: 
Fiqure 4.1 
Bias in ARR Described by Davis and Kav 
Bias in 
ARR = ARR-R* 
0 *6 10006 
Proportion of Goods and 
Services Bought in 
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Davis and Kay's bias may be associated with the omission of 
hidden capital but is not explain6d by this phenomenon, as 
hidden capital can be formed independently of buying in goods 
and services. Furthermore, it cannot be explained by the other 
forms of bias identified in the literature: those due to 
inappropriate valuation of assets and depreciation profiles. 
As buying in is associated with a decrease in the level of a 
firm's operational gearing, ie the extent to which expenditure 
is fixed, Davis and Kay were, in effect, claiming that ARR is 
biased by the firm's operational gearing. They offered no 
formal explanation for this effect nor statistical evidence to 
back up their claim, appearing to consider the existence of 
such a bias to be self-evident. A similar view may have found 
expression in the assertion in the MMCIs report on the Supply 
of Cinema Advertising Services (1990) that ARR is not the most 
appropriate measure for-service industries where capital 
employed is relatively low in relation to turnover. 
No satisfactory explanation for ARR being biased by 
operational gearing is provided in the literature. Without 
such an explanation, the possibility that q could be similarly 
affected cannot be dismissed. 
An unexplained bias in ARR is of great practical significance. 
In line with Edwards, Kay and Mayer's (1987) conclusion that 
ARR is 'directly relevant to economic analysis', it has become 
the accepted practice for government regulators, researchers 
and financial analysts to compare ARR, on a clean surplus, 
current cost basis, with the risk adjusted cost of capital, 
estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in 
order to assess whether supra-normal profits have been earned. 
The biases in ARR due to the omission of hidden capital, the 
historical cost convention, and straight line depreciation are 
well understood and can, in theory, be allowed for. That 
identified by Davis and Kay cannot be eliminated until it is 
understood. An unexplained bias in ARR could result in the 
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mis-allocation of resources throughout the economy as 
regulated firms are set inappropriate price ceilings and the 
economic profitability of firms generally is mis-interpreted 
by researchers and financial analysts. 
Despite the importance of the issue and the absence of a 
satisfactory explanation in the literature, it is relatively 
easy to demonstrate that ARR is indeed biased by operational 
gearing. A formal proof is provided in Appendix 3. 
4.2 The Economic Rate of Return for a Firm 
The failure of ARR-r to indicate in an unbiased way the ex 
post economic profitability of a firm can be explained by its 
divergence from an ideal measure of economic profitability. 
The analysis in this section therefore commences by partially 
operational ising the ideal profitability measure EP3 proposed 
in Chapter 2. The first step is to assume that K. 
and K, are single payments, so that 
EP3 = log 
PVO, 1 (S) +Kj. e -,, 
k (18A) 
( 
KO +PVO, 1 (E) +PVO, 1 (BI) 
) 
where: S is the sales in the year; 
KO is the replication cost of the firm at the start of 
the year; 
K, is the replication cost at the end of the year; 
r. is the discount rate or cost of capital appropriate 
f or Kj; 
E is the fixed expenditure in the year in cash terms; 
and 
BI is the variable expenditure in the year. 
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As previously, it is assumed for simplicity that S and BI are 
the same in cash terms and on an accruals basis, while, by 
definition, the accruals form of fixed expenditure, Exp, is 
Exp =E -CAPEX +Depn (82) 
where: CAPEX is capital expenditure, ie expenditure on fixed 
assets in the year; and 
Depn is depreciation on fixed assets in the year. 
Thus, in effect, stocks, debtors, creditors and other working 
capital are abstracted. These may be allowed for by adjusting 
the period over which cash flows are discounted to reflect the 
period of credit given and taken, the time stocks are held, 
etc; but a good approximation would be achieved in most cases 
simply by including working capital in KO and K1. 
In separating expenditure into components BI and E, it is 
assumed that expenditure can be classed as either variable or 
fixed. This basic distinction, though somewhat arbitrary, is 
one that has long been recognised by both economists and 
accountants. Fixed expenditure is typically associated with 
internal production and Value Added and variable expenditure 
is associated with bought in goods and services re-sold to 
provide the firm with a trading mark-up. The distinction 
therefore has much in common with that drawn by Davis and Kay 
between bought in expenditure and other expenditure. 
Finally, there is an accounting identity such that 
Ko +r-APEX -Depn +Revn = Ki (83) 
where Revn is the surplus in the year on revaluing fixed 
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assets. 
Assuming S, E and BI are continuous, EP3 may be expressed in 
the form 
EP3 ý log 
( fo I S. e--rs-t dt +Kl. e-zk 
(18B) 
KO +f 
1 
E. e-. re. t dt +f 
1 
BI. e--rbi-t dt 
00 
where r, rk, r., and rbi are the discount rates appropriate for 
SI K1, E and BI respectively'. 
It is assumed that S, E and BI are constant in real terms 
within the year. This represents the most reasonable 
assumption an external analyst without knowledge of the actual 
profiles of a firm's annual cash flows in the year can make'. 
It is a much better representation of reality than either of 
the other assumptions employed in the literature: 
a. that cash flows arise at the end of the year; or 
b. that the accounting period is instantaneous. 
Whilst Peasnell (1982) defended these assumptions on the 
grounds an accounting period can, in theory, be made as short 
as one desires - "a year, a week, an hour", this ignored the 
fact that it is not the external analyst who determines the 
accounting period. The reality of the situation is that the 
normal duration for published accounts is one year 3. 
With constant cash flows in the year, the integrals may be 
evaluated, as follows 
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1-e-I S+ Kj. e -. rk 
EP3 ,, ý log - 
rs 
-re 
) 
-rbi 
KO + 
1-e E+ 
1-e BI 
re 
) 
rbi 
Substituting for K, using equation 83 
f 1-e--rs)S + Revn. e--k + KO. e-rk + (CAPEX -Depn)e-ýkl 
EP3 = log 
KO + 
(1-e-ze)E 
+ 
(1-e-xbl 
BI 
Z, rbi 
) 
Assuming that the difference between capital expenditure and 
depreciation is small in relation to sales and the initial 
capital, so that 
i-e--'s S+ Revn. e -zk + Ko. e -zk >> (CAPEX -Depn )e -zk 
and EP3 is small so that 
S+ Revn. e-zlk + K,. e-gk + (CAPEX -Depn)e-zk a Ko + 
1-e-z E+( 1_e"zbi 
( 
Z,, 
) 
r. 1 
)BZ 
the Binomial Theorem can be used to approximate equation 114 
as 
1-e-r s+ Revn. e'rk + K. e", k 
10 
( 
Z, 
) 
Y, + 1-e-91 Z+ Br - (CAPEX -Depn) o»rk 
( 
Z, 
) 
rb, 
)1 
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Substituting equation 82, this may be expressed as 
(1-e-rs 
S+ Revn. e -. rk + Ko. e -rk 
EP3 og) 
re -rbi 
(118) 
Ko + 
1-e Exp + 
1-e 
BI 
re 
) 
-rbi 
where 
(CAPEX -Depn) e -rk - 
1-e-re (119) 
re 
) 
CAPEX-Depn has already been assumed to be relatively small. 
Assuming rk and r. are of a similar magnitude, it follows that 
A is very small indeed and can therefore be ignored. Thus 
( i-e--rs S+ Revn. e -zk + Ko. e -zk 
EP3 = log 
(Z1)e 
-' 1-e -, rbi 
(120) 
Ko + Exp + BI re 
) 
r., 
This semi-operational form of EP3 can be expressed as the' 
difference between a rate of return and the firm's risk 
adjusted cost of capital. This rate of return is called in 
this paper the Return on Total Capital Employed (ROTCE )4. 
Thus, by definition, 
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( i-e-zs 
S+ Revn. e -zk + KO. e -zk 
ROME =r+ log 
rs 
) 
(121) 
1-e-I 1-e-rbi K. 0 +(.. 
)Exp 
+ 
rbi 
)BI 
where r is the firm's risk adjusted cost of capital'. 
A shorthand form of this definition to facilitate subsequent 
manipulation is 
ROTCE =r+ log 
PV(S) + Revn. e -. rk 
.+ 
KO .e-. rk (121A) 
( 
KO + PV(Exp) + PV(BI) 
) 
where the present value operator PV(. ) is implemented by 
multiplying the term by (1-e-1) /r.. 
A formal proof that ROTCE is unbiased by operational gearing 
is provided at Appendix 3. 
4.3 The Davis and Kay Bias in ARR Explained 
Assuming ROTCE is a good approximation of EP3. the bias in ARR 
can be specified as: 
BIASARR = ARR -ROTCE (122) 
Substituting equation 121A 
BIAS = (ARR-. r) - Lo 
PV(S) +Revn. e -rk +Ko e -'k (123) 
ARR 
4 
Ko +PV(BI) +PV(Exp) 
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where ARR-r is the level of supra-normal profitability 
apparently indicated by ARR. 
The reason for the bias identified by Davis and Kay can now be 
understood. Buying in is associated with variable expenditure, 
while internal production and manufacture is associated with 
fixed expenditure. Assuming this identification is loot, the 
Bought In Ratio, BIR, can be defined in present value terms, 
as follows: 
BIR = 
PV(BI) 
_= 1- 
Ko +PV (Exp) (124) 
Ko +PV(BI) +PV(Exp) Ko +PV(BI) +PV(Exp) 
Thus the bias in ARR is 
BIASARR , (APR-r) - 10 
PV(S) +Revn. e-, k +4e -x. 
- log(1-BIR) 
(125) 
4 
Ko +PV (Exp) 
which may be expressed as 
PV(S) +Revn. e-lk +Ye 
+lo l+ PV(Exp) log(1-BIR) 
(126) 
BIASAm - (ARR-r) - 104 KO 
Z*) 4 
yo 
)_ 
Sales Intensity, SI, and the Manufacturing Technology Ratio, 
MTR, are defined as follows: 
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SI Pv(s) 
Ko 
and 
(127) 
MTR = 
PV(Exp) (128) 
Ko 
The bias in ARR can therefore be expressed as: 
BIASAm - (ARR-r) - 109 (a +SI) +109 (1 +MTR) - log (1 -BIR) (129) 
where 
ev aR Ko 
n)e -zk (130) 
Where the firm's assets are not of a speculative nature, a 
reasonable approximation would be a=1. Thus 
BIASA,, w (ARR-Z) - 109(l +SX) +109(1+MTR)- 109(1-BIR) 
This relationship can be illustrated as follows: 
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Fiqure 4.2 
BIAS IN ARR 
BIAS in 
ARR 
When there is no buying in, the bias in ARR is 
BIASARR ý (ARR-r) - log 
1+SI (132) ý1 
+MTR) 
As SI > MTR for a profitable firm, the log term is positive. 
Thus the bias must be small, being less than (ARR-r )6 . As the 
proportion of goods and services measured by BIR increases, so 
does the bias. As BIR approaches 1, the bias becomes 
infinite. This corresponds well with the relationship 
described by Davis and Kay and illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Furthermore, abstracting from buying in, 
LImitK,, 
_O(BIASARR) = (ARR-r) -log 
PV(S) ý 
PV(Exp) 
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00-. Boucrht In Ratio 1000-. 
The log teri 
bias could, 
(ARR-r) are 
high values 
of ARR when 
shown to be 
m is likely to be 
nevertheless, be 
typically observ, 
are explained by 
the capital base 
well founded. 
small in this situation, but the 
significant as high values of 
Bd as - K. approaches zero. These 
the bias. Thus the MMCIs mistrust 
is small in relation to sales is 
4.4 Translating the ROTCE into a Usable Profitability Measure 
Given its derivation from EP3 and the failure of other measures 
such as ARR-r to correspond to this ideal, a fully operational 
version of ROTCE-r would be of considerable practical value. 
Such a measure is now derived. 
ROTCE-r corresponds to 
( 1-e -. rs S+ Revn. e -zk + K.. e-rk 
ROTCE-. r = log 
( 
re 
) 
(121A) 
KO + 1-e-' Exp + 1-e-rb'i)BI 
-re 
) 
r., 
where: S is the sales in the year; 
Revn is the surplus on revaluing fixed assets; 
KO is the replication cost of the firm at the start of 
the year; 
Exp is fixed expenditure on an accruals basis; 
BI is variable expenditure; and 
ri are the discount factors or costs of capital 
appropriate for each cash flow. 
S and (Exp+BI) are disclosed in published accounts. BI can be 
represented by expenditure on Materials and Consumables which, 
as explained in Chapter 7, can be estimated from information 
in published accounts. Abstracting from the option value 
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associated with sunk investment, KO can be represented by the 
net replacement cost of net tangible and intangible assets, 
the latter being estimated by depreciating prior expenditure 
on such items as R&D and advertising. As noted in Chapter 2, 
an allowance is also required for the possibility that 
replicating the firm would prove unsuccessful, but, in many 
types of business it would be reasonable to assume that this 
adjustment was not significant. Thus, to operationalise ROTCE, 
it only remains to estimate the various costs of capital that 
appear in the equation above. This can be achieved using the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), according to which: 
X ro + Beta 
rs ro + Beta, (--, --ro) 
rk -rO + Betak(r. -ZO) (134) 
-rbi r. + Betabi(r. -ZO) 
re ro + Betae(. rm-. ro) 
where: r,, is the risk f ree rate of return; 
is the market return; 
Beta is the firm's beta coefficient; 
Beta, is the beta coef f icient of sales income; 
Betak 'S the beta coefficient of the terminal value Kj; 
Betabi is the beta coefficient for bought in 
expenditure; and 
Beta, is the beta coefficient for other expenditure. 
Beta, the firm's beta coefficient, is the covariance of the 
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return on the firm's securities with the market return, 
deflated by the variance of the market return, ie 
Beta = 
cov (Z , Z, ) (135) 
var (r. ) 
where: Cov( ) signifies covariance; and 
Var( ) signifies variance. 
This may be expressed as 
(136) 
Beta 
var (r. ) 
where: VO is the market value of the firm' s securities at the 
start of the year; and 
6V signifies change in the market value of the firm's, 
securities, ie 6V/V is the proportional change in V. 
Assuming dividend irrelevance and abstracting from taxation, 
it is assumed that 
6V/Vo = bPr/Pro 
where Pro is the f irm, s clean surplus prof it in the year and 
bPr are changes in the profit. This assumption implies that 
changes in the return to shareholders correspond to the 
proportional changes in profits. This is a reasonable and 
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common assumption which underlies, for example, the use of the 
so-called accounting beta as a-proxy for beta. In effect it is 
assumed that there are no systematic gains for shareholders 
unrelated to current profit S7. 
By definition 
Pro = P~. 0 -b. 0 -Exp +Revn 
where: P- is price; 
is the quantity demanded; 
b is unit bought in cost; 
Exp is internal, cost, assumed to be fixed 
expenditure; and 
Revn is the surplus on revaluing fixed assets. 
(137) 
Treating demand Q as the only variable correlated with r.: 
6Pr = P-. 6Q -b. 60 (138) 
Thus 
Co £D-. b0-b. 82-Exp+Revn 
. - 
Be ta a -4 
pro 
, 
') 
. P--b 
C0v(8Q, r) (139) 
var (r. ) Pro Var (r. ) 
By definition 
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P-. 
where S is sales 
and 
BI = b. Q 
where BI is the variable or bought in cost 
Betas, Betak, Betabi and Beta, are the respective covariances 
with the market return of the proportional changes in sales, 
bought in and other expenditure respectively, each deflated by 
the variance of the market return. They may be analysed in the 
same way': 
P-. 6 
Beta, 
CH 
s, Z-) p- cov(80, r') (140) 
Var (r. ) s Var (r. ) 
Beta, = 
CoT4Revn , x. ) =0 Var (z, ) 
Coý b. 8 
Be ta., = 
BI "rl) 
-b 
C0v(ÖQ, r) (142) 
var (x, ) BI var (r, ) 
Betae ` 
Co výExp, )=0 
Var (z, ) 
Rearranging to eliminate Cov OQ, r. ) /Var (r. ) : 
(143) 
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r'+ 
Rr 0 Beta (rm-. ro) (144) 
*5 
'z 'rbi 'rO , 'S-BI 
and 
'rk «ý 'r, «ý r. (145) 
r,,, rk, rbi and r, can now be eliminated from equation 121A to 
arrive at: 
ROTCE-r = Log 
. S. a+ (Ko +Revn) e -, rO 
(146) 
KO + Exp 
(1-e-r") 
+B. T. a 
where 
-ro- 
pro Beta (Z. -ro) 
cc 1-e 
Pro 
S-BI 
(147) 
ZO+ -T-BI Beta (z,,, -ro) 
Beta can be estimated from share price information and 
estimates are published by the London Business School Risk 
Management Service. It follows that all the variables needed 
to calculate ROTCE-r using the above equations can be 
estimated. 
The conventional method of assessing supra-normal 
profitability is to estimate ARR-r, where r is estimated using 
the CAPM. As information on Beta and K. is needed for such an 
evaluation, the additional information needed to estimate 
supra-normal profitability using ROTCE-r is modest and 
comprises any two of the three accounting variables sales, S, 
variable expenditure, BI, and fixed expenditure, Exp. As noted 
above, these variables can readily be estimated from published 
accounts. 
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In the preceding analysis, borrowing has been-abstracted. In 
order to accommodate borrowing, it is simply necessary to 
exclude interest paid from Exp and substitute the asset Beta 
for the equity Beta. 
4.5 Modellincr ROTCE, ARR and Other Profitabilitv Measures 
In order to demonstrate the scale of the bias in ARR as the 
proportion of goods and services bought in increases, a simple 
model employing various realistic assumptions was constructed. 
The model, which is specified at Appendix 4, assumes that KO, 
capital employed, is proportional to the quantity manufactured 
(ie, constant returns to scale) and sales price is constant as 
the proportion of buying in increases. 
A wide variety of situations can be represented by this model. 
In the version reproduced at Appendix 5 the following 
illustrative variables were employed: 
Selling price (P_) 1.1 
Manufacturing cost per unit (Exp/Q, ) 0.900 
Bought in cost per unit (BI/Qbi) 0.975 
Capital employed per unit 
manuf actured (K., O/Q. ) 0.79 
Capital employed per unit bought 
in (KbiO/Qbi) 0.25 
Risk free rate 3.016 
Risk premium 9.0? 6 
Beta(sales) 0.3 
With these parameters, economic profitability, as measured by 
ROTCE-r, assuming it is indeed a. good representation of EP3. is 
constant and equal to 9.1t. In contrast, supra-normal 
profitability as measured by ARR-r increases from 7.5t to 
44.3t as the proportion bought in increases. The Bias in ARR, 
ARR-ROTCE, increases from -1.6t to +35.2t over the range 
modelled. The Added Value Ratio (AVR) proposed by Davis and 
Kay as a measure of economic profitability also increases, 
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reaching astronomical levels at high levels of buying in. The 
corresponding measure with bought in expenditure included in 
the denominator (AVR mk 11) also increases, but to a more 
modest extent. Return on Sales (ROS), which provides no signal 
by itself of supra-normal profitability, decreases as buying 
in increases. 
The above results illustrate the extent to which ROTCE can 
eliminate bias that is present in ARR and other profitability 
measures. 
4.6 Summarv and Conclusions 
An explanation for the bias in ARR associated with operational 
gearing, to which Davis and Kay drew attention, has been 
found. It is due to the mis-specification of ARR relative to 
the ideal profitability measure EP3. By assuming that a firm's 
cash flows are continuous and constant in real terms 
throughout the year, it was shown that ARR-r inflates relative 
to EP3 as buying in increases. Support was also found for the 
mmvs view that ARR is an inappropriate measure for non- 
capital intensive firms. Given the accepted practice of 
government regulators, researchers and financial analysts to 
compare ARR, on a clean surplus, current cost basis, with the 
estimated risk adjusted cost of capital, this is of some 
significance. 
An operational form of EP3 was derived by applying the CAPM to 
each of the cash flows comprising the corporate cash flow. 
This measure is called here the Return on Total Capital 
Employed (ROTCE). It is proposed as a superior ex post measure 
of economic profitability to either ARR-r, the Corporate 
Internal Rate of Return Relative or Davis and Kay's Added 
Value Ratio. 
ROTCE was applied to data from a simple corporate model to 
confirm that the bias in ARR can be significant. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 
1. It should be noted that risk is a characteristic of a cash 
flow and can be defined independently of the business with 
which it is associated. Thus the risk associated with a firm's 
sales in a year can be defined in terms of, say, their 
variability (total risk) or by their correlation with the 
market return (systematic risk). While the nature of the 
business will determine the business risk and hence the 
magnitude of these statistics, it is possible in this analysis 
to abstract from such considerations. The means by which risk 
associated with a component cash flow can be quantified using 
the cApm is dealt with later in the chapter. 
2. An alternative assumption that expenditures grow at a rate 
sufficient to maintain a constant internal rate of return 
throughout the accounting period is rejected. It is considered 
that, in practice, expenditures on, for example, wages are not 
determined with such an objective in view. Abstracting from 
variations in volume within the year, separate types of 
expenditure will typically represent level cash flows in 
nominal terms with one or more discrete increases in the year 
to compensate for inflation. Assuming there is no correlation 
between the dates on which increases occur, the growth profile 
of expenditure in total will then correspond to zero growth in 
real terms. 
3. All equations in this pi 
where necessary to reflect 
accounts for periods other 
4. An alternative approach 
Equivalent Rate of Return, 
rate of return that can be 
such that 
aper can, of course, be 
situations where firms 
than one year. 
is to define the Certa, 
CARR, as the risk free 
compared with the risk 
amended 
publish 
inty 
equivalent 
free rate ro, 
CARR -ro = ROME -. r = EP3 
S. Throughout the analysis in this chapter, continuously 
compounded interest rates are employed. These may be replaced 
by the more familiar annual compound interest rate, r,, by 
substituting log(l+r. ) for r. Thus equation ROTCE may be 
expressed as 
Pv, (S) + 
Rev72 
+ 
Ko 
ROTCE, + (1 +X, ) 
'+Zka '+Zka 
Ko +PV, (Exp) +PV, (BI)- 
where 
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PV, (X) = -rxa (1 +rxa) log (1 +ZX, ) 
Similar substitutions may be made elsewhere in this chapter. 
6. The bias could even be negative, but large negative values 
are unlikely as the Sales Intensity will not be high when 
there is no buying in unless ARR-r is big. 
7. The-Heip Nguyen and Bernier (1987) argued that a firm's 
systematic risk consists of two elements: one associated with 
its return on existing assets (a cash Beta) and the other 
associated with its growth opportunities (a revaluation Beta). 
This would suggest that there is a systematic return to 
shareholders correlate with current profits, but the authors 
were unable to suggest practical ways in which this might be 
estimated. 
8. The same result can be arrived at by abstracting from the 
revaluation surplus and assuming that Beta, = Betabi, Beta. =0 
and Beta, is the one period weighted average of Beta, Betabi 
and Beta., ie 
Beta, = -ýLr-Beta + 
BIBetaBI 
+ 
ExPBetae 
sss 
9. This is the definition of the Added Value Ratio employed by 
Davis and Kay in a subsequent paper I Assessing corporate 
Performance', Business Strategy Review, Summer 1990. 
147 
CHAPTER 5 
EX ANTE MEASUREMENT OF THE ECONOMIC PROFITABILITY OF A FIRM: 
MODIFIED TOBIN'S 
Introduction 
The usual rationale for employing q as a measure of a firm's 
economic profitability derives from a consideration of a 
firm's behaviour when the capital market for its securities is 
efficient in a fundamental sense and the product market for 
its goods is less than fully competitive. In this chapter, a 
slightly different approach is taken. q is derived from EP,, 
the theoretical ex ante measure based on the ratio of a firm's 
inputs to its outputs identified in Chapter 2. This approach 
does not abandon the insight provided by the conventional 
approach, but it facilitates a more objective appraisal of q's 
strengths and weaknesses and suggests other ways in which EP, 
might be estimated. one such alternative, arrived at by 
combining the Dividend Growth Model and the Capital Asset 
Pricing model, is proposed as a practical ex ante measure of a 
firm's economic profitability. it is called in this paper 
Modified Tobin's q, or modq. 
5.1 Rationale for cr as a Measure of Economic Profitability 
Whilst, as noted in Chapter 3, Salinger (1984) and Sawyer 
(1985) related q to the growth in demand, Salinger (ibid) 
related q to the elasticity of demand, and Chen, Cheng and 
Hite (1986) related q to Beta, the fundamental insight that q 
measures a firm's economic profitability is that 
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identified by Lindenberg and Ross (1981) and is broadly as 
follows. The cost of entering -a market is CO, the cost to the 
providers of the equity and loan capital of replicating their 
interest in a firm that has entered the market, ie the cost of 
re-creating the business in its existing state and potential 
(see Chapter 2). Provided the product market is competitive, 
ie there are no barriers to entry, the cost of entering will 
also equal the expected present value of future payments to 
the providers of loan and equity capital - if it were greater, 
there would be no incentive to enter and if it were less, more 
entrants would be induced to enter, depressing the return. 
According to the Fundamental Model of share value, the value 
of the firm's securities is also equal to the expected present 
value of these payments. It follows that, in a competitive 
product market, 
VO + Vb «2 P VO, 0 
(CO) (148) 
where: V. is the market value of the f irm's equity securities; 
Vb is the market value of the firm's loan capital; 
PVo, c, (C,, ) is the replication cost of the firm. 
When, however, the market is uncompetitive, ie there are 
barriers to entry, it is the cost of entering the market and 
the cost of overcoming these-barriers that equals the expected 
present value of future earnings. According to the Fundamental 
Model of share value, the value of the entered firm's 
securities remains equal to the expected present value of its 
earnings. Thus 
V. + Vb = PVO, 0 
(Co) +B (2ý49) 
where B is the present cost of overcoming barriers to entry. 
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Defining q as 
.W Vo, ok Lýo ) 
v. + v. 
it follows that 
(23) 
q=1+B (150) 
. PVO, 0 (CO) 
The additional cost, B, that must be incurred by new entrants 
enables the firm to set prices above the level applying in a 
competitive market. For a profit maximising firm, the expected 
present value of these supra-normal profits is exactly equal 
to the present cost of the barriers to entry. -Therefore 
q=1+ 
PVO, 0 (SNP) (25) 
PVO, 0 (Co) 
where SNP are the firm's supra-normal profits. Thus the extent 
to which q exceeds 1.0 signals the expected present value of 
supra-normal profits attributable to the firm's market power 
as a proportion of the replication cost of the firm. 
The above analysis, which is widely accepted in the 
literature, suggests that, provided PVO, O (CO) can be measured, q 
is an unbiased measure from the ex ante perspective of a 
firm's economic profitability. As demonstrated in Appendix 3, 
q is certainly free from the bias due to operational gearing 
which afflicts some ex post measures. The analysis does, 
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however, gloss over a number of problems. In-practice, q is 
measured as 
Ve+Vb 
BV 
(151) 
where BV is the book value of a firm, s net assets' on a net 
replacement cost basis. 
Abstracting from the prior risk that, on replication, the sunk 
investment would be lost, in a world without taxes, the 
dif f erence between PVO, O (Cc)), the replication cost of the 
business and the book value, on a net replacement cost basis, 
of the firm's net assets is, by definition, its hidden 
capital, HC, ie 
PVO, 0 (Co) = BVO +HC 
(152) 
In a world with taxes, the values and cash f lows in EP, are 
post tax, including personal taxes. As, however, returns after 
personal taxes cannot be observed, is necessary to abstract 
from personal taxes and consider cash flows after payment of 
corporation tax and before income tax. Thus PVO, O(CO) is valued 
after mainstream corporation taX2 . BV is measured before 
deducting any provision for deferred taxation. Assuming the 
trapped equity model applies and the tax shield on borrowing 
is effectively an asset of the firm, it follows that 
PVO, 0 (Co) = BV, -DT + TSB +HC (153) 
where: DT is the deferred tax liability described by Edwards, 
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Kay and Mayer, being the amount which, 'when deducted 
from BV, results in the. net replacement cost of the 
firm's net assets on a post-mainstream corporation tax 
basis; and 
TSB is the tax shield on borrowing, valued by 
discounting tax savings from borrowing at rates of 
interest applying at the pre-income tax level. 
As DT, TSB and, especially, HC are difficult in practice to 
estimate, it is usual to estimate q using equation. 152. This 
introduces a bias into q as, from equation 21 
HC+TSB-DT 
Blas %g=g -EP, _ 
PVO, 0 (Co) (154) 
EP, 1- HC+TSB-DT 
PVO, 0 (Co) 
. 
Thus when HC+TSB-DT is significant in relation to PVO, O(CO) 
there is a significant bias in q. 
5.2 Derivation of modcr 
As noted in the review of literature, Black commented that 
accountants have achieved, with their concept of profit, a 
remarkably good measure of value, but their measure of value, 
book value (BV in the above), is ineffective. Although the 
seriousness with which Black made these comments might be 
questioned, they have some force. Book values are arrived at 
by employing generally accepted accounting policies consistent 
with various fundamental accounting concepts. Even when the 
current cost convention is employed, the sum of book values is 
not intended to provide a measure of the value of the firm. 
one of the fundamental accounting concepts, that of prudence, 
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will generally result in the book value of intangible assets 
being stated at below their expected present value, 
contributing to hidden capital. Furthermore, book values do 
not reflect the tax shield on borrowing, the economic value of 
the deferred tax liability nor any value attributable to the 
possibility that sunk investment might have been abortive. The 
objective of the following section is therefore to derive from 
EP, a variant of q, called here modified Tobin's q, or Imodql, 
which employs profit and the estimated cost of capital of the 
firm rather than book value, thereby reducing or eliminating 
the distortion in q due to these shortcomings in book values. 
EP, correspond to 
E- [PVO, 0(Divi)+PVO, 0(Inti)] EP, 
PVO, 0 (Co) 
where: Divi is the dividend in year i; 
Inti is the interest in year i; and 
PVO, O (C, )) is the replication cost of the business. 
Assuming the Fundamental Model of capital market efficiency 
applies, 
V, = E- PVO, 0 (Di vi) (155) 
and 
153 
Vb 
=Ei .1 PVO, 0 (In t., ) (156) 
Substituting in equation 7 above and, for simplicity, writing 
CO for PVO, 0 (CO) 
EP, - 
V. + Vb 
CO 
(7A) 
Thus, on the assumptions made, EP, and q are the same. Next, 
however, C., which is difficult to estimate, is replaced with 
variables that can be observed. This is achieved as, follows 
Consider cash flows in the year immediately following t=0 when 
ex ante profitability is measured. Abstracting from personal 
taxation, from the definition of clean surplus profit, 
C, = C, +Pr, -Div, +Y., (158) 
where: Pr, is the clean surplus profit or 'earnings, in the 
following year; 
Div, is the gross dividend paid in that year; 
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Y, is the net proceeds from new borrowing in the 
following year; 
C. is the replication cost or 'capital employed' at the 
end of the current financial year (corresponding to 
time t=O); and 
C, is the replication cost or 'capital employed, at the 
end of the following year. 
This may be expressed as 
C, = Co + (I -P) Pri + Y, (159) 
where p is the payout ratio, defined as the ratio of gross 
dividends to clean surplus profit; 
Four points should be noted: 
i. cash flows are considered on a post corporate pre- 
personal tax basis; 
ii. as CO and C, are the replication costs of the business, 
it follows that profit Prj must be arrived at on a 
consistent basis - in practice this means charging 
depreciation on a net replacement cost basis; 
iii. C. and C, include hidden capital, deferred tax, and the 
tax shield on borrowing; and 
iv. the clean surplus profit includes any change, 6Vb, in 
the market value of borrowing in the next year. 
The net proceeds from new borrowing is related to borrowing at 
the end of the year, VbO, and at the end of the next year, Vbj, 
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by the following relationship: 
VbO + yl +8 Vb : "-- Vbl (160) 
Assuming borrowing is at market rates, 6V = 0. Therefore 
+v cl «ý Co+(' P) Prl bl-Vbo 
Note the same result may be obtained by assuming that 
borrowing is not necessarily at market rates but the clean 
surplus profit excludes gains accruing to shareholders from 
changes in the market value of debt. This alternative 
assumption may be a better representation of data encountered 
in practice. 
The rate of growth of equity share capital in the following 
yeart gl,. is, by definition: 
+gl = 
VII 
710 (162) 
where: V., is the market value of equity share capital at the 
end of the financial year; and 
V., is the market value at the end of the next year 
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The gearing ratio at t=O is BO, where: 
Bo - 
Vbo 
Veo+ VbO 
(163) 
where: Vb,, is the market value of borrowing at the end of the 
financial year. 
It is assumed that gi, Bi and p are constant in all periods 
after t=0 and equal respectively to g, B and p, the levels at 
t=0 or derived from the year ending t=O. These assumptions are 
reviewed below. It follows that: 
v 
J+g bl 
Vb, 0 
(164) 
and assuming capital markets are efficient in a fundamental 
sense 3: 
J+g - 
Pri. 
- -ci (165) P. r. CO 
Substituting these identities into (161) and rearranging: 
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Co = (1 -p) Pro 
(J+g) 
+ vbo (166) 
9 
This result is similar to the familiar substitution commonly 
employed in the Dividend Growth Model 
(I -p) ARR (167) 
where ARR is the Accounting Rate of Return, except that 
allowance is made for loan capital4. 
Substituting equation 166 into equation 7: 
EP, = 
E-I., [ PVO, 0 (DI vi) +PVO, , (In t., ) ) (168) 
(I-p) Pro ('+g) +Bbo 
9 
Assuming capital markets are efficient in a fundamental sense 
and substituting equations 154 and 155 
EP, ý-V. O+Bbo (169) 
(1 -p) Pro 
(1 +9) +Bbo 
9 
Substituting from equation 163 
Vb 0 ý' lBV 0 
(170) 
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and substituting the following definition of the Price 
Earnings ratio based on profits in the current year 
PER - 
results in 
PER +B PER 
EP, 1-B (172) 
(I-P) PER.. r+PER +B PER 
( 
PER. Z -P 
)1 
-B 
Substituting for r using the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
z= zo +Beta (r. -zo) (173) 
where: ro is the risk f ree rate; 
Beta is the equity Beta Coefficient; and 
(r. -r. ) is the risk premium. 
and re-arranging results in 
EP1 
(1 -p) (1 -B) (1 +ro +Be ta (. r, -. ro) BI-1 (174) PER(. ro+Beta(zm-ro)) -p 
159 
Each of the variables on the right hand side of the above 
equation can be observed or estimated. This side of the 
equation can therefore be used to estimate EPj. It is called in 
this paper 'Modified Tobin's q, or Imodql. Thus modq is 
defined as: 
modq 
(I -P) (1 -B) (1 +. ro +Be ta (r. -ro) 
+ B]-l (175) PER (zo +Beta (z,. -zo) ) -p 
Given the reciprocal structure of modq and the need, described 
in later chapters, to use 1/modq, rather than modq, to test 
the measure, a case could be made to use 1/modq as the measure 
of profitability. This option is not, however, taken as it 
could reduce the measure's acceptability to users familiar 
with q and the convention that profitability measures are 
directly related to profitability. 
5.3 Significance of Assumntions Employed in the Derivation 
of moda 
The Fundamental Model of share price assumes expectations to 
be homogenous, so that, in continuous time, 
0 
EO(f -Di v (t) .e dt) (176) 
where: EO (. ) is expectations at time t=0; 
r(t) is a unique discount rate; and 
g(t) is a unique expected growth rate. 
The assumption of a constant growth rate assumes that there is 
a constant g., that is the solution to 
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EOVýDivo. e('av-'('ý"'t dt) = EOV-Div(t) e--r(t: )-t dt) (177) 
00 
where Divo is the current level of dividends. 
There may well be such a solution, but it could diverge from 
what would be seen as the long term growth rate. This might be 
acute when EO (Div (t) ) has discontinuities, such as when 
statutory controls of dividends are in place'. Similar 
considerations apply to the assumptions that B and p are 
constant. 
The future levels of B and p are assumed to be indicated by 
current levels, and, in effect, growth is estimated from the 
perceived long term growth rate implied by the historic Price 
Earnings ratio, ie 
PER. r-p 
PER+p 
(178) 
In order to avoid bias in modq, these need not be the 'best, 
estimates of B, p and g available, but they should themselves 
be unbiased. In practice, better estimates may be available 
from other sources - for example, in the summary of brokers, 
estimates published each month as Earnings Guide. There will 
certainly be particular situations where current levels would 
be a poor predictors of future levels, for example when 
earnings are depressed below the long term level as a result 
of short term factors. High values of the payout ratio, p, 
might signal such situations and thereby indicate when modq 
should not be used. Another situation when modq would be 
unreliable would be when tax rates were known to be subject to 
future change. This situation arose immediately after the 1984 
Budget. There is no reason why such factors cannot be built 
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into the above analysis. When, however, such estimates are not 
available, for example when a large number of companies are 
being studied and it is impracticable to obtain information 
other than that in the accounts, the use of actual values for 
p, PER and B may introduce 'noise, but should not introduce a 
systematic bias into the estimate of modq. 
Whilst, as stated above, no explicit assumption has been made 
about how the tax shield on borrowing is valued, the 
assumption that B is constant has implications for its 
valuation. This matter is discussed in the next chapter. 
5.4 modcr and a Compared 
Like q, modq is free from 
according to the analysis 
is due to divergence from 
ratios for the firm. modq 
therefore avoids this e= 
bias due to operational gearing as, 
in the previous chapter, this bias 
the form of theoretical input-output 
was derived directly f rom EP, and 
: )r. 
The bias in q when the denominator employs the book value of 
net assets, BV, is given by equation 157. This bias is not 
present in modq where, by construction, 
BIAS % modq = 
modq-EP, 
=0 EP, 
If, however, the assumption that the current, historic levels 
for the payout ratio, p, growth rate, g implied by the 
historic Price Earnings ratio, PER, and gearing ratio, B, are 
unbiased estimates of future levels is invalid, biases will be 
introduced into modq. Furthermore, these estimates are not 
necessarily the best estimates available. It is therefore 
possible that modq has a larger random error or noise' 
associated with it than has q. 
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Unlike q, modq requires an estimate of r, the'company's risk 
adjusted cost of capital. This is arrived at using the CAPM. 
If the estimate is biased in the sense that there is a 
variable w for which 
d 
-y- EP, =0 (180) w 
and 
dx 
gt 0 (181) dw 
it follows that modq will be biased as 
_ýd iw modq 0 (182) 
Possible variables w include the assumed levels for the risk 
premium and risk free rate of return. Thus if these estimates 
are significantly different from the true levels, or if the 
CAPM itself is flawed, modq will be systematically over or 
under-stated. 
Estimation of modq requires that profits after a charge for 
the depreciation of hidden capital, are observable. As only 
the earnings after expenditure on related items can be 
observed, there is an implicit assumption that expenditure on 
hidden capital is equal to the depreciation charge accruing on 
this item. In effect, any changes in the year to the net 
replacement cost of hidden capital are ignored. In the light 
of the relatively long term nature of much hidden capital 
suggested by the literature, this assumption is not 
unreasonable. Furthermore, provided hidden capital is not 
volatile, any bias should be less than that in q when BV is 
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used to estimate C. In situations where hidden capital is 
known to have changed significantly in the period, for example 
when a competitor suddenly introduces a new technology which 
undermines that of the firm, modq would not be a reliable 
profitability measure and should be avoided. 
As profits are calculated on a clean surplus basis, modq will 
contain an erratic element due to the presence of such items 
as currency translation differences and extraordinary items. 
This creates no problem when profitability is measured as the 
average modq over a relatively long period. modq, is, however, 
like q, an ex ante measure. When expectations have changed, 
modq in earlier periods may be of limited relevance; and even 
when this is not the case, a long series of modq may simply 
not be available. In this situation, it would be preferable to 
employ some measure of sustainable earnings instead of the 
clean surplus earnings. In the empirical work which follows, 
sustainable earnings are estimated as follows: 
a. the current cost operating profit before tax and 
monetary working capital adjustment in the latest year6; 
b. (less) interest paid; 
c. (less) tax at a rate (T-tp)/(I-tp) on the 
corresponding historical cost profit after intereSt7; 
d. (plus) the holding gain on stock and fixed assets in 
the latest year. 
By employing the net replacement cost basis of valuation, it 
is implicitly assumed that net replacement costs are 
observable, or at least estimatable. Estimates can be made by 
applying an appropriate index to capital expenditure. The best 
known technique for doing this by forward iteration, in which 
errors in the earliest estimate become less significant as 
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subsequent estimates are computed. Another approach is to 
employ the information disclosed in published Current Cost 
accounts. This approach is the one used in the empirical study 
and is discussed in Chapter 7. In using either technique, it 
is, however, necessary to assume that the net replacement cost 
of the firm's net assets as a whole are equal to the sum of 
the net replacement costs of the individual assets and 
liabilities. 
A crucial assumption, not only in the derivation of modq but 
for q itself, is that the capital markets for the firm's 
shares and loan capital are efficient in the fundamental 
sense. A possible way of allowing for some limited departure 
from this form of capital market efficiency is discussed 
below. 
5.5 Modifications for Possible Inefficiency in Capital 
Markets 
if capital markets fail to reflect rational expectations about 
future cash flows, modq will fail to indicate the 
profitability of a firm'. Although the existing literature 
makes little of the point, capital market inefficiency can 
take two forms: Systematic Inefficiency and Unsystematic 
Inefficiency. Systematic Inefficiency occurs when a securities 
market is 'over-valued, as a whole in relation to the expected 
present value of, future dividends. This form of inefficiency 
would appear as an apparent over or under-valuation of a 
comprehensive index such as the FTA Industrials Group relative 
to the present value of anticipated dividends and capital 
gains. Unsystematic Inefficiency, on the other hand, would 
take the form of 'noise, associated with an individual share 
price at a particular time and could be represented as an 
error term associated with an individual share price about its 
Fundamental Value, adjusted for Systematic Inefficiency. For a 
large portfolio and for the average for an individual share 
over an extended period, such an error term would have a zero 
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value. 
Despite the evidence described in.. Chapter 3 that capital 
markets are efficient, estimates of Systematic Inefficiency 
have been made by Davies and Wadhwani (1988) and, on a regular 
basis, by County Nat West Wood Mac. The principles involved in 
such estimates are straightforward: yields on equities are 
compared with those on supposedly risk free gilt edged 
securities and the reverse yield gap is analysed in the light 
of historic returns and expectations of growth in dividends 
and inflation. Such estimates are primarily intended for 
investors seeking relatively short term investment 
opportunities by switching between equities and gilts, but 
Shillerli (1981) comparison between the Standard and Poor's 
Composite Stock Price Index and the ex-post rational price 
suggests that so-called Rational Bubbles might persist for 
years. In order to adjust modq for Systematic Inefficiency, an 
estimate over a longer time scale than that employed by Davies 
and Wadhwani and County Nat West Wood Mac is therefore called 
for. In Appendix 6a method of estimating the Systematic 
Inefficiency in UK share prices is suggested and an adapted 
version of modq (called modq*) is proposed. As noted in 
Appendix 6, the suitability of modq* as a profitability 
measure is, however, questioned as its derivation employs the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model which itself rests on an 
assumption that capital markets are efficient. 
modq can only be adapted to Unsystematic Inefficiency by 
restricting its use to portfolios or to long run averages. The 
latter approach is only suitable when the underlying 
expectations determining profitability remain relatively 
constant. In view of Utton's finding that market power can 
persist for years, this restriction would not preclude the use 
of modq to assess market power. 
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5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
While q has many advantages as. a profitability measure, 
including an absence of the bias due to operational gearing 
present in ARR, it is difficult to measure because its 
denominator, the firm's capital employed, cannot be observed. 
The usual approach is to assume that the capital employed is 
equal to the net replacement cost of the firm's net assets, 
but this approximation ignores hidden capital and taxation 
effects and thus introduces a serious bias into q. 
A modified form of Tobin's q for use as a profitability 
measure, called here 'modified Tobin's q1 or Imodql, is 
derived, in effect by combining the Dividend Growth Model and 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. In this way, the unobservable 
capital employed is eliminated and replaced with the firm's 
profit and the cost of capital. modq takes the form: 
modq 
(1 -P) (1 -B) (1 +ro +Be ta (r. -ro) + B]-l (177) 
PER (ro +Be ta (z,,, -zo) )-p 
Like q, modq depends on the assumption that capital markets 
are efficient. Two forms of inefficiency are identified: 
Systematic Inefficiency and Unsystematic Inefficiency. 
Systematic Inefficiency corresponds to the extent to which the 
market as a whole is over or under-valued relative to the 
expected present value of future dividends. A possible method 
of adapting modq to compensate for this factor is suggested. 
unsystematic Inefficiency corresponds to the noise associated 
with an individual share price. If it exists, it would be 
necessary to restrict the use of modq to portfolios or to 
averages over time. 
In Chapter 4, it was possible to evaluate ROTCE by examining 
ex post data provided by a simple corporate model. This 
approach is less suitable for a measure such as modq which 
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measures profitability ex ante. A more effective evaluation 
can be made by employing real. data incorporating the actual 
expectations of shareholders at the time. The next chapter 
describes how such tests to appraise modq were devised. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 
1. Net assets here correspond to. fixed assets plus stocks, 
debtors and prepayments, less creditors, liabilities other 
than loan capital and unpaid dividends, and provisions other 
than deferred taxation. 
2. The term 'mainstream' corporation tax is used in this paper 
to refer to the corporation tax charge net of Advance 
cc 
* 
rporation Tax (ACT), which is assumed to be fully 
recoverable against the investors' Income Tax assessment. 
3. This result could be deduced from the Dividend Growth 
Model, which is an application of the Fundamental Model of 
share price, but is more generalised. 
4. This can be illustrated by re-arranging equation 166. Thus 
Pr, (1 -p) 
- (CO - vbo) 
5. In practice this might not be the case. It is my personal 
view, based on the experience of working in HM Treasury on 
dividend controls at the time, that dividend cover concessions 
granted in 1978 rendered the dividend controls then in 
operation largely cosmetic. 
6. it would be preferable to exclude the profits of 
discontinued businesses, but these were not required by SSAP 
16 to be disclosed separately in Current Cost accounts. 
7. This is only a first order approximation as no allowance is 
taken of initial allowances, timing differences and tax 
exhaustion. As, however, a similar approximation is often used 
by financial analysts when estimating the long run tax charge, 
it is possible that there are market inefficiencies which 
would compensate for the error. 
8. q would also be affected by an absence of capital market 
efficiency, as. would the statistic ARR-r if the cost of 
capital, r, were estimated using some method, such as CAPM, 
which depends on capital market efficiency. 
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CHAPTER 6 
TESTS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER moda MEASURES PROFITABILITY 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter a modified form of Tobin's q, modq, 
was proposed as an unbiased measure of a firm's economic 
profitability. A new profitability measures can be appraised 
in two ways: 
a. by using data from a corporate model and comparing the 
new and existing measures with the theoretically 'correct' 
result indicated by the model; and 
b. by sampling the new measure using real data and 
examining whether the results are consistent with 
predictions. 
The evaluation of ROTCE in Chapter 4 used the first method. 
This method is, however, unsuitable for modq as, in building 
the model, it would be necessary to make the same assumptions 
about the relationship between market values and current cash 
flows that were made in deriving modq. The only practicable 
way of appraising modq is therefore to sample real data. 
The most straightforward way to use real sample data would be 
to compare modq with some unbiased profitability measure 
covering the same period. A test may be constructed by 
assuming that q is such a measure. This is a useful test, as 
modq might have some applications even if it were simply a 
noisy estimate of q. modq is, however, intended to eliminate 
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the bias in q due to hidden capital and taxation effects. A 
second test is therefore devised by making assumptions about 
the extent of these biases. A third test is devised by 
assuming that profitability is determined by market power and 
its appropriation by labour. 
Tests such as these using real data drawn from samples cannot 
'prove' that modq is a reliable profitability measure. They 
might, however, provide evidence that, for the sample 
selected, modq did not indicate profitability in the way 
intended and is not, therefore a credible profitability 
measure. 
6.1 Usincr Sample Data: Testing 1/modcr rather than moda 
As noted in the previous chapter, modq is preferred to its 
reciprocal in order to build on the familiarity of users with 
q and to adhere to the convention that profitability measures 
are direct, not inverse, measures. The discussion of the 
appropriate statistical methodology is deferred to the next 
chapter, but in devising the tests, it is necessary to 
recognise that, as they will be subject to statistical 
analysis, it is necessary to invert modq. This 
imposes on each 
test a structure in which independent accounting variables are 
deflated by market values. Not only does this avoid the 
undefined variables which would arise if market values were 
divided by zero accounting variables, but it conforms with the 
principle expounded by Christie (1987) that, while there are 
no natural deflators and it was difficult to generalise, 
deflation by anything other than a function of the dependent 
variable could result in mis-specification. Christie was 
referring to equity valuation models, but, as the tests 
devised here are somewhat similar in form, inversion of modq 
for testing purposes would appear to be a called for. 
6.2 Test-1: Is I/modcr -Positively correlated with 1/cr? 
The most straightforward way of evaluating modq would be to 
compare it with an unbiased measure of profitability. The 
review of the literature indicated that no such measure was 
available. Indeed, if such a measure existed, there would be 
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little need to propose new measures. In Chapter 3a new 
measure, ROTCE, was proposed, but this relates to the ex post 
profit in a single accounting period, whilst modq relates to 
the expected profit in future periods. In the absence of 
exceptionally long series of data, ROME would therefore not 
provide a suitable comparator for modq. 
As the review of literature confirms, q is, in theory, an 
unbiased measure, but, in practice, it is necessary to employ 
the net replacement cost of net tangible assets as the 
denominator. As a result, q is distorted by hidden capital and 
taxation effects. For the purposes of Test 1, these effects 
are. assumed not to be material. Inverting both q and modq so 
that the former is deflated by market value, Test 1, referred 
to as T1 later, takes the form of a test of the null 
hypothesis that 1/modq and 1/q are not significantly and 
positively correlated. 
Consideration of test methodology, including statistical 
considerations, is deferred to the next chapter. 
6.3 Test 2: Do Hidden Capital and Taxation Effects explain 
any of the difference between 1/modcr and 1/a? 
Test 1, is a useful test in that modq would have a some 
interest and application even if it were no more than a noisy 
estimate of 1/q. modq is, however, intended to overcome the 
bias in q as conventionally measured arising from hidden 
capital and taxation effects. 
The assumption in the first test that q is an unbiased measure 
of profitability is now relaxed. q is in practice measured as 
V/BV 
where: V is the market value of the firm; and 
BV is the net replacement cost of the net 
tangible assets. 
if I/modq is simply a noisy estimate of 1/q 
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I/modq = 1/q + e- 
where e- is an error term. 
Thus 
1/modq-l/q = e- 
If, on the other hand, modq measures profitability as intended 
modq = V/C 
where: C is the replication cost or 'capital' of the firm, 
such that 
C= BV + HC + TSB - DT 
where: HC is the hidden capital; 
TSB is the tax shield on borrowing; and 
DT is the deferred tax liability. 
It follows that 
1/modq - I/q = HC/V + TSB/V - DT/V + e- 
Test 2, referred to 
hypothesis that the 
unrelated to any of 
the null hypothesis 
hypothesis in T2 is 
noisy estimate of 1, 
as T2, is an examination of the null 
difference between 1/modq and I/q is 
the factors HC/V, TSB/V and DT/V. Assuming 
in Ti has not been rejected, the null 
consistent with 1/modq being simply a 
/q. 
In order to perform T2, it is necessary to devise ways of 
estimating HC/V, TSB/V and DT/V. In the next sections of this 
chapter the ways in which, in principle, this can be done are 
explained. A consideration of test methodology is deferred to 
the following chapter. 
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6.31 Estimatincr Hidden Capital 
The hidden capital of a firm,. HC, is, by definition, the 
difference between the replication cost of the business and 
the net replacement cost of its net assets and Tax Shield on 
Borrowing, less the Deferred Tax liability. Thus 
HC =C -BV -TSB +DT (156A) 
where: C is the replication cost of the business; 
BV is the net replacement cost of net assets; 
TSB is the Tax Shield on Borrowing; and 
DT is the Deferred Tax liability. 
Abstracting from any difference between the net replacement 
cost of net assets in their entirety and the sum of the net 
replacement costs of indevidual assets, and assuming that TSB 
and DT are valued in terms of their present value and present 
cost to the firm, hidden capital can be identified with the 
intangible assets represented by various types of past 
expenditure that would have to be incurred again if the firm 
were to be replicated in its entirity. The research reviewed 
in Chapter 3 identified four principal types of expenditure 
that might generate hidden capital in this way: 
a. expenditure on advertising; 
b. expenditure on R&D; 
c expenditure on creating human capital, including the 
cost of organisation; and 
d. expenditure on infrastructure including investment in 
distribution networks, computer systems and supplier 
networks. 
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In addition, investment by third parties or 'stakeholders, in 
the firm can generate hidden capital, but, as there is no way 
in which this can be estimated without considerable firm- 
specific research, the estimate of hidden capital in this 
paper is confined to that generated by these four sources. 
The hidden capital generated by the four sources above might 
be estimated by identifying the relevant expenditure incurred 
in the past and applying a policy of capitalisation, 
revaluation and depreciation on a net replacement cost basis. 
Approximations can, however, reduce the amount of data needed. 
Thus, in the case of advertising, if it is assumed that 
expenditure in previous years has grown in real terms, ie 
after indexation with a suitable cost index, at a rate g, it 
is straightforward to show by summation of an infinite 
geometric series that 
HC = 
Ady (184) 
d+g 
where: HC is the hidden capital generated by advertising; 
Adv is the current level of expenditure on advertising; 
d is the exponential rate of depreciation of this 
hidden capital; and 
g is the rate of growth of expenditure on advertising. 
Given the imperfect information available, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the rate of growth in real terms 
is zero, so that the current level of spend is the best 
estimate of the spend in previous years. If it is also assumed 
that the rate of depreciation of hidden capital generated by 
advertising is common to all firms, it follows that 
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HC = b, Adv (185) 
where b, is a coefficientý common to all firms equal to 1/d. 
This model also fits R&D where, as the review of literature 
confirms, the benefits of expenditure may be experienced only 
some years after the expenditure has been incurred. In the 
case of human capital and other investment in infrastructure 
and corporate organisation, a simple model does not emerge 
from the literature reviewed in Chapter 3. Furthermore, while 
expenditure by a firm on advertising and R&D can be observed, 
expenditure on human capital and infrastructure is difficult 
or, even impossible, to observe or estimate. It is, therefore, 
assumed that this expenditure is linearly related to the 
market value of the firm. A model of hidden capital is 
therefore proposed such that: 
HC = boV + b,.. Adv + b2. R&D + e- 
where: Adv is the current level of expenditure on advertising; 
R&D is the current level of expenditure on R&D; 
V is the market value of the firm; 
bi are unknown positive coefficients; and 
e- is an error term with zero mean. 
Account must be taken of the fact that worldwide advertising 
cannot generally be observed. As explained in the next 
chapter, Advertising in the UK (UKADV), the corresponding 
sales (UKSL) can be observed. Thus, assuming UK advertising 
intensity is representative of worldwide advertising, hidden 
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capital, deflated by V, can be estimated as 
HC/V = bo + bl. UKADV/UKSL + b2. R&: D/V 
This model represents a considerable simplification of 
reality. In the real world, the coefficients might well be 
different in different industries or vary over time. The 
former assumption could be dropped if the model was applied to 
a single industry. The latter assumption could lead to severe 
difficulties if the currently observed levels of expenditure 
on advertising and R&D is untypical of previous levels. Hidden 
capital may also have been generated independently of any 
input, for example by technological spill-over. No account is 
taken of factors, such as poor industrial relations and 
uncompetitive products, which could have a negative influence 
on hidden capital. Finally, to be useful in the work that 
follows, it is necessary for the error term, when divided by a 
suitable scalar, to have a zero mean and normal distribution. 
6.32 Estimatincr Deferred Taxation 
Edwards, Kay and Mayer identified the deferred tax liability 
of a firm with the present value of tax payments on the cash 
generated by the firm's assets. They were apparently able to 
estimate this present value, but, in the absence of a full 
explanation of their methodology, it is necessary to specify 
one. This now follows. 
It is assumed that the (current cost) book value of a firm, s 
assets is equal to the present value of the pre-tax cash flows 
generated by using those assets in the business, ie 
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BV=Ei ., (1, ru) i 
(186) 
where: BV is the book value; 
n is the remaining useful life; 
Xi is the pre-tax cash flow; and 
r,, is the firm's (ungeared) cost of capital 
This may indeed approximate valuations used in current cost 
accounts., as SSAP 16 defined 'economic value' in such terms. 
The limitations of current cost asset values disclosed in 
Current Cost accounts are, however, appreciated and the 
approximation involved in using them in this way is 
recognised. 
Consistent with the approach adopted elsewhere in the paper, ru 
is the cost of capital after mainstream corporation tax. A 
case could be made for using a pre-tax rate when discounting 
tax payments, but this would be both complicated and possibly 
tautologous. As the objective is simply to arrive at a working 
estimate of the deferred tax liability, this complication is 
avoided, and ru is used throughout, being estimated f rom the 
CAPM and the de-gearing equation: 
ru=ro+_Beta (. r, -. ro) 
1+ b 1-7)P 
(187) V 
ve I- tp 
According to Edward, Kay and Mayer's concept of deferred tax, 
amended only by employing the effective rate of mainstream 
corporation tax, the deferred tax liability, DT, is 
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T- tp En Xi _ 
WDAj IA GRC,, 
DT= 
1-tp i. 1 (1+z,, ) 1 1+z")i (1+zu)n 
1 
(188) 
where: T is the corporation tax rate; 
t is the income tax rate; 
p is the payout ratio; 
n is the remaining life of the assets; 
WDAj is the annual allowance for tax purposes in year i; 
1A is the initial allowance on the eventual replacement 
in year n; and 
GRCn is the replacement cost in year n 
Equations 185 and 187 enable the deferred tax liability for 
different classes of asset to be estimated as follows: 
(a) Assets valued on a Open Market Basis. 
There is no deferred tax liability as it can be assumed that 
the valuation takes into account this factor. 
(b) Assets valued on a Current Cost Basis when there is an 
annual allowance or initial allowance. 
it follows from equations 185 and 187 that 
DT= T- BV 
1-tp 
(189) 
This equation is appropriate for estimating the deferred tax 
liability associated with investments in associated companies 
and non-industrial buildings, provided they are not stated at 
an open market value. 
(c) Plant and machinery and some other classes of asset where 
an annual allowance is granted in perpetuity on a reducing 
balance basis. 
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Assuming such assets are held in perpetuity, -so that n is 
infinite, Equations 185 and 1B7 become 
Xi 
U) 
1 (190) 
DT= T- tp 
Xi WDA i 
J=tp 
F-i-i 
(I+Z, ), (1+. r, )il 
The presence of balancing charges for tax purposes enables the 
assumption of infinite retention to be relaxed. The annual 
allowance for plant and machinery is 
WDAi=D GRCj (1-IA) (I-D) a+i-1 (192) 
where: a is the age of the assets, assumed common for 
computational ease; 
D is the rate of annual allowance; and 
1A is the rate of initial allowance. 
GRCj rather than GRCo is chosen, despite the fact that tax 
allowances are based on historical cost, not current or 
replacement cost because, although the expectation operator 
E(. ) has been omitted, DT concerns expected tax liabilities 
and the perspective is ex-ante throughout. Thus 
BV=GRCi (1-d)' (193) 
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where d is the rate of economic depreciation. -It is assumed, 
at least as a first order approximation, that 
D=d 
Therefore BV = GRCi (1-D)8 
Substituting into equation (190) and summing the 
geometric series. 
DT = 
T- tpBV I- D 
(I -IA) (194) 
1-tp ru+D 
I 
(d) Industrial buildings. 
The annual allowance is given for a finite period on a 
straight line basis. In order to estimate this deferred tax 
liability, a different approach is needed. It is assumed that 
a replacement asset could be purchased at a cost net of tax 
equal to the book value less any initial allowance. The 
deferred tax liability is then 
1) BV(1-IA) 
DT= 
T- BV 1-IA- D(I-IA) D 
1-tp 
4ru1+. ru 
As D is small (no more than 0.04 in the period studied), a 
good approximation is 
DT= T- BV(I-IA) (196) 
1-tp 
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The above equations represent practical means of estimating 
the deferred tax liabilities associated with most classes of 
asset. There is, however, sufficient uncertainty over both the 
analysis and the effective tax rates to apply to include a 
coefficient in any estimate. Thus the deferred tax liability 
is estimated as 
DT = EDTj (197) 
where DTj are the estimates of deferred tax liability for each 
class of asset. 
6.33 Estim tinq the Tax Shield on Borrowing 
The estimation of TSB, the tax shield on borrowing, must rely 
on theory about which previous literature is not agreed. 
Various conflicting models were described in Chapter 3. A 
slightly different approach is developed below which draws on 
several of the existing models while conforming to the 
assumption made in Chapter 3 that the gearing ratio is assumed 
by investors to be sustained. 
The tax shield on borrowing is defined as the expected present 
value of the future tax savings each year, S,. Assuming, as was 
done when modq was derived, that the expectation is that the 
debt/equity ratio is sustained, ignoring again taxes on 
personal income, and assuming borrowing is at the risk free 
rate ro, the annual tax saving from cash flows in year t is: 
st ý vbro 
T- (1+9)1 (198) 
1-tp 
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Assuming the payout ratio is a measure, albeit approximate, of 
the proportion of cash flow paid out to satisfy equity 
shareholders, this saving may be-analysed into three elements: 
(1) a 'pure' equity element. This element contributes 
directly to the stockholders, return and is equal to 
P vb 'rO 
T- (1+g) t (199) 
1- tp 
As the riskiness of this element of the cash flow is the 
same as that of the returns to equity shareholders, the 
appropriate rate of discount is r, the observed cost of 
equity capital. 
(2) a 'Pure' loan element. This corresponds to 
(i -p) Vb ro 
T- tp (200) 
1-tp 
and is assumed not to grow. Its riskiness is the same as 
that of the borrowing itself, which is assumed to be at the 
risk free rate, so it is discounted at the risk free 
interest rate, ro. 
(3) a mixed element. This corresponds to 
(i -P) Vb ZO 
T- (201) 
1- tp 
183 
As this is dependent on the anticipated growth rate, it is 
held to be as risky as the. 1purel equity element and is, 
accordingly, also discounted at r, the observed cost of 
equity capital. 
Note that as borrowing is assumed to grow at rate g, the rate 
of growth of the market value of equity, the gearing ratio, B, 
will remain constant. 
The Tax shield on Borrowing is the discounted sum of the 
entire cash flow discounted at the appropriate rates r. 
TSB= 
st 
- (202) (1+. r. ) t 
Summing the three elements as geometric progressions 
TSB=Vb ro 
Tý I- 
+ (i -P) 
(-L 
+I 
)1 
(203) 
I-tp (r-g) Zo r 
The anticipated growth rate, g, is not directly observable, 
but can be replaced by the PE ratio. From the Dividend Growth 
Model: 
= 
Pri p- Pro (1 +g) p V, 0 r-g r-g 
(204) 
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where: V.. is the market value of equity. 
Pro is the clean surplus prof it in the year ended; and 
Pr, is the clean surplus profit in the next accounting 
year. 
Substituting PER = VO/PtO where PER is the Price Earnings 
ratio and rearranging: 
g= 
PER. r-p (205) 
PER+p 
Using this expression to replace g 
TSB = Vbro tp 
ý PER +p + (i -P) -L -. 
4 
(206) 
p (i +r) 
NO 
z 
As noted in Chapter 3, the theory underlying the expected 
present value of the tax shield is incomplete, and the above 
method is simply a refinement of the various methods proposed 
by prior researchers (and one that gives a result close to 
equation 49). For statistical analysis, some transformation 
may be needed to give less weight to high values, thereby 
taking some account of bankruptcy and tax exhaustion costs. 
Thus the Tax Shield is estimated as 
TSB = 
ýV ý PER +p + (1 _) 
(_L 
_ _1)1) (207) ,b 
ro 
T- 
p 
I-tp p(l+z) ro 
where T( ) is some suitable 'top slicing' transformation such 
as square root or log(l+ ). 
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6.34 Summarv of Test 2 
Test 2 is an examination of the null hypothesis that the 
difference between 1/modq and 1/q are unrelated to HC/V, TSB/V 
and DT/V. Rejection of the null hypothesis resulting from at 
least one of the explanatory variables being significant would 
be consistent with modq behaving as profitability measure that 
eliminates some of the bias present in q. Ways in which these 
dependent variables can, in principle, be estimated has been 
devised. Test methodology is considered in the next chapter. 
6.4 Test 3: Can some of the variability in I/moda be 
exiDlained bv market vower and its anDropriation bv labour? 
The first two tests employ assumptions about how q measures 
profitability and then construct testable hypotheses about the 
relationship between 1/modq and 1/q. In the third and final 
test, T3, q is set aside and the question whether modq 
measures profitability is approached directly. 
If modq functions in the way intended, 
mo qV c 
(208) 
and, assuming capital markets are efficient, 
V=C +E(PVSNP) (209) 
where: PVSNP is the present value of supra-normal 
profits; and 
E( ) signifies expectation. 
Thus 
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1=1-E (SNP) (210) 
modq .v 
The connection between supra-normal profits and market power 
is well grounded in neo-classical economics. As noted in the 
literature review, many researchers have assumed that market 
power is the sole determinant of supra-normal profits; but 
theory suggests that economies of scale could also generate 
supra-normal profits and should not be ignored. In addition, 
as Salinger recognised, labour may be able to appropriate a 
significant proportion of supra-normal profits otherwise 
generated by market power. X-inefficiency, on the other hand 
might reasonably be ignored on the grounds that it is eroded 
too quickly by competitive pressures, particularly market 
entry, to significantly affect E(PVSNP). 
Following the above analysis, it is assumed that supra-normal 
profits are attributable to: 
a. market power; 
b. (less) the appropriation of this market power by labour; 
and; 
c. other factors, including economies of scale, 
proportional to V. 
In most empirical work involving the relationship between 
market power and profitability, market concentration and 
market share are used as proxies for market power. Using such 
structural variables to provide a firm-specific estimate of 
market power to test modq would, however, be unsatisfactory 
for the following reasons: 
a. Most of the work using structural variables in this way 
has been concerned with establishing whether profitability 
and market structure are related. The absence of a 
statistically significant result could therefore be due to 
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the absence of a relationship between structural variables 
and market power rather than a failure of modq to measure 
profitability. 
b. In many of these studies, including the empirical 
research referred to in the review of literature, the 
relationship between structural variables and profitability 
has been found to be far from straightforward. 
c. As numerous reports published by the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission confirm, barriers to market entry are an 
essential condition if a firm is to translate a high market 
share or participation in concentrated markets into market 
power. The existence of such barriers can generally only be 
revealed by careful study of the particular market. 
d. Firm-level estimates of the market share of UK firms are 
either unreliable or unavailable'. 
An alternative approach is therefore adopted. The market power 
of a firm with a single product-market can 
be represented by 
the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand it experiences, 
I/edl where ed is def ined as: 
( öo) 
ed «ý - -0 ÖP~ 
where: p- is unit price; and 
Q is quantity demanded 
Thus market power is assumed to be Proportional to l/ed. The 
expected present value of supra-normal profits is then assumed 
to conform to the following linear relationship: 
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E (SNP) 
+C 
1w 
Co 1 ed - 
C2 
V (212) 
where: W is the staff costs; and 
ci are positive coefficients. 
If modq measures profitability as intended 
1=1 
-Co -Ci 
1+ 
C2 
2 
(213) 
modq ed v 
If, on the other hand, modq fails to measure profitability, a 
null hypothesis can be constructed that none of the 
variability of 1/modq can be explained by the variables 1/ed 
and W/V. 
T3 is an examination of this null hypothesis. In order that it 
may be undertaken, it is necessary to devise a way of 
estimating 1/ed, In the following sections of this chapter a 
way in which this can be done is devised. A description of 
test methodology is deferred to the next chapter. 
6.41 Estimating the Average Elasticity of Demand Experienced 
by a Firm 
The literature provides no method by which the elasticity of 
demand experienced by a firm can be estimated 2. It is 
therefore necessary, for the purposes of this study, to devise 
a method using the type of data that might be obtained, ie 
cross-sectional accounting and financial data. 
The market power of a firm operating in a single product- 
market can be represented by the reciprocal of the elasticity 
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of demand. 1/ed, experienced, where ed is def i-ned as : 
ed 
where: P- is unit price; and 
Q is quantity demanded 
A firm without market power is a price taker and experiences a 
high elasticity. A firm with market power can set prices as a 
result of a low elasticity which gives it the opportunity of 
restricting output and increasing prices. 
The definition of elasticity can be expressed in differential 
terms as 
dP- Q (211A) T-)- p ed L 
Changing price and output affects the risk to which the firm 
is exposed and hence its cost of capital. The firm with market 
power must take account of the change in its cost of capital 
when optimising its net worth. If this net worth is v, its 
market value, the situation may be illustrated as follows: 
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7 
vm 
Vc 
Q 
Qm Qc 
where: Qc is the quantity supplied in a competitive market; 
Qm is the restricted output of the firm with market 
power that maximises market value; 
Vc is the market value of the firm in the absence of 
market power; and 
Vm is the market value of the firm with market power. 
To develop this model, consider a single product firm with no 
borrowing which experiences an anticipated demand for a single 
product. As has been demonstrated, assuming capital market 
efficiency, 
modq =Z 
PER. r -p (214) 
-p) (1 +Z) 
where: V is the market value of the firm's securities; 
C is the capital employed; 
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PER is the Price Earnings ratio; 
r is the cost of capital;., and 
p is the payout ratio. 
Abstracting for simplicity from any evaluation surplus, this 
may be expressed as 
V= -c. -1 
vr 
I-T) -PI (215) I-P I+r (P'Q -EXP-BI) 
(1-tp 
3 
where Exp+BI is the total expenditure incurred . 
The firm with market power seeks to maximise V by reducing Q. 
Differentiating by Q and setting dv/dQ =o 
V. r_ 
_pj 
d(1) 
(P'. Q-EXP-BI) 1-T) dQ 1+r (1-tp 
-dV. 
r 
1- ) -P =0 (3, +'r) YO (PQ-Exp-BI) (1-tp 
I 
completing the differentiation and rearranging 
(216) 
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dr P' d(EXP+Bl) (P-. Q-Exp-BI)V do dQ dQ 
(P. Q-Exp-BI) 2 (217) 
1rV. r1d 
tp dQ 1 +. r [P'. 'Q - Exp - B-I 1-tp 
7)] c,. r o 
Substituting the definitions 
1=- 
-Q -eT, ed P dQ 
MC =d 
(Exp+Bl) 
dQ (218) 
PER v 
(P'. Q -EXP-BI) 
1-T) (1-tp 
where: ed is the elasticity of demand; 
MC is the marginal cost; and 
PER is the Price Earnings ratio. 
results in: 
PER dr I 
dr (PER.. r -P) 
PER. r- (P, - _MC) =0 
(219) 
Q 1+r dQ P. Q-EXP-BI ed 
.1 
dr/dQ may be substituted in the above equation as follows: 
From the CAPM 
r= rO + Beta(rm-rO) 
where: rO is the risk free rate; 
rm-rO is the market risk premium; and 
Beta is the beta coefficient, equal to 
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Cov(r, rm)/Var(rm), where Cov( ) signifies covariance 
and Var( )signifies variance. 
Assuming dividend irrelevance' 
r= 6V/V = 6PTP/PTP 
where PTP is the pre-tax profit = P-. Q - Exp - BI. 
The CAPM can therefore be expressed as 
Co 
8 PTP r, 
ro + 
(220) 
Var (. r. ) 
It is assumed that only proportional changes in demand, 6Q/Q 
is correlated with rm. Defining marginal cost, MC, as 
MC = 
d(Exp+BI) (221) 
dQ 
it therefore follows that 
Co ÖQ ,r 
ro + 
P-. 0 -mc. QýQ -) (rm-Z0) (222) 
P-. Q -EXP-BI Var (z, ) 
dr/dQ is now be found by differentiating the above with 
respect to Q: 
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dz coý±?; -, Z. 
) 
dQ var (r. ) (223) 
(. P-. Q-Exp-B, ')(p-+Q_yf: _d(E! KP+BI))-(p-. C)_MC. L))(p-+Q_qL d(Ex do dQ - 
p+B I 
do do 
(P-. O-EXP-BI) 
Substituting into 219 and reintroducing MC and ed where 
appropriate results in 
(P- - -f: -MC) [ (PER (r -ro) 
1 
ed 
(P-. 
Q-mc. Q 
1 
P-. Q-EXP-BI (224) 
PER. r (r-ro) 11 _Tý: -. Q-Exp-BI 1-+r 
(P-. 
Q-MC. Q P~. Q-Exp-BI) 
There are two solutions to the equation above: 
p- - mc =o ed 
and 
(225) 
11 
-)(PER Cr-. r. ) -1(. r-ro) (PER. r-p) P 
PER. r=0 (226) (P-. 
Q-MC. Q P-. Q-Exp-TI i+r -- Q-Exp-! iI- 
The second solution is not used in this analysiss. 
The first solution may be expressed as 
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1- P- -mc (227) ed p- 
This is the familiar relationship that can be derived assuming 
single period profit maximisation and ignoring the cost of 
capital. It has now been derived assuming maximisation of the 
firm's market value with cost of capital dependent on price 
and demand. The significance of the relationship is that the 
reciprocal of the elasticity of demand of a firm supplying a 
single product-market is a measure of that firm's market 
power. In the case of a multi-product firm, the reciprocal of 
the elasticity of demand may still provide some indication of 
the firm's overall market power. Marginal cost is, however, 
difficult to observe and, without an estimate, the 
relationship is of limited practical use. How marginal cost 
can be achieved is now considered. 
Two possibilities exist for estimating MC. First, it can be 
assumed that marginal cost equals average variable cost per 
unit, AVC, so that 
1- 
-P-. 
0- AVC. 
(228) 
ed P-. 0 
The right hand side is the Profit Volume ratio that, as 
explained in the next chapter, can be estimated from data in 
published accounts. While some researchers have used this 
technique6, it is unsatisfactory as in practice the average 
variable cost per unit can be significantly different from 
marginal cost. An alternative approach is, therefore, adopted. 
Using the same analysis as that in equation 222, 
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Beta P-. 0- -mc 
coý 'Q , ---) (229) -Q P-. Q -Exp7BI Var(rm) 
Within a particular market, Cov(bQ/Q, rm) is constant. It 
therefore follows that 
P- -MC -1=k Beta 
P-. 0 -Exp-BI (230) 
p ed P-. Q 
where k is a constant. Therefore 
1-k. Beta. ROS (231) 
ed 
where ROS is the return on sales. Dropping the assumption that 
there is no borrowing, ROSb, the return on sales after 
interest, is substituted. Therefore 
-L = k. Beta. ROSb (232) ed 
Assuming that marginal cost and average variable cost are 
proportional, a simple test of this model can be performed by 
checking that Beta. ROSb and PVR are significantly and 
positively correlated. 
6.42 Summarv of Test 3 
It has been shown that, if modq measures profitability as 
intended 
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1 =1 -Co -ci -L + C2 
Z 
(212) 
modq ed v 
where ci are positive coefficients. In 6.41 above it was shown 
that 
1-k. Beta. ROSb (232) 
ed 
where k is a positive constant. 
Combining these relationships: 
I= 
co +cBeta. RoSb+ c2f 
(233) 
modq v 
where cl is a negative coefficient and C2 is a positive 
coefficient. 
A null hypothesis can then be constructed that the variability 
in 1/modq is not related to Beta. ROSb or W/V. The examination 
of this hypothesis, which is consistent with modq not 
indicating profitability, forms T3. 
The precise methodology for T3 is described in the next 
chapter. 
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In view of the difficulty in constructing a corporate model 
that does not use the same assumptions employed in arriving at 
modq, the tests devised for modq use real data drawn from 
samples. The envisaged use of statistical analysis in the 
appraisal of the results prompts the use of I/modq for testing 
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purposes. 
Three tests for 1/modq are envisaged in principle, as follows: 
Is 1/modq positively correlated with 1/q? 
Do Hidden Capital and Taxation Effects explain any of the 
difference between 1/modq and 1/q? 
Can some of the variability in I/modq be explained by 
market power and its appropriation by labour? 
In order to express the second test in an operational form, it 
is necessary to devise ways of estimating hidden capital and 
taxation effects. This was achieved by drawing on the existing 
literature. In order to express the third test in an 
operational form, it is necessary to estimate a firm's market 
power. In previous research this has typically been done by 
assuming that market power can be represented by structural 
variables such as market concentration. This approach is 
rejected. Instead, a relationship not found in the existing 
literature is employed: market power, as represented by the 
reciprocal of the elasticity of demand, is shown to be 
linearly related to the product of the Beta coefficient and 
the Return on Sales. 
The operational forms of the tests are expressed as the 
following null hypotheses: 
T1: 1/modq and 1/q are not significantly and positively 
correlated. 
T2: The difference between 1/modq and 1/q is unrelated to 
UKADV/UKSL, R&D/V, DT/V and TSB/V, where: 
UKADV is the current level of expenditure on 
advertising in the UK; 
UKSL is the current level of sales in the UK; 
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R&D is the current level of expenditure on R&D; 
V is the market value of the firm; 
DT is the deferred tax liability of the firm 
estimated as 
DT = EDTj (196) 
where DTj are the estimates of deferred tax 
liability for each class of asset indicated by 
various equations; and 
TSB is the Tax Shield on Borrowing estimated as 
TSB = 
ýVbr, T-tP[ PER+P + (1-p)(-L--! 
)]) (206) 
1-tp P(l+z) ro r 
where T( ) is some suitable 'top slicing, 
transformation such as square root or log(l+ 
T3: The variability in 1/modq is unrelated to Beta. ROSb 
and W/V, where: 
Beta is the firm's equity Beta coefficient; 
ROSb is the Return on Sales af ter interest; and 
W is the salary and wage costs incurred. 
Rejection of all three null hypotheses would not 'prove' that 
modq is an effective profitability measure, but acceptance of 
any of the null hypotheses would not be consistent with modq 
measuring profitability in the way intended. 
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Test methodology and statistical considerations are described 
in the next chapter. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 
1. Comprehensive published data on market share and 
concentration in the UK is based on the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC). SIC relates to the type of goods 
produced, not the markets in which they are sold. Furthermore, 
these data are not analysed into shares of individual 
companies; and companies themselves are not required to 
disclose in their accounts the analysis of their turnover in 
terms of SIC. 
2. This position is confirmed by Black (2) and Sawyer (page 
15). There have, however, been occasional attempts to estimate 
elasticity at the firm level using serial data, eg by Baker 
and Bresnahan (1988), of a type unavailable in this study. 
3. The notation is that used previously and has been adhered 
to for reasons of consistency. In this section, however, 
Exp+BI is, in effect, a single variable representing total 
expenditure and no significance should attached to the 
distinction between the fixed element Exp and the variabýe 
element BI. 
4. This assumption was reviewed in Chapter 3. 
5. This second solution is of interest as it suggests there is 
a relationship between Beta and financial and accounting 
variables. This would enable Beta to be estimated 
independently of the correlation between the company's share 
price and the market return. Subsequent analysis using Maple 5 
to solve the differential equation suggests, however, that, 
when the condition that Beta is positive is included, no real 
solutions for Beta exist. 
6. Market power is sometimes represented in econometric work 
by Lerner's Index, comprising 
1 
P-. Q-AVC. 0 
P-. 0 
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CHAPTER 7 
METHODOLOGY USED IN THE TESTS OF mod 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, three tests of modq were described in 
outline. This chapter describes: 
i. the basic methodology employed in performing these 
tests; 
ii. the statistical criteria and software used; 
iii. the principal sources of data used; 
iv how the samples were chosen; and 
v how each of the variables was defined and estimated. 
7.1 The Basic Methodology 
The three tests of modq formulated in the previous chapter are 
expressed as tests of the following null hypotheses: 
T1: 1/modq and 1/q are not significantly and positively 
correlated. 
T2: The difference between 1/modq and 1/q is unrelated to 
UKADV/UKSL, R&D/V, DT/V and TSB/V, where: 
UKADV is the current level of expenditure on 
advertising in the UK; 
UKSL is the current level of sales in the UK; 
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R&D is the current level of expenditure on R&D; 
V is the market value of the firm; 
DT is the deferred tax liability of the firm 
estimated as 
DT =E DTj (196) 
where DTj are the estimates of deferred tax 
liability for each class of asset; and 
TSB is the Tax Shield on Borrowing estimated as 
TSB 
4V,, 
r,, T- tp 
PER+p + (206) 1-tpýp(l+r) zo 
where T( ) is some suitable 'top slicing, 
transformation such as square root or log(j+ 
T3: The variability in I/modq is unrelated to Beta. ROSb 
and W/V, where: 
Beta is the firm's equity Beta coefficient; 
ROSb is the Return on Sales af ter interest; and 
W is the salary and wage costs incurred. 
Rejection of all three null hypotheses would not 'prove' that 
modq is an effective profitability measure, but acceptance of 
any of the null hypotheses would not be consistent with modq 
measuring profitability in the way intended. 
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Provided that in each case the explanatory terms, including 
any error term, are independent of each other and normally 
distributed, and provided random samples of the terms 
involving modq are taken, and these are also normally 
distributed, the tests may be performed using the methods of 
ordinary least square (OLS) linear reg3ýession. 
It is impossible to obtain random samples of the dependent 
variable in this type of study. It is, however, a common 
failing and is assumed not to invalidate the OLS method. 
The choice of OLS regression as the basic statistical tool is 
a natural one given the structure of the tests devised. 
Alternative statistical models to OLS linear regression exist 
in the form of generalised linear models and non-linear 
regression, but OLS was preferred because: 
a. the model and the confidence tests associated with it 
are familiar and well understood; 
b. it is possible to examine the data to assess their 
suitability for OLS linear regression; and 
c. a user friendly computer package, Minitab, was available 
to perform the necessary calculations. 
There is, however, a disadvantage in using any form of 
regression or correlation technique to evaluate 1/modq. 
Regressions can be statistically significant even when the 
individual error terms are large relative to the dependent 
variables. The approach adopted is, therefore, better suited 
to evaluating I/modq as a tool for econometric research than 
it is for evaluating modq as a tool for financial analysis. In 
the former, statistical inferences can drawn despite the 
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presence of a significant error term. In the latter, the value 
attaching to a single measurement may be crucial and the 
presence of an error term, even if it has an average value of 
zero, may undermine the utility of the measure. Further 
research is needed to investigate modq's suitability in the 
latter context. 
As noted in the previous chapter, inversion of modq results in 
tests that are similar in structure to equity valuation 
models. Christie (1987) commented that, while there are no 
natural deflators in valuation studies and it was difficult to 
generalise, deflation by anything other than a function of the 
independent variable could result in mis-specification. in 
these tests, by inverting modq, V acts as the deflator for all 
the independent variables except UKADV. Christie's criterion 
is therefore largely satisfied. It should, however, be noted 
that Keenan (1970) argued that, as the great majority of the 
estimated parameters in equity valuation models are neither 
statistically significant nor stable, too much effort has been 
waisted on this type of study. Subsequent successful research 
such as that of Lindenberg and Ross, Hirschey and others 
referred to in Chapter 2 would appear to contradict this view. 
Thus, while Keenan's criticism may have some validity in 
respect of blind searches for independent variables to 
'explain, equity prices, it has less relevance to studies 
which explore such topics as the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
paradigm, the existence of hidden capital, and, as in this 
case, the performance of a profitability measure. 
Statistical tests can be applied to time series and 
cross-sectional data. Due, however,, to the reliance, explained 
below, on data published in compliance with SSAP 16, there was 
insufficient data to construct a useful time series. It would 
have been possible to analyse separately a number of cross- 
sections taken from the data of each company, treating each as 
an independent sample, but this was considered inappropriate 
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as: 
a. successive cross-sections would not result in truly 
independent sets of data; 
b. all measures of profitability perform better when 
averaged over several years and there is no reason to 
believe that modq would be exempt from this principle; 
c. the independent variables are subject to measurement 
error that would be reduced by taking averages; and 
d. the DGM could not be expected to hold in situations 
where isolated profits were earned in a single year as 
such profits would often not reflect the anticipated long 
run level of profits assumed in the DGM. 
The approach adopted was therefore to exclude from the samples 
companies for which it was not possible to construct two or 
more consecutive complete data sets. Values for the dependent 
and independent variables were then taken as the average of 
the two or more data sets derived from each cross-section. 
7.2 Statistical Criteria and Software 
The method of establishing whether the conditions for OLS were 
satisfied was inspection of data, examination of the 
correlation between independent variables, and review of plots 
of the error terms against the dependent variables. 
In T1 the correlation coefficient was calculated and assessed 
at the 95k confidence level. In T2 and T3, the F test at 95k 
confidence was chosen to test the null hypothesis in each case 
and the significance of individual coefficients were assessed 
from their t ratios, using the same 95k confidence level. The 
overall explanatory power of the model was described and 
assessed using adjusted 
R2. 
207 
The statistical software employed was Minitah, DOS 
Microcomputer Release 7. Thischoice reflected its 
availability, relatively low cost-and the training available. 
7.3 The Principal Sources of Data 
Data published in compliance with SSAP 16 were employed in all 
three tests: in T1, the denominator of q, BV, the net current 
cost of net tangible assets, was extracted from such accounts; 
and in T2 and T3, modq was calculated using the clean surplus 
profits disclosed in them. As SSAP 16 only applied to 
accounting periods starting after 1 January 1980 and, 
following a period when many companies were failing to comply, 
was withdrawn in June 1985, most companies published at most 
five sets of Current Cost accounts. As a consequence, while 
Current Cost accounts represent a unique source of data on 
current values, the period they cover is limited. 
It would have been possible to have estimated replacement 
costs from data in historical cost accounts by such techniques 
as the so-called 'standard perpetual inventory method' in 
which capital expenditure is indexed and depreciated. There 
are, however, three reasons for preferring current cost values 
disclosed in Current Cost accounts: 
a. the values disclosed were audited' and therefore 
represent reasonably objective and reliable source of 
information; 
b. the information disclosed on asset values has been 
under-utilised by other researchers; and 
c. estimates arrived at by indexing data in historical 
cost accounts are hampered by inadequate disclosure of 
information on asset disposals and deficiencies in 
representing replacement costs by indexed historical 
costs'. 
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The decision to use Current Cost accounts foreclosed any 
possibility of choosing a period of relative economic 
stability in which to study modq... The first half of the 1980's 
was a period of recession followed by economic recovery. With 
possibly swiftly changing expectations, this is not an ideal 
period in which to study an ex ante measure of profitability. 
There are, however, few periods in recent years when economic 
expectations in the UK have been as stable as those in, say, 
Germany. Further research is needed to assess whether modq can 
indicate profitability in a different economic climate to that 
of the first half of the 1980s. 
An alternative to iterative approaches for estimating the net 
current cost of a company's assets from historical cost book 
values might be provided by using a simple linear model 
similar to that used by Gray and Skerratt (1982) to predict 
current cost profits from historical cost profitS3. 
The decision to use published Current Cost accounts as a 
principal source of data necessitated the use of micro fiches 
published by Companies House as, the data were not available in 
any other form. Many of the fiches were indistinct and the 
process of transferring the data from fiche to spreadsheet was 
time consuming. This was a significant factor in the choice of 
sample size - see below. 
Historical cost accounts were used for their disclosure of 
specific items. At the commencement of the study, no suitable 
computerised database of this information was available' and, 
as the fiches needed to be accessed for the current cost data, 
this method was also used for the historical cost data. There 
were, however some advantages to be gained from this approach - 
information summarised on databases is never as complete as 
the original and contains an unquantifiable amount of 
categorisation and transcription error. 
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Other sources of data used included MEAL foradvertising 
expenditure, a variety of sources for R&D expenditure, the 
London Business School Risk Management Service for estimates 
of Beta and the Extel Handbook of Market Leaders for share 
prices. These sources and the way in which they were used are 
detailed and discussed at 7.5 below. 
7.4 Choice of Sample 
The availability of stockmarket prices, Betas and Current Cost 
accounts represent essential criteria for inclusion in the 
sample. one possibility was to select a random sample of such 
companies, but this was rejected as: 
a. T2 assumed common rates of depreciation of hidden 
capital; 
b. T3 assumed a single product-market; and 
c. a random sample would make it more difficult to obtain 
information on advertising and R&D as no industry-specific 
knowledge would be built up. 
A sample comprising all the companies comprising a sector of 
the FTA All Share Index was then considered. The 
characteristics of the sector desired were: 
a. a reasonable level of profits in the period (the models 
employed did not work with loss making companies); 
b. a wide distribution of R&D and advertising intensities; 
c. inclusion of at least a few firms thought likely, on a 
priori grounds, to possess market power; and 
d. a high degree of adherence to SSAP 16. 
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No information on Betas prior to 1 January 1985 were 
available'. FTA All Share sectors were therefore defined in 
terms of the sector constituents. at that date. Two suitable 
sectors were identified: the 23 companies comprising the 
Buildings Materials sector and the 21 companies comprising the 
Food Manufacturers sector. A single combined sample was 
created from companies defined by these sectors which provided 
the necessary data,., As two distinct industries and two 
separate markets were involved, a dummy variable was added to 
tests T2 and T3. No dummy variable was necessary for Test 1 as 
this test did not depend on an assumption that industries or 
markets were homogeneous. 
It was also necessary to define the sample in terms of the 
period covered and the cross-sections taken. As noted above, 
SSAP 16 was withdrawn in June 1985. Current Cost accounts were 
published by a diminishing number of companies for periods 
ending between 14 March 1984 and June 1985, but these were 
excluded from the samples examined as, according to Devereux 
(1988), the changes to corporation tax announced by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer on 13 March 1984 resulted in a 
massive short-term distortion of the post-tax cost of capital. 
This distortion could have impacted on T1, T2 and T3. It was 
therefore decided to take no cross-sections on or after this 
date. 
Perfect cross sections are impossible using accounting data as 
companies adopt different financial year ends. Pseudo-cross 
sections may, however, be taken by aggregating data for which 
the financial year ends fall into suitable annual bands. The 
availability of Current Cost accounts and the Chancellor's 
statement on 13 March 1984 restrict the number of annual bands 
that can be constructed. Following Barron (1986), who proposed 
that, to minimise errors due to differing accounting year 
ends, mid-June was the best cut-off date for UK companies, 
five bands covering the following accounting periods were 
taken: - 
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I January 1980 - 15 June 1980 
16 June 1980 - 15 June 1981 
16 June 1981 - 15 June 1982 
16 June 1982 - 15 June 1983 
16 June 1983 - 12 March 1984 
As explained in the next chapter, it was found that there were 
insufficient data to employ the first and last bands in 
statistical analysis. 
7.5 How the Financial Variables Were Estimated 
Despite the wide range of possibilities for defining and 
estimating many of the financial and accounting variables 
used, the existing literature provides little guidance on this 
important aspect of the work. A detailed specification of the 
various variables in T1, T2 and T3 is therefore provided 
below: 
a. 
1 (1 -P) (1 -B) (i +. ro +be ta (rm-ro) 
+B (175A) modq PER. r -p 
V/BV 
1/modq -I/q =I 
d. V= Ve + Vb. 
e. Ve is the product of the number of equity shares 
issued and their price at the balance sheet date plus the 
book value of preference shares. Share prices were read 
from semi-log charts of adjusted price in the Extel 
Handbook of Market Leaders, corrected for any adjustment 
for prior rights or scrip issues by means of a share 
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price correction factor. The share price correction 
factor is equal to 
Cash flow ner Extel 
Cash flow per share per Extel X no of shares per accounts 
In the case of volatile prices, the price at the balance 
sheet date was estimated from a straight line fitted by 
eye to the share price chart for some three months before 
and after the balance sheet date. No correction was made 
for systematic changes in share prices in this period as 
the necessary adjustments would not be material. 
f. Vb is the book value of overdrafts and borrowing, net 
of cash on deposit. Negative Vb was taken to be zero. 
g. is defined as 
Vb 
Ve+Vb 
h. Beta is the company's equity Beta coefficient and was 
taken from estimates published by the London Business 
School Risk Management Service at 1 January 1985. This 
single date for Beta was necessitated by limited access 
to LBS data, but is not a serious shortcoming as the LBS 
estimate used was based on data for the period 1 January 
1980 -I January 1985 which fits well with the period of 
the study. 
i. ro was taken to be the 3 months' Treasury Bill rate at 
the balance sheet date as per the Annual Abstract of 
statistics; 
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j. (rm-ro) is the risk premium in nominal terms (ie 
including inflation), before personal taxes. Analysts and 
researchers have generally used the longest period 
available to estimate this on the basis that the longer 
the period the smaller the standard deviation. The post- 
war volatility of the market return was, however, only 
some 35k of its pre-war level, and, as this was a 
backward-looking study of profitability in the period 
1980-1985, it was felt more appropriate to base the 
estimate on market returns in the period 1946-1985. 
According to the BZW Equity Gilt Study 1988, the 
arithmetic average return before Income Tax on UK 
equities in this period was 16.5k and the return on Gilts 
was 5.9k, indicating a risk premium of 10.6k. As, 
however, the risk free rate employed in this study was 
the Treasury Bill rate, which, according to BZW yielded 
about a half percent less than Gilts, the risk premium 
was rounded down to 10k. 
k. p, the Payout Ratio, is the ratio of gross dividends 
paid and payable in the year (net dividends per the 
accounts grossed up at the average income tax rate in the 
year) to 'clean surplus profit, for the year. p in excess 
of 1 or less than 0 is clearly invalid, but p greater 
than 0.8 was also considered invalid on the grounds that 
such high payout ratios could not be sustained and 
therefore could not be a reliable estimate of anticipated 
P. 
1. The 'clean surplus profit, was the total the following 
items disclosed in the Current Cost accounts: 
CCA operating profit for the year ended; 
holding gains and monetary working capital adjustment 
arising in the year as per the Current Cost Reserve; 
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other net income; 
the existing estimate of income tax deducted from 
dividends; less 
corporation tax at the average nominal rate for the 
year applied to the historical cost profit before tax; 
and 
net interest paid. 
m. PER, the Price Earnings Ratio, is the ratio of Ve to 
the clean surplus profit in the year ended, where both 
items were estimated as above. 
n. BV, the book value of net tangible assets, was taken 
from the. Current Cost accounts. The following liabilities 
shown in the accounts were not, however, deducted: 
(1) net dividends outstanding - while these are shown 
as liabilities in the accounts, they do not effect the 
market value of the firm unless taxation and 
signalling effects are taken into account; 
Vb as previously estimated; and 
deferred taxation as stated in the accounts. 
Intangible assets were disregarded unless they were 
completely separate from hidden capital items represented 
by the independent variables, in which case book values 
were included in BV. 
0. DT was estimated for each class of asset disclosed in 
the Current Cost accounts as follows: - 
(1) Plant and machinery. 
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DTpm = 
T- tp BV+- 
DPM(3*-IA pm) (194) T--t-p ru+Dpm 
where: BVpm is the book value of plant and machinery 
disclosed in the Current Cost accounts; 
IApm is the Annual Allowance for plant and machinery at 
the balance sheet date; 
Dpm is the annual allowance for plant and machinery; 
T is the corporation tax rate at the balance sheet 
date; 
t is the income tax rate at the balance sheet date; 
p is as previously'estimated; and 
ru is the ungeared cost of capital estimated using the 
cAPM and the ungeared Beta coefficient, all items 
being as previously estimated. 
(ii) Buildings. Only industrial buildings qualify 
for an Initial Allowance, IAIB, and Annual Allowances, 
DIBI which are given on a straight line basis. The 
book value of land in Current Cost accounts is 
generally its open market value for existing use so 
there is no deferred tax liability associated with the 
land element in the book value of land and buildings. - 
The deferred tax liability DTB associated with 
buildings is therefore, from equations 189 and 196 
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DTB = 
T- (BVNIB+BVrB(1-IAB)) (234) 
1-tp 
where: BVNI13 is the book value of non-industrial 
building per the Current Cost Accounts; and 
BVIB is the book value of industrial buildings in 
Current Cost accounts. 
This may be written in the form 
DTB = 
T- BVLB m (I+n(l-IAB))) (235) 
1-tp 1+n 
where: BVLB is the book value of land and buildings; 
m is the proportion of this value attributable 
to buildings; and 
n is the proportion of industrial buildings to 
non-industrial buildings. 
In the absence of any direct evidence in the account 
to be contrary, it was assumed that m=0.5. 
For a non-manufacturing company, it was assumed n=0. 
Following Devereux's (198611) estimate, it was assumed 
that for a manufacturing company n=0.65. 
(iii) Investment in associated companies. When 
investments in associated companies were valued at 
market value, there was assumed to be no deferred tax 
liability. When such investments were not valued at 
market value, it was assumed that the book value of 
the investment corresponded to the pre-tax cash flows 
anticipated, so that the deferred tax liability is, 
from equation 189: 
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DVASS) = T-tp BV(Ass) 
1-tp 
where BV(Ass) is the book value of the investment 
shown in the Current Cost accounts. 
Uv) Other classes of Asset. No Deferred Tax 
liability arises on other classes of asset unless book 
values correspond to anticipated pre-tax cash flows. 
In these circumstances, DT (other) was estimated as 
for plant and machinery. It should be noted that there 
is no deferred taxation liability for hidden capital 
as, in effect, 1001i Initial Allowance is available. 
p. The tax shield on borrowing, TSB, is : 
TSB =T 
ýVbro T- ( PER+p + (1 -P) 
(-L 
- -1))] (207) 1- tp p (1 +. r) ro x 
where T( ) is a suitable transformation reducing high 
values relative to lower values and all the elements are 
as previously specified. 
q. The advertising expenditure, Adv, for the year was 
taken from estimates by Media Expenditure Analysis Ltd 
(MEAL), and was found either by aggregating expenditure 
on the firm's leading brands published in Media Digest or 
from the corporate totals published annually in Campaign. 
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r. R&D was estimated from a number of sources. In 
descending order of preference they were: 
(i) Company Accounts. Munson (1987) identified only 
13 companies in the mid-1980s which disclosed R&D 
expenditure, and commented that it was likely but not 
certain that this small number included those 
companies with the highest expenditure. Following an 
amendment to SSAP 13, it has now mandatory for public 
companies, (together with certain other categories of 
no relevance here) to disclose their expenditure on 
R&D in accounts for periods commencing after 31 
December 1988. Where, as a result of the amendment of 
SSAP 13 or through voluntary disclosure, R&D 
expenditure is disclosed for subsequent periods, the 
level of expenditure in the accounting year studied is 
inferred by assuming that the ratio of R&D to turnover 
has remained constant. 
(ii) Monopolies and Merger Commission Reports. The 
Monopolies and Merger Commission have on many 
occasions disclosed the estimated R&D expenditure of 
firms dealt with in their reports. This source is used 
whenever possible. 
(iii) other Public Sources. R&D spend and/or the 
number of technically trained staff is occasionally 
referred to in the financial press, brokers, reports 
etc. This source was used when available, but only 
applied in a small number of cases. 
(iv) DTI Statistics. Business Monitor M014 provides 
1981 medium and upper and lower quartile estimates of 
company financed R&D/Sales ratios for 14 groups of 
companies classified by their principal product and 
for 56 industries. In the absence of any other 
information, the R&D expenditure was estimated either 
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by applying the most appropriate R&D/Sales ratio to 
the company's sales, given its principal business and 
overall reputation for innovation, or by classifying 
turnover to the appropriate industry. 
(v) US Patents. Patel and Pavitt (1987) argued that 
patenting by British companies in the USA is a useful 
proxy for technological activity. Their estimates of 
the number of patents registered by British companies 
in the years 1981-84 can theref9re be used to rank 
companies according to their R&D spend or to classify 
them according to its R&D intensity - high, medium or 
low - for the particular industry. Very little use was 
made of this source. 
Where it was necessary to estimate the R&D/Sales ratio, 
this was estimated for the entire period and the R&D 
spend arrived at by multiplying this by the sales in the 
period. 
In each case the variable estimated was company financed 
R&D. Government funded R&D and spillover technology was 
disregarded even though it could be argued that these 
expenditures also contribute to R&D hidden capital. 
s. Wages comprise staff costs taken from disclosures in 
the historical cost accounts. The Companies Act 1981 
required world wide staff costs including NI and pension 
elements to be disclosed for the first time. Prior to 
this, only information on UK salaries were disclosed. To 
estimate world wide salary costs in periods before the 
Companies Act 1981 applied, UK salaries were grossed up 
by the earliest available ratio of world wide salaries/UK 
salaries. In order to estimate UK staff numbers (not used 
in the final analysis) a similar technique employing 
staff numbers was used. 
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t. ROS., is ratio of clean surplus prof it to sales; 
u. Sales is the turnover disclosed in the accounts; 
v. PVR is the Profit-Volume ratio, estimated for each 
company as 
Sales - Materials and consumables 
Sales 
where Materials and Consumables represent those costs 
which, a priori, change in the short-term in proportion 
to the volume of sales. This item is occasionally 
disclosed in Value Added Statements and, following the 
Companies Act 1981, in one format of the profit and loss 
account. Where Materials and Consumables was not so 
disclosed, it was estimated by deducting Depreciation on 
Plant and Machinery and Production Wages from Cost of 
Sales. Where Production Wages was not disclosed, this 
item was estimated from the proportion of costs, net of 
distribution and administration costs, to total costs 
applied to total Wages. For periods prior to 
implementation of the Companies Act 1981, when most of 
the necessary data were not disclosed, the earliest 
estimate of PVR was used 
w. The Dummy Variable was 1 for building materials 
companies and 0 for food manufacturing companies. 
Direct entry of data extracted from micro fiche on to Lotus 
123 Spreadsheet was found to be impracticable. Data were first 
recorded manually on data collection sheets and entered into 
the Lotus 123 Spreadsheet as a separate exercise. The data 
collection sheets are illustrated at Appendix 7. The formulae 
used on the Lotus 123 Spreadsheet are listed at Appendix 8. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 
1. 
, 
Auditors were not required by the accountancy bodies to 
state an opinion on whether the Current Cost accounts showed a 
true and fair view, only that they had been 'properly 
prepared, in accordance with SSAP 16. In practice, however, 
auditors would have examined the Current Cost accounts and in 
most cases would have ensured that the accounts were not 
misleading. 
2. Bond and Devereux (1987) used analogous current costs 
values published by US corporations to examine the 
relationship between q and investment. In this context they 
concluded that these values performed no better than values 
estimated by the perpetual inventory method using historical 
cost data. This conclusion cannot, however, necessarily be 
extended to the use of q as a profitability measure. 
Consider, for example, the hypothesis that: 
CC =, HC. RPI(O) - RPI(n) 
RPI( n) 
where: CC is the current cost of a firm's fixed assets; 
HC is the historical cost of firm's fixed 
assets; 
RPI(O) is the Retail Price Index at the balance 
sheet date; 
RPI( n) is the Retail Price Index n years 
before the balance sheet date, where: 
n= Accumulated depreciation-carried forward 
Depreciation charged for the year. 
This hypothesis could be tested by examining the regression: 
ý: C = ao + a,. RPI (0) - RPI (n) + e- 
HC RPI (n) 
where: ao and al, are coefficients; and 
e- is an error term. 
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4. Micro-Extat, providing a ten year series of summarised UK 
accounting data, but excluding current cost information 
published under SSAP 16, is now available at a cost of around 
E12,000 per annum. 
5. Betas were published quarterly from April 1979 by the 
London Business School Risk Management Service, but the cost 
of acquiring these earlier data was in the order of Elooo. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS OF THE TESTS OF moda 
Introduction 
In this chapter the data collected to perform the three 
empirical tests of modq are described and the results of the 
tests are reported. The overall conclusion is that the tests 
provide no evidence that suggests that modq does not behave as 
intended. 
8.1 Data 
Using FTA Buildings Materials and Food Manufacturers sectors 
at 1 January 1985,44 companies were selected for study, as 
f ollows: 
No of 
companies 
in field 
Building materials selection 23 
Food manufacturing selection 21 
Total 44 
Potential 
No of Cross- 
sections 
115 
105 
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Cross-sections were excluded from the study if they failed to 
provide a complete set of data, or if the set of data they 
provided was isolated, ie a complete set of data could not be 
obtained from the previous or succeeding cross-section. The 
principal reasons for incomplete sets of data were: 
a. failure to comply with the disclosure requirements of 
SSAP 16; and 
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b. contravention of assumptions underlying the Dividend 
Growth Model, ie 
i. losses were reported; or 
ii. Payout Ratios were unsustainable - as described in 
the previous chapter, Payout Ratios in excess of o. 8 
were not considered sustainable. 
Applying these criteria, 136 cross-sections were rejected and 
the remaining 84 sets of data were combined into a sample of 
26, as follows: 
No of No of 
Companies Cross- 
in sample sections 
Building materials companies is 50 
Food manufacturing companies 11 34 
Total 26 84 
A sample of 26 is relatively small for an econometric study 
employing accounting and financial data; but such studies 
typically employ readily available accounting data. In this 
study, some 50 items of raw data were needed for each cross- 
section and each set of data in the final sample comprised the 
average of 3.4 cross-sections. Furthermore, before many of the 
cross-sections could be eliminated, it was first necessary to 
assemble and review the data. A considerable volume of unused 
data was therefore unavoidably gathered, both for the 18 
companies eliminated from the final sample and for cross- 
sections of the 26 remaining companies. 
8.2 Values of moda 
For the 26 companies in the sample, the following values of 
modq were found: 
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Building materials companies modq q 
Blue Circle Plc 0.77 0.45 
BPB Industries Plc 2.11 0.98 
John Carr Plc 2.42 1.08 
Henderson Group Plc (The) 0.74 0.94 
Ibstock Johnsen Plc 0.89, 0.49 
Johnston Group Plc 1.59 1.31 
Manders (Holdings) Plc 2.65 0.63 
Marley Plc 1.10 0.66 
Marshalls Halifax Plc 1.10 0.70 
Pilkington Brothers Plc 0.88 0.52 
Redland Plc 2.00 0.96 
Ruberoid Plc 1.91 0.78 
Rugby Portland Cement Plc (The) 0.81 0.44 
Tarmac Plc 1.73 1.37 
Travis & Arnold Plc 5.92 0.96 
Average for building materials companies 1.77 0.82 
Food Manufacturinq Comloanie 
Associated British Foods Pic 4.07 1.63 
Avana Group Pic 6.76 2.66 
Bibby & Sons Pic 4.71 1.61 
Cadbury Schweppes Pic 2.00 0.78 
Hazelwood Foods Pic 1.77 2.06 
JN Nichols (Vimto) Pic 1.75 1.92 
Pauls Pic 1.12 0.61 
Rowntree Mackintosh Pic 1.10 0.64 
Tate & Lyle Pic 1.14 0.51 
Unilever Pic 1.54 0.51 
United Biscuits (Holdings) Pic 1.91 1.10 
Average for food manufacturing companies 2.53 1.27 
Average for sample 2.10 1.01 
The theoretical value of modq for a firm selling in a 
competitive market is 1. The average value for the food 
manufactures was 2.53 and for the building materials companies 
was 1.77, suggesting that both industries are characterised by 
market power. This is not implausible given the market 
concentration and possible barriers to entry', but an 
alternative explanation is that the risk free rate and the 
risk premium assumed when calculating the risk adjusted cost 
of capital was too high. Further research is needed to 
establish whether modq in excess of 1 is typical of other 
sectors, including those for which market power is inherently 
implausible, and for longer periods than those considered 
here. 
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The standard deviation of modq for the entire sample was 7501, 
compared with 56% for q. The variability of modq was therefore 
somewhat greater than that of q, but, as the extra variability 
could result from an incremental information content, no 
conclusion can be drawn about the relative uncertainty or 
estimating error in each measure. 
8.3 Results of Test 1 
Test 1 was a test of the null hypothesis that 1/modq is not 
significantly and positively correlated with 1/q. The 
correlation coefficient was found to be +0.71. The hypothesise 
could therefore be rejected at the chosen 95*k confidence level 
in favour of some non zero correlation. 
Test 1 provided no evidence that, after inversion, modq was 
not at least a noisy estimate of q. About half of the 
variability of 1/modq could be explained by 1/q. Test 2, which 
concerns the possibility that modq improves on the measurement 
of profitability provided by q, could then be proceeded with. 
8.4 Results of Test 2 
Test 2 was a test of the null hypothesis that y, the 
difference between 1/modq and 1/q, is unrelated to UKADV/UKSL, 
R&D/V, DT/V and TSB/V, where: 
UKADV is UK advertising; 
UKSL is UK sales; 
R&D is research and development expenditure; 
DT is the sum of the estimates for deferred tax 
associated with each class of asset using the various 
equations in 4.32; 
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TSB is the tax shield on borrowing found from equation 
55, including a suitabl. e transformation; and 
V is the market value of the firm. 
A rather severe cube root transformation was found to be most 
conducive in the estimation of the Tax Shield using equation 
55, suggesting that financial markets attach considerable 
weight to the cost of bankruptcy when placing a value on the 
tax shield. 
A dummy variable, 1 for a building materials company and 0 for 
a food manufacturing company, was added to reflect any 
industry specific factors such as the average life of the 
hidden capital. 
Regressing on UKADV/UKSL, R&D/V, DT/V, TSB/V and the dummy 
variable resulted in the following regression equation and 
statistics: 
-0.3 +0.2 
UKAD 
-6.0 
R6D 
-1 -1 -2T + 5.1 
TSB 
-0.04Dummy UKSL vvv 
t -1.9 0.04 
t probability 
93.1%; 2.950k 
R2 (adi) 
F statistic 
F statistic probability 
-1.0 -3.0 1.9 -0.03 
67.211 99.3k 92.6k 2.1k 
39.31; 
4.24 
99. loc 
The F statistic indicated that collectively the independent 
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variables were significant, but only the coefficient of DT/V 
was significant at 95! k. Eliminating variables in succession 
until only significant variables remained, the following 
regression equation and statistics were arrived at: 
-0.3 -1.2 DT/V +5.2 TSB/V 
t -2.5 -4.1 
probability 98.0-Ov 99.9k 95.3k 
2 (adi) 44.41111; 
F statistic 11.0 
F statistic 
probability 9 9.9! k 
The above results indicate that the null hypothesis that 
difference between I/modq and 1/q is due to DT/V and TSB/V 
cannot be dismissed at the 95! k confidence level. Thus, on the 
evidence of this test, some 44k of the difference between 
1/modq and 1/q is explained by taxation effects. 
The influence of the variables UKADV/UKSL, R&D/V and the dummy 
variable on y were examined individually and collectively and 
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the residuals were examined, but no evidence'emerged that 
these variables could provide-any explanatory power. other 
variables not predicted by the model to be significant, such 
as Beta. ROSb and W/V (see below) , were tried but no significant 
explanatory power was found. 
In the case of the dummy variable, the absence of explanatory 
power not unexpected: there is no theoretical reason why the 
two industries should necessarily differ in this test. The 
finding that none of the difference between 1/modq and 1/q is 
explained by R&D and advertising intensity can be explained by 
the low levels of intensity observed: 
R&D/V 
Mean Maximum 
Value 
0.009 0.051 
UK Advertising/UK Sales 0.007 0.054 
Assuming an intangible asset life of, say, four years, the 
maximum R&D intensity observed of 0.51 would, for example, 
only increase 1/modq of 1.0 by about one percentage point to 
1.1. Given the degree of variability in modq observed and the 
unavoidable estimating error in R&D and advertising spend, 
this effect would tend to be obliterated by other influences. 
8.5 Results of Test 3 
Test 3 was a test of the null hypothesis that none of the 
variability in I/modq can be explained by market power and its 
appropriation by labour. 
As an initial test of the model for market power, the 
relationship between the Profit Volume Ratio and Beta-ROSb was 
examined. For the sample this was found to be: 
230 
Beta. ROSb = d, + d2PVR + d3Dummy 
where: Beta is the Beta Coefficient; 
ROSb is the Return on Sales af ter interest; 
PVR is the Profit Volume ratio; 
Dummy is the dummy coefficient; and 
di are coefficients where d, is expected to be positive. 
Dropping the dummy variable which was not significant at the 
95t confidence level, the following result was obtained: 
Beta. ROSb -0.0048 + 0.17 PVR 
t -0.21 3.28 
t probability 16.5-t 9 9.7! k 
F statistic 10.78 
F statistic probability 99.7t 
Assuming the Profit Volume ratio is equal to the reciprocal of 
the elasticity of demand, this result is consistent with 
Beta. ROSb being, as the analysis indicates, a linear function 
of the inverse of the elasticity of demand. Thus the use of 
Beta. ROSb as a measure of market power was proceeded with. 
Test 3 was a test of the null hypothesis that none of the 
variability in 1/modq could be significantly explained by 
Beta. ROSbI W/V and a dummy variable, where: 
W is the staff costs; and 
V is the market value of the firm. 
The dummy variable was found to be insignificant at the 95t 
confidence level and was dropped. Regressing I/modq on 
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Beta. ROSb and W/V resulted in the following regression equation 
and statistics: 
1/modq = 0.1 +4.4 Beta. ROSb +0.64 Wages/V 
t 0.69 
t probability 50.2t 
R2 (Adj) 
F statistic 
F statistic probability 
3.3 2.6 
99.71c 98.4--, o 
36.51; 
8.2 
99.8! k 
Thus the null hypothesis was rejected at the chosen 95k 
confidence level. Some 37k of the variability in 1/modq was 
explained. A number of variables not indicated by the model, 
including those used in Test 2, were examined to see if the 
provided any explanatory power, but no significant results 
were obtained. 
Although not constituted as a formal test of modq, the 
performance of 1/q in Test 3 is not without interest. The 
dummy variable was again found not to be significant at the 
95* confidence level and was again dispensed with. The 
regression estimated was then: I 
1/q = 0.51 +4.9 Beta. ROSb +0.96 W/V 
t 1.7 -2.0 -2.1 
t probability 91.4k 94.4;; 95.4;; 
R2 (Adj) 19.0! k 
F statistic 3.92 
F statistic probability 96.6t 
Thus while the relative performance of q is close to that of 
modq, the fit is slightly less good and the market power term 
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just fails the 95! k significant test. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The empirical evaluation of a profitability measure is a 
difficult task. The review of literature threw up no examples 
of it being attempted previously. 
The three tests undertaken were incapable of 'proving, that 
modq is a satisfactory profitability measure. They are tests 
that can only provide evidence that modq does not perform in 
the way predicted by the theory. working at the 95? k confidence 
level, they provide no such evidence. 
In Test 1 the null hypothesis that 1/modq is correlated with 
I/q is rejected, suggesting that modq is at least a noisy 
estimate of q. In Test 2 the null hypothesis that the 
difference between 1/modq and 1/q is unrelated to estimates of 
taxation effects is rejected. This is consistent with modq 
being free from the taxation biases present in q. In Test 3 
the null hypothesis that none of the variability in 1/modq is 
explained by terms representing the firm's market power and 
its appropriation by labour is rejected. This is consistent 
with modq indicating profitability. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 
1. Neither sub-set of the sample corresponds to a single 
homogeneous product market, but both contain companies that 
possess high market shares in specific markets, eg BPB 
Industries Plc share of the plasterboard market and Associated 
British Food's share of the sliced bread market. Potential 
barriers to entry include high transport costs associated with 
building products and branding strategies associated with food 
manufacturing. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK 
9.1 Conclusion 
Despite the importance of the matter to competition 
authorities, utility regulators and economic researchers, 
relatively little effort has expended in determining how the 
economic profitability of a firm should be measured or even 
exactly what is meant by this term. In Chapter 2, three ideal 
forms of the economic profitability of a firm were identified: 
an ex ante measure, EP,; and two ex post measures, EP2 and EP3 
EP,, and EP2 were based on the concept that the economic 
profitability of a firm is measured by the ratio of its output 
to its inputs when both are expressed in present value terms. 
EP3 was based on a different concept, the internal rate of 
return on inputs, but was shown to be a simple transformation 
of EP2 * 
The review of literature relevant to using q as a measure of a 
firm's economic profitability indicated that it could be 
biased by hidden capital and taxation effects. The literature 
on using ex post rates of return to measure a firm's economic 
profitability identified another form of bias, that due to the 
extent to which a firm buys in goods and services. This bias, 
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was identified but not convincingly explained by Davis and 
Kay. 
Differences between ARR and EP2 provide an explanation for the 
Davis and Kay bias. As no corresponding differences between q 
and EP,. arise, q should be free from this form of bias. 
A new operational ex post measure of a firm's economic 
profitability, called here the Return on Total Capital 
Employed (ROTCE) , was derived in Chapter 4 from EP2. ROTCE was 
shown to be free from the Davis and Kay bias. An operational 
form of ROTCE was derived by disaggregating Beta and was 
appraised using data from a simple corporate model. 
In Chapter 5, a new operational ex ante measure of a firm's 
economic profitability, called here Modified Tobin's q (modq), 
was derived from EP1. Compared with q, modq employs an estimate 
of the risk adjusted cost of capital, using CAPM, and the 
payout ratio in lieu of Capital Employed. This avoids the need 
to estimate hidden capital and taxation effects responsible 
for the principal biases in q. It was not deemed practicable 
to appraise modq in the same way as ROTCE using a data from a 
corporate model as many of the assumptions used to derive modq 
would have to be duplicated. An empirical study was therefore 
undertaken using real sample data. In the absence of a 
suitable unbiased profitability measure with which to compare 
modq, statistical tests were devised which incorporated 
assumptions about how q measures profitability and what are 
the underlying determinants of long run supra-normal profits. 
Whilst such statistical tests, by their nature, cannot 'prove' 
that modq is an useful measure, they are capable of providing 
evidence that modq does not perform as intended. 
The three tests devised were tests of the following null 
hypotheses: 
TI: I/modq and I/q are not significantly and positively 
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correlated. 
T2: The difference between 1/modq and 1/q is unrelated to 
UKADV/UKSL, R&D/V, DT/V and TSB/V, where: 
UKADV is the current level of expenditure on 
advertising in the UK; 
UKSL is the current level of sales in the UK; 
R&D is the current level of expenditure on R&D; 
is the market value of the firm; 
DT is the deferred tax liability of the firm; 
and 
TSB is the Tax Shield on Borrowing. 
T3: The variability in 1/modq is unrelated to Beta. ROSb 
and W/V, where: 
Beta is the firm's equity Beta coefficient; 
ROSb is the Return on Sales af ter interest; and 
W is the salary and wage costs incurred. 
T2 drew on the existing literature to devise ways of 
estimating hidden capital and taxation effects, but T3 
employed a novel way of estimating the elasticity of demand 
experienced by a firm. 
Real data drawn from a sample of companies in the buildings 
material and food manufacturing sectors was used. The R&D and 
advertising terms in T2 were not found to be significant in 
explaining the difference between 1/modq and 1/q. This may be 
due to the relatively low intensities observed. In other 
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respects, it was possible, using the OLS regression method, 
to dismiss at the 95k confidence level the null hypotheses. 
Thus the tests provide no evidence that modq does not perform 
as intended. 
9.2 Suggestions for further Work 
In deriving the theoretical measures EPj, EP2 and EP3. the 
opportunity cost which Pindyck (1988) pointed out was 
associated with sunk investment was abstracted. In deriving 
ROTCE from EP3 and in the empirical work to appraise modq, no 
allowance was made in the replication cost of the firm for the 
prior risk that the sunk investment would prove abortive. 
Further research is called for to establish whether Pindyck's 
effect is related to or the same as the abortive sunk cost 
effect and to identify practical methods of estimating them. 
one possibility is that the opportunity cost of sunk 
investment might be estimated by applying the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model to corporate cash flows. It is also 
conceivable that option pricing theory could be employed to 
estimate the prior risk of unsuccessful investment. 
Also on a theoretical level, it should be noted that ROTCE was 
conceived in pre-corporation tax terms and modq was conceived 
in post corporate, pre-personal tax terms. Effective levels of 
corporate tax were assumed to be influenced by the payout 
ratio. Alternative assumptions about tax levels could be 
employed, and further work, both empirical and theoretical, 
could be undertaken to model taxation better. modq might also 
be re-specified with an Earnings Growth model rather than a 
Dividend Growth Model. This approach might reduce the 
prominent role played by the Payout Ratio in the analysis and 
re-assert the Modigliani and Miller concept of Dividend 
Indifference in equity valuation when tax is abstracted. 
Turning to the appraisal of modq, no empirical study can, as 
noted above, 'prove' that modq is a useful and reliable 
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measure of a firm's economic profitability. More extensive 
studies using a wider range of. companies, longer and different 
periods and different explanatory-variables would, however, be 
productive. These studies could be extended to consider 
whether modq is indeed free from bias due to operational 
gearing, as the theory indicates. Such studies could now 
employ financial databases such as MicroExtat that were 
unavailable when this study was commenced. It would be 
necessary to use iterative techniques to estimate net 
replacement costs of assets from historical cost data held on 
such databases. The possibility of estimating the net 
replacement cost of net assets from historical cost values 
using regression techniques could also be explored. The 
possibility of designing tests using data from a corporate 
model might also be re-evaluated. One approach here might be 
to aggregate investments with known internal rates of return. 
In the empirical study, taxation effects 
44t of the difference between 1/modq and 
arising from advertising and R&D appears 
explaining the difference in view of the 
observed. Further work is needed to find 
difference between 1/modq and 1/q. 
explained only some 
1/q. Hidden capital 
incapable of 
low intensities 
out what causes the 
As already noted, in order to undertake T3 a method of 
estimating the average elasticity of demand experienced by a 
firm was devised. It was demonstrated that, for a particular 
product market, the reciprocal of the elasticity of demand is 
proportional to the product of the Return on Sales and the 
Beta coefficient. This conclusion, which is consistent with a 
finding of a positive and significant correlation between this 
compound variable and the Profit Volume ratio, contrasts with 
a widely held view that market power is, in general, inversely 
related to Beta. Further empirical work could be conducted to 
examine this hypothesised relationship, perhaps using 
structural variables such as market concentration and market 
entry to represent the presence of market power. 
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The bias in ARR demonstrated in Chapter 4 and the new ex post 
measure proposed, ROTCE, are important for competition 
authorities and utility regulators. Further analytical and 
empirical work is called for on ROTCE to establish whether it 
performs as intended. 
At some point in future work, modq and ROTCE should be 
employed in a joint empirical study. 
As noted in Chapter 8, the high average value for modq found 
in the companies sampled could be due to conventional over- 
estimation of the risk free return and/or the risk premium. 
Examination of modq for a large number of companies, including 
some where market power is implausible, would throw further 
light on this possibility. 
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APPENDIX 11 
POSSIBLE WAYS OF ESTIMATING 'ECONOMIC' DEPRECIATION 
Initially, a state of certainty with rational markets for 
second-hand assets but no innovation is assumed. Under these 
conditions 
xI 
(1 +R) 
and 
(2A1) BV. = 
X, r"m+' 
(l+R) -'-' 
where: RC is the replacement cost of a new asset; 
n is the life of the asset ie Xi =0 for all i>n; 
Xi is the cash flow generated by the asset - for 
algebraic simplicity, the terminal value of the asset 
is subsumed in Xn; 
R is the internal rate of return on investment in a new 
asset and, through the assumed existence of rational 
markets for second-hand assets, the internal rate of 
return on investment in a used asset; 
BVm is the (economic) book value of an asset used for Ta 
years ie its replacement cost less accumulated economic 
depreciation at rate dm, where, by definition: 
Al/l 
BVm-, -BVm 
. BV. -l 
From equation (2Al) 
X. 
-., 
Xm+2 
BVm + (l+R) (1 +R) 2 (l+R) n-m 
and 
BVm-, = 
X- 
, 
Xm'l 
** . +- 
X, 
(1 +R) (1 +R) 2 (1 +R) n-in+l 
Thus 
BV. = (1+R)BV, -, -X, 
Substituting for BV, in the definition of depreciation 
(3A1) dm = 
X, 
- BV. 
-1 
In addition, as 
Al/2 
BVO=RC 
it follows that 
'm 
Hm. 
3. 
(4AI) BV =RC 
Note from equation (3Al) that when 
X' 
BVm-, 
dm is negative. Thus, unlike accounting depreciation, 
economic depreciation charged in a period may be negative. 
Under a policy of exponential depreciation, di is constant, d, 
for all i<m. This implies that: 
(1 - d) '-' 
is constant. The necessary condition for this is that Xi grows 
at a rate 
d 
1-d 
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throughout the life of the asset. This is a precise assumption 
but not one that is generally considered before exponential 
depreciation is employed. The employment of exponential 
depreciation by researchers may therefore have more to do with 
computational simplicity than with economic reality. 
2. If assumptions that there is no uncertainty and no 
innovation are relaxed, equations (1A1) and (2A1) may be 
re-stated as follows: - 
(5AI) RCM, =1: 4r 
Et (Wi) 
"l fl+Et(R)]-' 
(6A1) BVjt=E'1'.,., 
Et (xi) 
[l+EC (R) 1 l-' 
where: RCM, is the replacement cost of a modern equivalent 
asset at time t; 
q is the life of such an asset; 
Wi is the cash flow it generates, including, for 
simplicity, any terminal value; 
Et( ) signifies expectation at time t; and 
BVmt again signifies the "economic" book value of a 
used asset at time t. 
Again, 
Al/4 
BVOC=RCt 
and 
BV('-') t-BVmt 
BV(. 
-, ) t 
where RCt signifies the replacement cost of an unused asset 
not incorporating the innovation incorporated in the modern 
equivalent asset. 
Note that, while RCMt and RCt are not the same, the former 
defines the anticipated rate of return which is required to 
specify the latter. The ex post depreciation profile (dmt, 
dm+1 t, dm+2 t etc) therefore reflects innovation: the greater 
the internal rate of return from a modern equivalent asset, 
the more severely the asset in place is written down. Results 
corresponding to equations (3A1) and (4A1) may be derived: - 
- 
Et (X) (7A1) d, t -Et (R) 
(8AI) BV,, t: =RCjr, .,., 
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The reservations expressed over the assumptions implicit in 
exponential depreciation are unaltered. 
3. A more generalised approach is possible which also allows 
for the fact that assets are depreciated in groups with 
difference ages. Dropping for simplicity the expectation 
operator and the t suffix, the 'economic' book value of a 
group of assets is given by: - 
Fn 
'i 
(9AI) BV=En, 
.,. j 
1-. j b (-i; j) (I +R) ---J 
where: BV is the 'economic' book value of a group of assets; 
I-i is the expenditure on this group of assets i years 
previously; 
R is the internal rate of return on investment in new 
modern equivalent assets; and 
is the recovery profile factor, ie the cash 
flow generated j years after El of investment i years 
Al/6 
previously. 
The generalised equation at (9A1) may be simplified by 
assuming a constant rate of growth, g, in expenditure and a 
common recovery profile such that: 
b(j) 
b(j) =0; 1 <= j <= q 
b(j) =k; q<j 
where k is a c6nstant, ie it is assumed that there is a fallow 
period of q years before a level recovery is made on the 
investment over the remaining n-q years. 
With these simplifying assumptions: 
(1 +9) -' (1 +R) BV=XokEn,.,,., ý 
where IOk is the current level of expenditure on this class of 
asset. 
Replacing the second summation with the sum of a geometric 
progression': 
IOk (I +R) [En BV= (1 +9) (1 +R) i -n-1) 
11 being a series of i-n+l terms compounded at 1/(I+r), 
with Ist term =1 
Al/7 
Rearranging: 
BV= 
IOk (1 +R) (i +g) (1+9) -'(l+k) i-n-1 R Iiizq+l 
The two summations may be replaced by the sums of geometric 
progressions. Following rearrangement: 
(10A1) BV= Ok(l+R) 
[-I( I) 
-( 
1 )"- 1 (( 1) n- 1 q_( 1 
R9 1+9 1+9 1+R 
"(I+g) 
J+g 
The current rate of expenditure, I. kI on a group of assets and 
the growth in expenditure on them, g, could be estimated from 
accounting data. The fallow period, q, and the life of the 
asset, n, could be estimated from accounting data or from 
industry-wide characteristics. The rate of return, R, might 
be estimated in the light of knowledge about 'normal' returns 
or, alternatively, from estimates of the internal rate of 
return from investment in the overall capital of the firm. 
The value of k, the constant recovery profile factor might be 
estimated a priori. Thus equation 1OA1, could be used to 
estimate the 'economic' book value of a group of assets. 
Al/8 
Appendix 2 
DOES THE TAX WEDGE EFFECT DISAPPEAR IF DEFERRED TAX IS 
ACCOUNTED FOR? 
1. Consider the case of a one-asset firm without borrowing 
whose single asset is a risk free security with a replication 
cost of k which generates income in perpetuity of y per annum 
before tax. It follows that, assuming efficient capital 
markets, the cost of capital is y/k and the market value of 
the firm, assuming an imputation tax system and all income is 
distributed, is the present value of the income received by 
shareholders, discounted at this cost of capital: - 
=k 
(1-T 
where: T is the corporation tax rate; and 
t is the income tax rate. 
If deferred tax is ignored: 
Ve- 1-T 
k 1-t 
This is the result described by King. If, however, the 
liability for deferred tax, DT, is held to be the present 
value of the tax allowances available on re-investment in the 
A2/1 
asset, ie 
DT= -L 
( T- t: ) 
=k 
T- t: ) 
y I-t 1-t 
k 
and this deferred tax liability is deducted from the 
replication cost in the denominator of q, it follows that: 
I-T 
T- t) 
1-t 
which reduces to: 
q=l 
Thus, when full distribution of profits is assumed, King's tax 
wedge effect can be ignored if the deferred tax liability is 
included in the denominator of q and is estimated in the 
manner proposed by Edwards, Kay and Mayer. 
2. If the assumption about full distribution of profits is 
relaxed, the effective rate of tax under the imputation tax 
system is: 
T- tp 
1-tp 
A2/2 
where p is the payout ratio. 
Returning to the one-asset firm model considered above, the 
market value of the firm is: 
py 1-T) 
y 
(1-tp 
where g is the rate of growth of gross dividends. 
But: 
g-(1-p) - 
Therefore the market value of the firm is: 
1-Tj 
The present value of tax allowances available on re-investment 
in the asset is: 
A2/3 
y 
which reduces to: 
T- tP) 
I- tp 
Tobin's q is therefore given by: 
q- 
kT) 
k-k ( T- tp) 
1- tp 
which reduces to 
q-1 
Thus making allowance for the effective tax rate when a 
proportion of profits is retained does not affect the original 
conclusion: when allowance for deferred tax is made in the 
manner advocated by Edwards, Kay and Mayer, King's tax wedge 
is eliminated. 
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FORMAL PROOFS CONCERNING THE B*IAS IN VARIOUS PROFITABILITY 
MEASURES DUE TO THE LEVEL OF OPERATIONAL GEARING 
HvDothesis 1 
The first hypothesis is that the Accounting Rate of Return 
(ARR) is biased by operational gearing. 
If ARR is biased by operational gearing, the rate of supra- 
normal profits represented by the difference between ARR and 
the firm's cost of capital will vary with a change in the 
level of operational gearing, other factors being held 
constant. The hypothesis may be therefore be expressed as: 
(HI) -Ji (ARR 0 dw 
where: ARR is the Accounting Rate of Return: 
r is the cost of capital; and 
w is the operational gearing. 
operational gearing is conventionally defined as 
Exp 
BI +Exp 
where: BI is variable expenditure; and 
Exp is fixed expenditure. 
This measure fails, however, to weigh expenditures, both 
revenue and capital, in present value terms; and the initial 
capital investment, which is in effect a fixed cost' as it 
does not vary with output, is ignored. Abstracting from the 
A3 1 
difference between cash flows and accounting costs, 
operational gearing, w, should. be defined as 
(3.1) w= 
Ko +PV (Exp) 
Ko + PV(BI) + PV(Exp) 
where: KO is the initial capital; and 
PV( ) is the present value operator - strictly PVO,, (. ). 
Assuming level cash flows 
PV(Exp) = Exp -L (1 -e re 
and 
PV (BI) = BI --L (I -e 
-rb') 
'rbi 
where: rbi 
is the cost of capital (discount rate) for BI; and 
re is the cost of capital (discount rate) for fixed 
expenditure. 
The condition that other factors are held constant may be 
expressed as follows: 
i. A change in operational gearing does not affect sales, 
ie 
A3 2 
(3.2) dS 
_ dw 
where S is the firm's sales; and 
ii. When operational gearing is changed, the present value 
of resources are held constant, ie 
d 
-j- (Ko + PV(BI) + PV(Exp)) =0 w 
Thus 
(3.3) Ko + PV(BI) + PV(Exp) = 
where a is a constant. 
iii. KO is determined at the commencement of the accounting 
period, 
(3.4) d Ko =0 dw 
Proof of Hvioothesis 1 
Assuming for simplicity that the revaluation surplus is zero, 
by definition 
A3 3 
ARR =S -Exp -BI Ko 
Abstracting from borrowing, the firm's cost of capital is, 
according to CAPM: 
r= ro + Beta (rm-. ro) 
From equations 139 and 140 of the main paper 
Be ta = 
S-BI Beta, 
S-BI-Exp 
so that 
(3.6) ro + 
S-BI Betas 
S-BX-Exp 
Therefore 
d (S-EXP-BI S-BI (ARR -z) -a7- -Z -- - Be ta w dw w Ko 0 2ý-BI-Exp 1) 
We now evaluate this differential. 4$ 
From equation 3.3 
BI 
Zbi 
rbl 
(a -PV(Exp) -KO) 
(1-e- ) 
A3 4 
Substituting for BI 
S-Exp- "I (a-PV(Exp) -K. ) S_ 
rbl (a-PV(Exp) -KO) 
dd 
_j_w (ARR-r) -jw Ko -ro __ rbl -Beta w S_ (a-PV(Exp) -Y. ) -Exp 
.1 
From equations 3.1 and 3.3 
(3.6) 
Ko +PV (Exp) 
a 
Differentiating with respect to w 
d (PV(Exp)) =a dw 
and 
d re 
-j- Exp = Iw_, r, 
)a (1-e 
These are the only non-zero differentials with respect to w in 
the above. Thus, completing the differentiation with respect 
to W 
d (ARR-. r) a. 
b (a. c. Be ta, (S -a. b +b. KO) 
_jw- Ko (S -a. b +b. PV(Exp) +b. Ko -c. PV(ExpT) 
A3 5 
where 
rbi 
1-e-Zbi 
and 
c 
Ze 
1-e 
The second term in the expression above includes PV(Exp) and 
therefore depends on Exp. The first term does not contain Exp. 
Therefore the expression cannot equal zero for all values of 
Exp. Therefore 
d (ARR -Z) vE 0 dw 
and the hypothesis Hl is proved. 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis is that the Return on Total Capital 
Employed (ROTCE) is not biased by operational gearing. 
The hypothesis may be expressed as: 
A3 6 
(H2) d (ROTCE -2i-w 
4 
From equation 121A of the main paper, assuming again, for 
simplicity, that Revn = 0, ROTCE-r is : 
ROTCE-. r o 
PV(S) +Koe-'rk 
Ko + PV(BI) +PV(Exp) 
The conditions are as previously expressed: 
(3.2) dS ý0 dw 
(3.3) Ko + PV(BI) + PV(Exp) =a 
where a is a constant, and 
(3.4) d Ko =0 dw 
Proof of HvDothesis 2 
Substituting equation 3.3 and replacing PV(S) with S: 
A3 7 
I-e-" +KOe 
--rk 
RO=-r = log 
rs 
) 
aI 
Differentiating with respect to w 
i-e--rs +Koe -rk 
4 
rs 
) 1-1 
d (ROTCE-. r) 
da 
From 3.2 and 3.3 
dK i-e--rs dS +e-rk 0 
ý( 
rs 
) 
dw dw 
I 
dS dK, 0=0 
dw 
Therefore 
d (ROTCE 0 -ýTw- 
and the hypothesis H2 is proved. 
Hypothesis 3 
The third hypothesis is that q is not biased by changes in the 
anticipated level of operational gearing. 
The hypothesis may be expressed as 
A3 8 
A 
(H3) ' _qq dz 
where: z is the anticipated future level of operational 
gearing, ie 
C +PV(Et) 
C +PV(Et) +PV(BIt) 
C is the firm's capital at the time of measurement; 
Et is all future fixed expenditure, both revenue and 
capital, in cash terms; 
BIt is all future variable expenditure; 
PV(. ) is the present value operator, strictly pv,,, (. ); 
and, for simplicity, abstracting from loan capital, 
Ve 
where V. is the market value of the equity of the f irm. 
The condition that other factors are held constant as z 
changes is expressed as follows: 
i. A change in z does not effect the anticipated present 
value of all future sales, PV(St) , ie 
A3 9 
A 
(3.5) d (PV(S, ) 0 -jz- 
ii. When z is changes, the anticipated present value of 
future resources expended remains constant, ie 
(3.6) C +PV(EC) +PV(BIt) = K, 
where K, is a constant. 
iii. Capital is spent and therefore does not change with 
ie 
(3.7) dC =0 dz 
Proof of Hvnothesis 3 
Assuming Capital Market Efficiency in the fundamental 
valuation sense 
Ve = PV(St) -PV(BIt) - PV(Et) 
Therefore 
q- 
PV(S. ) -PV(BIt) - PV(Et: ) 
c 
Substituting equation 3.6 
A3 10 
PV(St) -K, +C 
.c 
Differentiating with respect to z and substituting (3.6) and 
(3.7) 
dq 
dz 
Thus the hypothesis is. proved. 
A3 11 
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Appendix 6 
ESTIMATING THE SYSTEMATIC INEFFICIENCY OF UK SHARES AND 
ADJU, 5TING moda TO ACCOMMODATE THIS ESTIMATE 
Systematic Inefficiency represents the proportional 
over-valuation of the market as a whole, and at time t is 
defined as X, where 
(IA5) Ht-- (i -x) mt 
where: 
M, is the observed level of the FTA Industrials Index; 
and 
R, is the value of the FTA Industrials Index if valued 
rationally ie 
(2A5) gc--E-t-, 
E (Dt) 
(1+E(. r). ) 
where: D, is the dividend paid on the FTA Industrial 
Index in year t; 
r is the return on the FTA Industrials Index; 
and 
E( ) signifies expectation. 
A6/1 
If an expectation of constant long-term growth in dividends 
is assumed, equation 2A5 may be re-stated as 
E(D) 2ýc -i0 Et-, t l+E(g) l+E(r) 
which, after summation of the geometric progression, 
reduces to: 
(3A5) 
E(Dj) Rt--T(. 
r) -E(g) 
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model: 
WAS) E(-r) -E(r. ) +Beta (FTA) [E(. r,, ) -E(. r. ) I 
where: ro is the risk free interest rate; 
rm is the return on the comprehensive market portfolio; 
and 
Beta(FTA) is the Beta Coefficient of the FTA 
Industrials Group Index. 
Let the observed 'real yield' on the FTA Industrials Index 
by y, so that 
A6/2 
(5A-5) Y_ 
D, 
Me 
Assuming E(D, ) = D,, the equations above may be combined to 
give the systematic over-valuation of the market as a 
whole, in terms of variables which are measurable or 
estimatable in the light of long-run historical data: - 
(6A5) X-1- y 
E (ro) +Be ta (FTA) [E Cr. ) -E (ro) -E (g) 1 
Estimation is facilitated if rates of return are expressed 
in real terms. E(ro) may then be represented by the current 
yield on indexed linked stock, say 2% Treasury 1996 or 3.5% 
before issue as per Plymen; and y can be taken to be the 
, real yield' on the FTA Industrial Index as calculated by 
Plymen. Beta(FTA), the Beta Coefficient on the FTA 
Industrials Index, can be taken from data published by the 
London Business School Risk Management Service (1.02 in 
1985). The term [E(rm) - E(ro)] represents the risk premium 
in real terms on the comprehensive market portfolio and was 
estimated by Franks and Hodges (1983) to be 7.7%. Finally, 
E(g), the anticipated real, long-term rate of growth in 
dividends, can be estimated from widely held expectations 
about the real long-term rate of growth in the UK economy 
(say 2% per annum) or from the historical real growth in 
dividends (1.5% per annum in the year 1919-1969 according 
to statistics provided by Plymen). A figure of 2% per annum 
is adopted. Employing these estimates in equation 6A5, the 
systematic over-valuation of the market as a whole in the 
period 1980-84 chosen for the empirical study is: 
A6/3 
y 
RO+O. 058 
where R, is the yield on 2% Treasury Index Linked Stock 
1996, or 3.5%, as appropriate and y is the 'real yield' on 
the FTA industrials Index as calculated by Plymen. 
Using the estimation of Systematic Inefficiency above, the 
adjusted or fundamental value of the firm's equity could be 
substituted for the 'over-valued' equity to arrive at a 
modified version of q, q*, as follows: 
modq*- 
('-X) V. +Vb 
c 
If the capital gearing ratio is redefined as B*, where 
B* 
vb 
U_X) ve+ vb 
and B*, rather than B, is assumed to be held constant, the 
analysis leading to modq may be repeated to arrive at 
an expression for modq*, being modq adjusted for Systematic 
Inefficiency: 
A6/4 
(7A5) modq*- 
PE. R* r-p 
B*(PER*. r-l-r(l-p)j+(I-p)(l+r) 
where PER* is the Price Earnings ratio adjusted for 
Systematic Inefficiency, ie 
PER *- 
(i v, 
Ei 
Systematic Inefficiency contravenes an assumption underlying 
CAPM that capital markets are efficient. Use of CAPM when 
there is Systematic Inefficiency would presumably result in 
the cost of capital, r, being under-estimated, as no allowance 
would be made for the undiversifiable risk associated with 
volatility-of X, the departure of the market as a whole from 
its fundamental value. Therefore, if Systematic Inefficiency 
exists, modq* would tend to under-estimate profitability, at 
least for companies with modest capital gearing, and, if it 
did not exist, modq* would represent a corrupted form of modq. 
A6/5 
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